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ABSTRACT
My dissertation explores the relationship between intentional action and
knowledge. I argue that understanding this relationship is not only of central
importance to action theory; it is also a means to progress on questions about
the nature of knowledge, the mechanisms of oppression, and the foundations
of ethics.
The opening chapter argues for my view of the nature of intentional ac-
tion. I show that it is distinguished from nearby phenomena by an aim of
control-and that this control turns out to be Anscombean practical knowl-
edge, the special knowledge an agent can have of what she is doing, how,
and why.
The second chapter considers how my view about the knowledge-action re-
lationship differs from those advocated by 'shifty epistemologists'-theorists
who claim that what you know depends on practical factors like what's at
stake for you. I argue that my view undermines the motivation for this claim
and may debunk it.
The third chapter presents a new way of understanding epistemic injus-
tice and describes how epistemic injustice (thus understood) interacts with
action's constitutive aim of practical knowledge to cause shackling-a dis-
tinctive dilemma faced by marginalized agents that both manifests and con-
stitutes oppression.
The fourth chapter shows how my view of the nature of intentional action
entails a new kind of constitutivism about practical reason. I raise a worry
that this form of constitutivism threatens the existence and/or generality of
moral reasons before suggesting some possible ways out.
Thesis supervisor: Kieran Setiya
Title: Professor of Philosophy
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1 WHERE THERE'S A WILL,
THERE'S A WAY OF KNOWING
Consider two agents-God, and Wile E. Coyote. God is a perfect agent:
omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent. Wile E. Coyote is a mess: failing,
fallible, and at fault. This paper isn't about religion or cartoons, but it's
useful to think about both perfect and entirely imperfect agents as we get
started.
I'm going to argue for a view on which God's omnipotence is bound up with
her omniscience, and vice versa-and on which Wile E. Coyote's failures of
knowledge and action are likewise intertwined. These things follow from a
line of thought unspooled in reflecting on a famous-and contested-claim of
Anscombe's. She said that when you act intentionally, you know what you're
doing, in a special way. This isn't right (as Davidson showed), but it's onto
something important. There really is a crucial, constitutive link between
knowing and doing that explains why God's omniscience and omnipotence
go together, and why poor Wile E. is never going to catch the Road Runner.
The principle I propose says that intentional action constitutively aims at
control-and the control in question turns out to be practical knowledge, in
Anscombe's sense: the special knowledge an agent can have of what she is
doing, and how, and why.
To start, I'll review the relevant bit of Anscombe and the counterexamples
that have been taken to be fatal to her way of thinking, sketch some previous
replies on Anscombe's behalf, and explain why I think they don't quite give
us what we should want. That's 1.1-1.3. Next, I'll argue for the principle
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I call MIND CONTROL, which says that whatever else it may be, intentional
action is an exercise of agency such that something the agent has in mind is
supposed not only to match up with something that happens in the world,
but also to guide and secure that happening. I'll show that these conditions
are needed to distinguish intentional actions from nearby phenomena-mere
behaviors, things that befall agents, instances of deviant causation, etc.-
and that what they capture is the agential control that is distinctive of
intentional action. That's 1.4.
The heart of the paper is 1.5. There I'll show that MIND CONTROL turns
out to have several important upshots. First, control comes by degrees, so
what we want is a normative, rather than a necessary, condition. Second,
the securing condition means that what is required is for mind and world
to align and not as a matter of luck-and, third, that means that what is
required is knowledge. Finally, the guidance requirement tells us what the
agent must know, and the answer is that she must know what she is doing,
and why, and how. All together, this means that to say that it is constitutive
of intentional action to aim at control is to say it is constitutive of intentional
action to aim at Anscombean practical knowledge. With all that in hand,
in 1.6 I walk through the most famous Davidsonian counterexample to
Anscombe's thought, the doubtful carbon copier, and show how my view
makes good sense of the case.
Thinking about action in the way I develop in this paper doesn't just help
make Anscombe's thought less outlandish. It poses a new challenge to
views-such as, most famously, Michael Bratman's-on which intentions
are non-cognitive, distinctively practical attitudes. The challenge arises be-
cause my argument brings out a deep connection between intentional action
and knowledge that is not obviously explicable on a view that takes inten-
tions to be non-cognitive. There has been something of a stalemate between
cognitivists about intention and their opponents; I take it this paper shifts
the balance in that debate.
Finally, because the arguments of this paper weave together strands from
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action theory, epistemology, and and beyond, the resulting view has upshots
in several other areas of philosophy. I will briefly mention some of them in
1.7, though full discussion will require a great deal of further work.
1.1 ANSCOMBE'S THOUGHT
Anscombe (1963, 5-7) saw the connection between knowing and doing.
She said when you act intentionally, you know what you are doing, and in a
special way-you needn't look to see, and you needn't reason your way to
the conclusion. You know without observation or inference.1 Call this:
Anscombe's Thought: When you act intentionally, you know what you
are doing in a special way.
There is something intuitive here; we can build up. First, it seems right to
say that if you are utterly convinced that you are not #-ing, then you cannot
be 0-ing intentionally. 2 Second, as Anscombe explains, it also seems right
to say that one is not doing intentionally what one is simply unaware that
one is doing.
She invites us to consider a test: if you ask me why I am typing so loudly,
and I reply (truthfully) that I was not aware that I was doing so, then my
typing loudly was not intentional. 3 On the other hand, if you ask me why I
am typing, I will reply that I am writing a paper: my typing is intentional,
even if my typing loudly is not. To answer the 'why?' question is to accept
that the action about which the question is asked is intentional under the
description used in the question, and to give a reason for which the action
is done; to say instead that one is unaware of #-ing under some description
1. See Anscombe 1963, e.g. 13-15, 49-50. Setiya (2007, 24; 2008; 2011) emphasizes the
bar on inference, also citing Hampshire (1959, 70).
2. Setiya (2008) makes this point.
3. Anscombe 1963, 9.
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is to refuse application of the question, and thereby indicate that the action
is not intentional under that description. 4
This, then, is the kind of knowledge Anscombe says an agent has of what
she is doing: she knows that she is #-ing under the description used in the
'why?' question, and she has an answer to the 'why?' question, which is
her reason. Together, these parts enable her answer. As Anscombe (1963,
9) says, the sense of 'why?' at work in the test "is of course that in which
the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting."
What kind of things might one offer as a reason for acting in this way?
There are a few basic types. Again, suppose you ask me why I am (still,
doggedly, but hopefully not quite so loudly) typing. I might reply in any of
the following ways:
(1) I'm writing Chapter 1.
(2) In order to finish this draft.
(3) My deadline is tomorrow.
(4) I want to finish before teatime.
These are paradigmatic positive answers to the 'Why?' question, and so
mark my action as intentional. Note their variety. One says that my typing
(partly) constitutes another action; one points to an aim I have; one asserts
a fact about my circumstances; one cites a desire of mine. All these kinds
of things, and more, can be reasons in the sense Anscombe is after.
On the other hand, there are some rather different kinds of reply I might
have offered instead:
(4) No particular reason.
4. Anscombe 1963, 11.
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(5) I wasn't aware I was doing that.5
(6) I seem to be having a curiously elaborate spasm.
Anscombe says that (4) still counts as the kind of reply that indicates in-
tentional action, even though it is a denial that there is a reason for what
you're doing.6 This is a somewhat odd kind of case, and Davidson (2001,
6) and others have disagreed with Anscombe about the possibility of acting
intentionally for no particular reason. But for her, intentional action and
action performed for reasons are not equivalent. While actions performed
for reasons will be intentional, the reverse can fail to be the case. We can
get a sense of why Anscombe thinks so, and thus groups (4) with (1)-(3),
by contrasting (4) with (5).7
If, when you're asked why you're #-ing, you say that you have no reason,
you are still accepting that the question is apt. But if you say that you
weren't aware of the O-ing, you are refusing application of the question.
That's the case in (5), and for Anscombe a (5) kind of answer marks actions
that are not intentional (or, at least, descriptions under which an action is
not intentional).
What about (6)? It looks like a positive answer, but a spasm is exactly the
kind of thing that we want to class as unintentional. I won't recount all
of Anscombe's rather complex discussion of this kind of case here; I'll just
sketch the additional feature she adds to her account in order to deal with
it.
When I give an answer like (6), I am able to answer the question; I know that
I am q-ing (typing) because p (I am having a curiously elaborate spasm). So
5. Though obviously in the case of typing this would require some explaining!
6. See her 17.
7. In what follows, I'll leave open the possibility of intentional action for no particular
reason.
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structurally, this looks right, and it seems less strange in some ways than (5).
But if Anscombe is committed to spasms' counting as intentional actions,
her account is a non-starter-and nothing she has said so far gives her the
resources to bar spasms from the class of intentional actions.
And so Anscombe (1963, 8-9) asks that we notice a further distinction.
Suppose I do know what I'm doing in (6) as well as (1)-(4). Still, I don't
seem to know in the same way. In the spasm case, I as it were find myself
typing; we might say that I infer the spasm from observing my movements
and perhaps noting the lack of the kind of answer given in (1)-(4). As
Anscombe puts it, I require (empirical) evidence for (6), but in (1)-(4) I
know what I am doing without observation (or inference).
There is still much that is puzzling about this picture. In what follows,
I will address some worries, offer some clarifications, and ultimately argue
for an amendment. For now, I will merely summarize. Knowledge without
observation or inference is necessary (though not sufficient) for intentional
action, according to Anscombe. When an action is intentional, she says,
the 'why?' question is given application; the ability to answer the question
involves the agent's knowing what she is doing in a special way, viz., without
observation or inference. Thus intentional action has essentially to do with
knowledge. There is more to say-in particular, about the distinctively
practical nature of this knowledge-but this rough gloss should suffice for
our purposes at this point.
1.2 COUNTEREXAMPLES
Here's a problem, though: Anscombe's thought, as stated, is just false.
It seems that I can, for example, / intentionally, believe that I am O-ing,
but fail to know it, even if I will succeed. Suppose I need to get to class by
2 p.m. I look at my watch, and it says 1:47, so I pick up my things and walk
out the door. If you ask me what I'm doing and why, I'll say I'm heading to
class because it's time to go. But if my watch stopped at 1:47 a.m., and it's
just a fluke that when I looked at it it was in fact 1:47 p.m., we can think
14
of this as a case where I believe, but don't know, that I'm leaving on time
to go to class, because I'm Gettiered-and yet it certainly seems that I will
have left for class on time intentionally.
What's more, as Davidson (2001, 91-92) points out, it is perfectly possible to
act intentionally without even believing that one is doing what one intends-
and so without knowing that one is doing it, even if one succeeds. He
describes someone trying to make ten carbon copies at once (writing heavily,
pressing down hard on the stack of paper and carbons) while not at all
confident of the outcome, indeed, in a state of extreme doubt that he is
succeeding. It may be that the writer will in fact succeed in making ten
copies; if so, he will have done so intentionally, yet without knowing or
believing himself to be doing it. This kind of case has been widely thought
to pose a devastating challenge to Anscombe's point.8
If one can fail even to believe that one is #-ing, and yet still end up #-
ing intentionally, it is tempting to think there is no significant connection
between intending and knowing and doing after all; Anscombe's thought
seems on the brink of death by counterexample. Is there any hope?
1.3 SAVING THE ANSCOMBEAN THOUGHT: PREVIOUS PROPOSALS
A few people have thought so. The two main efforts to save Anscombe's
thought have come from Setiya and Thompson; I'll start with Thomp-
son.
On Thompson's (2008, 2011) way of thinking, the counterexamples basically
aren't counterexamples at all: because we properly describe intentional ac-
tions via the progressive, the weakness of that form means there is no great
obstacle to knowing what one is doing. He is right about the progressive-it
is certainly true that I am writing this paper at this moment, even if I will
never finish it. And we might think I will still be writing this paper when
8. Though see below.
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I am asleep tonight, since I will neither have finished nor have abandoned
the task. It doesn't matter that I may never succeed in having #-ed: it can
be true to say of me that I am writing this paper even if a moment from
now my laptop and I will be crushed by an asteroid, and so it will never be
the case that I have written it. That is what it means for the progressive to
be weak; it carries no implication of success. Pushing that thought further,
Thompson (2008) says that in fact as soon as I form the intention to #, I am
what he calls IMP to 0, where being IMP to # is just to be, in perhaps the
thinnest way possible, in the process of #-ing. So there is a sense in which,
as he sees it, for me to intend to #, even if I have as yet taken no steps,
is for me to be, already, q-ing.9 Thus if you and I are in the grocery store
on a trip in which you will soon accidentally take skim milk from the shelf,
instead of the whole milk that is on the list, you are nonetheless buying the
items on the list, because that is what you intend, even if it will not be the
case that you have done so when we are through. 10
Thompson (2011, 209) emphasizes the idea that practical knowledge is self-
knowledge, like one's knowledge that one is in pain:
My thoughts and pains are matters for self-consciousness, only
as long as I have them, as long as they are present. It is the
same with practical knowledge, and thus since the present in
this case must be imperfective, there is practical knowledge only
when the thing is precisely NOT done, not PAST; there is more
to come, something thing is missing, and the H-bomb may hit
before it does. My so-called knowledge of my intentional action
in truth exists only and precisely when there is no action, but
only something I am doing.
9. The strength of this claim varies between his (2008) and his (2011).
10. It even looks like on Thompson's view you can perhaps be buying three bottles of
invisibility potion, if that is what you have sincerely set out to do, until the moment
you give up on doing so.
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If Thompson is right, then knowing what one is doing is much easier than we
might have supposed, because intending is sufficient for being in progress,
and so intending is sufficient for doing. When we worry about cases of
picking up the wrong carton in the dairy aisle, or failing to bring our doings
to fruition in general, we are in some sense changing the subject.
So far, I am inclined to think this raises as many questions as it answers. But
since Thompson (2011, 209-10) addresses the carbon copier case specifically,
it may help to consider what he says about it. Thompson reasonably notes
that there is something peculiar about Davidson's version of the case: in such
a scenario one would naturally check after a few strokes to see if the marks
were making it all the way to the bottom. Thompson says that therefore we
need to distinguish a case that proceeds in this more natural way, with the
copy-maker checking as he goes, splitting the pile and doing more passes as
needed, from a one-off, no-checking version like Davidson's.
Thompson says that in the more natural, checking-as-he-goes scenario, the
carbon copier knows he is making ten copies, all along. In the one-off, no-
checking version, he doesn't know, and so it isn't actually right, Thompson
says, to say that if he succeeds, he has made his ten copies intentionally.
The one-off copier's copy-making is like buying a lottery ticket, and in both
cases lucky success does not count as intentional. As Gibbons (2001, 587-88)
says:
Consider the following three lottery stories. In the first, Cindy
buys a lottery ticket, knowing her chances are a million to one,
and she wins. In this case, with a fair lottery, Cindy's winning is
too accidental, or too lucky to count as intentional. In the second
case, Cindy mistakenly believes someone rigged the lottery in her
favor. She believes, on the basis of this, that if she buys a ticket,
she will win. She buys the ticket and wins. So her belief about
winning is true. She even has a justified true belief. But her
winning is just as accidental and just as lucky as it was in the
first case. So her winning is not intentional. What is missing? It
looks like knowledge. In the third case, Cindy knows the lottery
is rigged and knows that if she buys a ticket she will win. In this
17
case, Cindy intentionally wins the lottery.
In what follows, I will have a good deal to say about the relationship between
luck, intentional action, and practical knowledge. (I will not endorse the line
Gibbons pushes above, but my view will make it clear why he is tempted
to think that way.) But for now, I want to note a couple of worries that
have been voiced about Thompson's view. First, Thompson's view does not
yield especially plausible results in cases of intentions for the future, which
is desirable if we want a unified account of intention (as Thompson says he
does): suppose we grant that I can be, and can know that I am, writing this
paper, although I will never have written it, because of an asteroid strike;
it seems much less plausible to say that upon forming the intention to, say,
stand perfectly still at 6:14 p.m. tomorrow, I both am doing so and know
it." Second, the stark bifurcation of Thompson's account of the carbon
copier case can seem unsatisfying.
Those are standard worries. But what I want to focus on is something else:
In essence, Thompson's way of vindicating Anscombe's thought amounts to
trivializing it. Consider it from the agent's point of view. Thompson says
that she knows what she's doing, even in the problem cases, because what
she is doing is what she intends, even if she will never have done what she
intends. But why might an agent want to know what she is doing, on this
way of thinking?
When we ask why an agent would be interested in knowing that (or whether)
she is #-ing, the natural thought is that she is interested in knowing that she
is on her way to successfully having #-ed, but that is precisely what is ruled
out by Thompson's picture. Beyond that, if we go Thompson's way there
is also nothing an agent can do with her knowledge of what she is doing
that she can't do with her knowledge of what she intends. After all, if what
the agent is doing and what she intends can come apart, then knowledge of
11. cf Setiya (2011).
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the former can combine with knowledge of the latter to guide action: cueing
steps, enabling course corrections when things go awry. But if they march in
lockstep, this is impossible. If we go Thompson's way, practical knowledge
is just a byproduct, a spandrel.
It could of course be true that practical knowledge is a spandrel. But this
would, I think, be surprising news to Anscombe, who made it central to
her account-which is to say that I don't think Anscombe herself would be
delighted at this rescue. 12 And while we needn't take fidelity to Anscombe
as our mission, it seems to me that the particular way that Thompson's
picture violates the spirit of her view really is worrying, in that it seems
to rob us of a resource that we had in hand before we began. We started
by thinking practical knowledge might be rare, but valuable when had (and
theoretically useful); Thompson leaves us with truckloads of the stuff, along
with the sad news that it is worthless.
I want to say a bit more about this objection, but first I should get Setiya's
very different picture on the table, because it will turn out that my objections
to the two views are symmetrical.
Where Thompson saves the knowledge condition by weakening the content
that must be known, Setiya instead weakens the attitude: Roughly, he thinks
that if an agent is O-ing intentionally, she is exercising a capacity to know
what she is doing in Anscombe's special way, although on a particular occa-
sion she may merely believe, or she may fail to believe yet be more confident
than she otherwise would be, or have some other, weaker but still cognitive
attitude in the neighborhood.' 3
12. In fact Anscombe said (in her 29) that "to say that I really 'do' in the intentional
sense whatever I think I am doing" is a "false avenue of escape."
13. This way of putting the point-in terms of the exercise of a capacity-is found in,
e.g., Setiya 2016 (9-12); see also see also his 2011, 2012. For the original version and
various refinements that lead to this point, see his 2007, 2008, 2009, etc.
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So, unlike Thompson, Setiya does take the counterexamples to be counterex-
amples. But he invites us to notice that there are a range of possibilities
compatible with the exercise of this capacity to know. For starters, the
carbon copier and the other problem cases presented involve quite complex
actions-and Setiya (2007) suggests that while the carbon copy maker (for
example) does not believe he is making ten good copies (but only that he
is trying to do so), he believes and even knows that he is doing some of
the more basic constituent actions: things like writing heavily, and pressing
down hard. Therefore, Setiya (2007, 26) initially proposes a condition that
captures this idea:
Setiya's BELIEF: When you are acting intentionally, there must be some-
thing you are doing intentionally, not merely trying to do, in the belief
that you are doing it.
The 'not merely trying to do' condition means that the carbon copier's belief
(even knowledge) that he is trying to make ten copies is not enough for his
making ten copies to count as intentional; he must be doing, and believe he
is doing, the writing heavily and the pressing down hard.
This proposal is not far from something Davidson concedes: as Setiya (2011,
25) notes, Davidson (2001, 50) acknowledges that "Action does require that
what the agent does is intentional under some description, and this in turn
requires, I think, that what the agent does is known to him under some
description" (emphasis added). Unfortunately, it is not yet a solution. Setiya
himself (2011, 172) offers a Davidson-style counterexample:
Suppose that, as I recover from paralysis, my hopes are modest.
I think that I might be able to clench my fist, without being sure.
When I try to do so, I succeed: I clench my fist intentionally.
Here we have a lack of belief coupled with successful intentional action, as
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in the carbon copier case, but the action in question is a basic action.1 4
There is no constituent part available to satisfy BELIEF. And Setiya offers
other versions: for example, I might be not recovering from paralysis, but
merely anasthetized, with my hand behind my back. To handle this kind
of case, Setiya (2008, 2009, 2012) revises his principle, taking advantage of
the machinery of partial belief:
Setiya's BELIEF*: If you are O-ing intentionally, you believe that you are
#-ing, or you are more confident of this than you would otherwise be,
or else you are O-ing by doing other things for which that condition
holds.
The thought is that even in the paralysis or anaesthesia cases, you will at least
be, in some perhaps negligible way, more confident that you are clenching
your fist as you (in fact, it turns out) do so intentionally than you would
otherwise be. This is a much weaker requirement than Anscombe's thought,
but it preserves the cognitive flavor of intention while doing a much better
job on the extensional questions.
Even this very qualified principle is controversial. For one thing, what about
cases where what I intend to do is breathe normally? It seems plausible that
I should be less confident that I am breathing normally when I am trying
to do so intentionally than when I let my autonomic system take care of
it.15 Because specifying any particular necessary attitude faces challenges
like this, Setiya (2012, 18) has come to prefer the 'exercise of a capacity
talk.' As he says:
The exercise of this capacity [for practical knowledge] interacts
with evidence of other kinds and may affect one's degree of con-
fidence without sufficing for knowledge or belief. That is what
14. Though see Thompson (2008) against the possibility of basic action.
15. The case is Setiya's own, from his (2009) reply to Paul; see p. 130.
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happens in the case of recent paralysis, where I am clenching
my fist intentionally but only partly believe that I am doing so
because I am not sure that I've recovered. Such examples do not
refute the Anscombean conception of the will, any more than
examples of perceptual uncertainty refute the idea of perception
as a source of knowledge.
I am sympathetic to the idea that the will is a capacity for knowledge; hence
the title of this paper. But I want to suggest that it is a significant cost to
weaken the attitude required in the content of the principle in search of a
workable necessary condition, even if we suppose that Setiya's principle is
descriptively and extensionally accurate. In 1.4-1.6, I will offer and argue
for an alternative principle that keeps the focus on the connection between
intentional action and knowledge, instead of weaker attitudes, while still
avoiding the counterexamples.
One way to understand what I am up to in this paper is to say that I am
drawing out an undeveloped implication of Setiya's way of thinking: I am
suggesting that this capacity for knowledge is not idle, not a mere interesting
correlate; rather, it lies at the heart of agency. My principle focuses on how
when an intentional action fails to realize the agent's capacity for practical
knowledge, that action is therefore defective as an exercise of agency. And
this thought is what we need to see my objections to Thompson and Setiya
as parallel.
On Thompson's view, it's easy for me to know what I'm doing in part
because it doesn't matter whether I will succeed in that doing: he makes
agential success unnecessary for epistemic success. On Setiya's view, it's
the other way around. He counts as agential successes cases where there
is mere belief, or even just a slight uptick in confidence: everything can be
going just fine for me as a doer, even when my work as a knower is not so
impressive.
So for both Thompson and Setiya, success in knowing and success in doing
vary independently, and one can be doing well, even maximally well, in one
while things are going horrendously with the other. What I want to suggest
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is that this fails to capture the key connection between knowing and doing.
As I said regarding Thompson, on his picture, practical knowledge doesn't
seem to be of any use to the agent in her acting. And on Setiya's picture,
it's not clear if, or why, the carbon copier is doing less well as an agent
in his doubtful making of ten copies than when he makes only two in full
confidence. I think it is right (and more in the spirit of Anscombe's thought,
for what it's worth) to think that we should not hold either side fixed while
the other varies. And so in what follows, I will argue for a principle that
ties together agential and epistemic success, in such a way that both are
graded and they scale together. The essential thought will be that epistemic
success and agential success vary together because-it turns out-practical
knowledge is required for agential control, and control is required for agential
success. I can't be in the good case unless I succeed in having O-ed and I
know I'm #-ing, because what we want from an exercise of agency can't be
had without practical knowledge.
1.4 MY PROPOSAL: MIND CONTROL
My proposal takes the following thought as its starting point:
MIND CONTROL: Whatever else it may be, an intentional action is
an exercise of agency such that something the agent has in mind is
supposed not only to 'match up' with something that happens in the
world, but to guide and secure that happening.
MIND CONTROL is not a definition, but something like it has to be right if
we are to be able to distinguish intentional actions from nearby phenomena.
If we omit the requirement that the thing the agent has in mind guide and
secure the action, requiring only that mind and world match, we do not
distinguish intentional actions from (e.g.) mere wishes, or idle predictions,
coming true. If we keep guide but omit secure, then at best we do not
distinguish success achieved via agential control from merely accidental, or
lucky, success; and at worst we do not even distinguish successful from
merely attempted actions, or capture the important way in which a failed
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attempt is defective. If we keep secure but omit guide, we do not distinguish
proper intentional actions from cases of deviant causation.
MIND CONTROL suggests a rough, functional understanding of intention:
Intention: the mental state whose role is to guide and secure the agent's
#-ing, thereby (in the good case, when hooked up with the world in
the right way) constituting agential control.
So the key feature that distinguishes intentional action is this connection to
control. 16
1.5 CONTROL AS PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
The truth of MIND CONTROL entails some interesting things (some of whose
truth and/or interest will require a bit of drawing out below). It's worth
stating them here, together, to get them on the table as a group before
discussing them.
Gradability: Control comes by degrees-and once you have an aim that
comes by degrees, you have an internal standard of assessment.
Content: The guidance requirement determines the kind of content inten-
tions must have; specifically, an intention must capture not only an
outcome, but also the agent's means and reasons, if any. Guidance
means intentions describe not just what, but how, and why.
Hookup: The securing requirement is about the relationship between the
intention and what happens in the world; it is an anti-luck condition.
Given Gradability, we must (for starters) modify Anscombe's claim-which
provides a necessary condition-to make it a normative condition. But once
we do, since the aim of control is constitutive of intentional action (as we saw
in 1.4), we'll have a standard that tells us how an intentional action can be
16. Since I will not, in what follows, be discussing these other phenomena any further, I
will, for brevity, often say simply 'actions' when I mean 'intentional actions.'
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better or worse qua intentional action. This is not to say that this standard
gives us the only way that an action can be defective-there may well be
independent standards of ethics, or prudence, or asthetics, for example--
but it is a standard, and (the) one that is internal to intentional action as
such.
Why think Content is true? Roughly, the idea is that for guidance, you
need three things.
1. A starting point: you have to know where you are. Your starting point
is your circumstances; a subset of these, containing some especially
salient features of your circumstances, is your reasons (if you have
any)-the why.17
2. A destination: you have to know where you're trying to go. Your
destination is the outcome--what you intend to do, or (perhaps better)
to have done.
3. A route: you have to have a path from the starting point to the desti-
nation. Your route is your means (if you have any); this is the how.18
I take it to be obvious that the outcome and means must be included for
guidance; after all, what is guidance, if not a laying out of the steps to
take to move from point A to point B? But, one might wonder, why think
that reasons (when present) must be part of the content of an intention,
as I claim? Why not think one merely intends to #, rather than to #
17. I will leave open the possibility of intentional action for no particular reason, as
Anscombe does. (Though if such actions exist I think, with Anscombe, that they
must be marginal cases; see her 20-22.) The point here is, first, that the agent must
have a sense of her circumstances-to take oneself to have no reason is in part to take
oneself to be in certain circumstances-and, second, that if the agent has reasons they
must be captured in this way, and that the lack of any reason must likewise be captured.
18. Again, I do not wish to rule out the possibility of basic action, action for which no
means are required. The point here is analogous to the discussion of reasons above: if
there is a means that is to be taken, it must be captured; if there is no means to be
taken, that feature must likewise be captured.
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for reason(s) R? The answer is slightly complicated because of the many
kinds of reasons there are-recall the different types of answer to the 'why?'
question discussed in 1.1-but in a nutshell, the answer is that reasons
constrain both what counts as the intended destination and what routes are
preferable, acceptable, and even viable. 19
Compare two reasons why I might intend to drink a martini:
Election Martini: I intend to drink a martini because of the election.
007 Martini: I intend to drink a martini to look like James Bond.
Election Martini and 007 Martini differ in what counts as doing what I
intend: in Election Martini, I will not have succeeded unless I drink the
whole thing; in 007 Martini, I may well need only to take a sip between
turns at the baccarat table. That is, the difference in reasons makes for a
difference in goals, even though they can both be loosely characterized as
'drinking a martini.'
Election Martini and 007 Martini also differ in what routes are preferable
and even viable paths to the destination: in Election Martini, my intention
will recommend starting by obtaining a very large martini, the bigger the
better, which I will be content to drink from a plastic cup while wearing
sweatpants. In 007 Martini, I will not particularly care about the size of
the drink, but I will care a lot about its arriving in a proper glass; I'll prefer
to be wearing a very well-tailored dinner jacket; and I will make sure I say
"shaken, not stirred" while ordering. If my reason for drinking a martini is
to be like James Bond, then the means that would work just fine in Election
Martini-plastic cup, sweatpants-will in fact not be a viable means to
my end. So reasons, when present, must be captured by the intention if
the intention is to mark off a destination and delineate proper means, as
guidance requires.
19. Cf Fara 2013 for some analogous thoughts about desire.
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Do the martini cases really mean that one's reasons must always be part of
one's intention? I have shown that there exist cases in which the reasons
matter in the way I claim; the existential claim does not obviously establish
the universal one. But in fact, I think here it does.
From perspective of the intending agent, since reasons can sometimes affect
what outcomes or what means are preferable, acceptable, or viable, you've
always got to check: you can't know ahead of time in a particular case that
reasons don't matter. Suppose I intend to wear my striped shirt to campus
today. I might intend to do so because it's my lucky shirt (call this reason
Lucky), or I might intend to do so because the checked one is in the laundry
(call this reason Laundry). Both those reasons, it turns out, will have the
same guidance effects: I should go to the closet, get out the striped shirt,
put it on (along with whatever else I'm going to wear), and leave for campus.
Lucky and Laundry seem equivalent with regard to guidance. But I might
have intended to wear my striped shirt because I've already got it on and
I don't feel like changing (call this reason Lazy)-and Lazy does not guide
me in the same way: the whole point, in the Lazy case, is that I'm not going
to go to the closet before I leave for campus. I have to include the reason
to know, if I intend to wear my striped shirt to campus today, what that
means as far as whether or not I need to go to the closet. Because reasons
can offer different verdicts about guidance, it doesn't matter that sometimes
they will in fact agree. One could intend to # for all kinds of reasons; some
of those reasons will very likely disagree about guidance. So you have to
'check.' 2 0 Different reasons make for different intentions, because reasons
are part of the content of an intention.
The shirt case is still a complex action: do I really need to check if I'm
performing a simpler one? What about a basic action, if there are any?
20. I am not suggesting that agents do, or must, consciously check; I mean only that the
way reasons interact with the other constituents of an intention make it the case that
the reasons must be incorporated into the intention.
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Suppose I intend to blink, or clench my fist. Even those can be done in
different ways-quickly or slowly, forcefully or gently, etc-and the reason I
am blinking or clenching could bear on how I proceed. And even if there is
an action that can only be performed in one way, the question of when to do
it, or whether to do it at all, can easily be affected by the reason for which
one intends to do it. Recall that drinking a martini out of a red plastic
cup while wearing sweatpants will not count as doing what I intend if my
reason is to look like James Bond, so my reason would thus recommend that
I either forego drinking the martini, or wait until it can be done in the right
way, if the only way I can drink a martini (now) is in the Election Martini
way. The same can be true for a basic action.
So I would suggest that the right way to think about intentions is as having
'slots' for the what, the how, and the why, even if sometimes we want to
say there will be no means, or no reason. Roughly, I intend to # by means
m because r. Notice that thinking this way makes it clear why there are
the several kinds of answer to the 'why?' question described in 1.1: If
you ask why I am #-ing, I may reply with something about my means,
something about my reasons, or something about how actions and sub-
actions fit together. And in that sense, items that fit in any of the slots can
be a reason, because answers to 'why?' questions are reasons for acting, as
Anscombe says.
Therefore, I take it, an intention must include an agent's reasons, and guid-
ance explains why. Of course, it is also independently plausible that one
does not merely intend to 0, but rather intends to # because r. Just con-
sider how many domains outside action theory-ethics, epistemology, deci-
sion theory-take it to be obvious that there is very often a crucial difference
between #-ing because p and 0-ing because q.
What about Hookup? Hookup does two things. First, it notes that if an
intention must (in the good case) secure an outcome, then MIND CONTROL
is in part an anti-luck condition. Intentional actions are defective qua inten-
tional actions to the extent that they are achieved through luck (as opposed
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to agency). Second, what makes this particularly interesting is that the
kind of luck that must be avoided is epistemic; it is the kind ruled out by
knowledge. We can see all this by thinking about skill.
To begin, notice that skillfulness is a kind of assessment specific to inten-
tional actions; we do not evaluate other phenomena (such as those discussed
in 1.4) in terms of skillfulness. 2 1 Skillful actions are thus better qua actions
than less- or non-skillful actions.
What's more, skill amounts to a reduced reliance on luck; the success of a
(more) skillful action is less lucky than the success of a (less- or) non-skillful
action. Serena Williams is extremely skilled at serving a tennis ball; I am
woefully unskilled at serving a tennis ball. For any given pair of instances
of serving a tennis ball, if Serena's serve goes in, or is an ace, it is not (or
not much) a matter of luck; if my serve goes in, or is an ace, it is a matter
of luck, to an embarrassing degree.
Of course, we might think even Serena needs some luck; she needs the world
to refrain from providing a rogue tornado at the moment she serves, for
example. But any luck that Serena requires, any tennis player requires; it
is plausible that she requires less luck than any other player, perhaps in
the history of the game-and I require far more luck than Serena (or than
an even halfway decent player). If my serve is to go in, I will need luck in
the timing of my toss, the angle of my racquet head, the amount of force I
exert, and so on and so on and so on. Every instance of a successful serve
by Serena will be much less lucky than any instance of a successful serve by
me, and in particular, systematic ways.
As this enumeration of the luck I need for a successful serve suggests, the
reduction in luck involved in skillful action is brought about, for starters, by
21. Of course, agents are also assessed in terms of skillfulness. But I set that aside for
now; it is no objection to what I say here, in fact if anything it speaks in favor of
my point: skillful agents are, roughly, just those creatures prone to performing skillful
actions.
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knowledge of means (where we might gloss 'means' as 'what to do when').22
When Serena executes one of her skillful serves, the serve manifests her
knowledge of how to hold her racquet, when to release the ball and when to
swing her arm, how hard to swing, etc.2 3 If Serena merely believed those
things about her means, even truly believed them, that would be inadequate
for the particular case of serving to be skillful, because then the success of
the action would be lucky, and lucky success is not skillful success. 24 And
if Serena were to succeed in serving an ace during the rogue tornado, that
particular ace would not have been skillful, it would have been lucky: Serena
does not in fact know how to modulate the force, angle, etc of her serve to
compensate for the tornado (no human could; our perception doesn't provide
enough information about the states in the tornado, and the dynamics are
too complex to calculate in time anyway), and given that she did not know
the tornado was coming (we can stipulate that it was a rogue tornado that
materialized with no warning after the instant when she hit the ball), even
if she had known how to serve in a rogue tornado, she would not have served
22. The 'what to do when' phrasing is owed to Pavese 2016, which provides a very helpful
overview of the recent debate about the relationship between knowledge and skill.
Most of what I say here aligns with the view presented in Stanley & Williamson 2016,
which explains skill in terms of knowledge, though it's important to note that they
focus on skillful agents, whereas I am primarily interested in skillful actions. Perhaps
surprisingly, what I say here is also in many ways compatible with a rival view, the
virtue-theoretic epistemology on which knowledge is defined in terms of skill (as in, e.g.,
Zagzebski 1996, Sosa 2007, Greco 2010). I suspect that the picture I am developing in
this paper provides resources that bear on this debate, but I cannot pursue the question
here.
23. Cf Stanley & Williamson 2016 on the many kinds of knowledge-wh that are involved
in skillfulness.
24. If it's hard to see this, because it's hard to imagine Serena having merely true belief,
try another example: Suppose I believed in 2015 that the way to get rich was to bet
my life savings on the Chicago Cubs' winning the 2016 World Series, because I noticed
that my cat had a spot that looked kind of like the Cubs' logo. If I had bet my life
savings on the Cubs' win, I would have gotten rich. But no one would say that it was
a skillful instance of getting rich; it was too fluky.
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in the appropriate way in this instance.
But knowledge that some means is a way to 0 in general is not enough;
to act skillfully, an agent must know a means that is a way for her to # in
her circumstances. Otherwise, it will be lucky that the chosen means, which
works in general, works in this case. So in the good case, the agent's intended
means is one that is sufficient for success by that particular agent, here and
now. And the agent must know, in the good case, that her intended means
is sufficient for success by her here and now; otherwise it will be lucky that
she intends (chooses) the sufficient means rather than some other one. And
that means what is needed is in fact knowledge of ability, knowledge that the
agent's intention is sufficient for success here and now. 25 To see this, let's
set aside the tennis examples and consider a different kind of case.
Suppose there is a massive, incredibly complex, but perfectly constructed
domino chain before me. In fact, it is the longest domino chain ever created,
and it is full of exciting and quirky and original components, culminating in
a 100,000-domino portrait of Anscombe. 26 I am the greatest domino chain
expert in the world; I built this wonder; and all that is left to do is to flick
the first domino to start the chain-the absolute easiest part of the whole
undertaking.
But today, it happens, I have recently recovered from paralysis after a par-
ticularly severe domino mishap, and I have not quite recovered my normal
level of motor acuity in my flicking finger. I know the chain will do all
the wonderful things it's supposed to if I just don't mess it up at that first
step-that is my expertise, and I built the chain, we can suppose, before
25. Cf Setiya 2008 on the roles and importance of knowledge how and knowledge of ability
in intentional action.
26. According to the Guiness Book of World Records, as of this writing the most dominoes
toppled by an individual is 321,197, a record set by Liu Yang in 2011. It took more
than a month to set up the chain of 321,200 dominoes, 3 of which did not fall. Guiness
is silent on whether Anscombe was depicted.
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my injury, so there is no worry that something is out of whack there. But
there is a way I can fail to bring off my task: if I tap too hard, the first
domino will jolt its successor in a way that will ruin the chain. If I tap
too lightly, it will be moved out of place (and suppose I do not currently
have the dexterity to put it back just so). So I only have one shot, and I
know the only thing that can go wrong is if I fail to flick the starter domino
correctly. All I need is to perform the basic action of flicking the domino
with an amount of force in the acceptable range, but I don't know if I can
do this, and so I don't know if I can successfully achieve the run. And so, I
want to suggest, if I do succeed, my success will be lucky-and in a way that
means it is not skillful, even though under normal circumstances it would
be, and even though we might wish to say that I, as an agent, still have skill
in this domain-because I do not have enough control of the basic action of
finger-flicking.
What the domino case brings out is that skillful actions are actions from
knowledge, and in the good case the agent has all the knowledge required to
make it the case that if she intends to #, she will #: what is wanted is knowl-
edge of ability, which rests on knowledge of circumstances plus knowledge
of means (if any).
Let's put all these pieces together. (Into something that will be, indeed,
rather Anscombe-shaped.)
o The requirements for guidance (in Content) show that an agent's in-
tention must represent what she is doing, including (if applicable) her
means and her reason(s).
o The requirements for securing (in Hookup) show that this representa-
tion must be accurate, and not as a matter of luck.
o Therefore, in the good case, because the agent must have knowledge
of her ability to # via her intended means, once she begins to # in
light of, or from, that knowledge, she has knowledge in intention of
what she is doing. (I'll say more about why below.) Which is to say
that to aim at agential control in the way we are considering is to aim
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at Anscombean practical knowledge. Thus intention is the practical
analog of belief.
Those who go in for a picture of intention along the lines Bratman (1987,
1991, 2009, etc) advocates, on which intentions are distinctively practical
attitudes that involve planning and commitment and don't have this cogni-
tive flavor, won't like the conclusion that MIND CONTROL entails an aim of
knowledge in intention. Even if I'm right that control requires knowledge
of ability, they may ask: why couldn't it be that the intention is something
Bratmanian, and thus non-cognitive?
Recall that MIND CONTROL requires that something in the mind guide and
secure what happens. In this section, I have argued that that job is only
accomplished when the agent has (and acts from) knowledge of ability. If
intentions are at least partly cognitive, as I claim, and so the practical analog
of belief, it makes sense that they would aim at knowledge in this way. On
the other hand, if intentions are non-cognitive, there is no explanation for
why their constitutive aim (of control, which is practical knowledge) turns
out to be epistemic.
To put it another way: in 1.4 I said that MIND CONTROL suggests a func-
tional account of intention, on which intentions are the mental states tasked
with the guiding-and-securing job. On that view, the aim of knowledge
I derive is internal to intention. The Bratmanian will have to argue that
intentions are non-cognitive, but nonetheless constitutively come with two
curious add-ons: first, an aim that is epistemic, and therefore, second, some
other accompanying mental state to do that epistemic work (in the good
case), since there is nothing in a Bratmanian intention that is fit for pur-
pose.
I have said a lot in this section, but we can now sum up. MIND CONTROL
distinguishes intentional action from nearby phenomena by identifying a nor-
mative condition specific to intentional action; identifying agential control as
that condition; and identifying agential control with knowledge in intention,
or practical knowledge. Thus agential control, i.e. practical knowledge, is
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the (or at least a) constitutive aim of intentional action. MIND CONTROL,
along with its corollaries Gradability, Content, and Hookup, yields a princi-
ple that's in the spirit of Anscombe but more plausible (and not vulnerable
to Davidsonian counterexamples, as we'll see):
NEED TO KNOW: When you act intentionally, you aim at control, un-
derstood as practical knowledge; when (and to the degree that) you
fail to have such control/knowledge, your action is defective, though it
can still be intentional.
At this point some people will think, hang on, knowledge isn't degreed! But
there are a couple of things to say here. First, one way an agent can have
more or less knowledge of what she is doing, and so more or less control,
has to do with knowing more about her circumstances, means, etc. She can
know these things in more or less detail, which is a matter of knowing more
or fewer particular facts.
Compare me to God. Her intentions can be perfectly precise, which is to
say she has total control, because she knows everything. For me there are
lots of things about my circumstances I don't know, which means even if I
perfectly knew how all possible means worked, there would still be some luck
(because I wouldn't know I'd chosen the right means for my circumstances),
and of course in fact there is a lot I don't know about how my means work,
so it is (at least ordinarily) lucky to some degree when they do. Those things
that I don't know add up to less-than-perfect control.
Second, we could also think about this question in terms of degrees of confi-
dence: if an agent has less knowledge about her means, she is entitled to less
confidence that she is <-ing. (This way of thinking will be especially appeal-
ing to those who emphasize the importance of basic action, who are likely
to resist building everything into the content.) I am inclined to think that
in some cases, thinking in terms of levels of detail will be more illuminating,
while in others we'll want to think in terms of degrees of confidence-but in
any case, these two possibilities make it clear that knowledge of what one is
doing comes by degrees.
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1.6 REVISITING DAVIDSON'S CARBON COPIER CASE
Let's revisit Davidson's carbon copier case in light of our discussion thus
far. To fill it in a bit:
Abraham the Carbon Copier: Someone, call him Abraham, wants to
make ten carbon copies of a page of text, all at once. (He has a
lot on his plate and doesn't have time to write the thing out eleven
times.) So he's built a stack of papers-eleven sheets of regular paper,
interleaved with ten sheets of carbon paper-and selected his sturdiest
pen. He begins to write, pressing down very hard: "Four score and
seven years ago, our fathers brought forth on this continent a new
nation..." Given that the odds of Abraham's succeeding in making
ten copies all at once are very low, he doesn't believe he is doing so.
Nonetheless, if he manages it, he will have done so intentionally: we
would certainly not say that someone who built the stack of papers,
selected a special pen, pressed down hard for the entire duration of
the episode, etc, had made all those copies by accident.
Abraham is a counterexample to Anscombe's Thought: he does not know,
because he does not even believe, that he is making ten carbon copies, even
if in fact that is what he is doing, and intentionally so. But the case is
no problem for NEED TO KNOW: according to NEED TO KNOW, Abraham's
non-believing copying is intentional, but defective. And this seems right:
it's why Thompson urged us to recognize how unlikely it is that an actual
agent would attempt the whole shebang rather than checking as she went,
as discussed in 1.2. Agents are very often sensitive, responsive, to defects
like this.
But we can say more. Not only is Abraham not a counterexample to NEED
TO KNOW, he is in fact predicted by it. After all, Abraham's skepticism
27. Abraham and the particular text here do not figure in Davidson's case, which is more
schematic, and the five known handwritten copies of Lincoln's address vary in the
details of their wording, and so were not in fact made with carbon paper. But carbon
paper was invented in 1801, so the Great Emancipator could have decided to make
some duplicates of his speech for posterity.
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about his own action is a product of several gaps in his knowledge regard-
ing his means, gaps we should expect to find among non-omniscient, non-
omnipotent agents.
o Could one do this, in principle? Abraham doesn't know if there is any
amount (or range) of pressure he could exert that would be enough
for his stroke to reach all the way to the bottom sheet without tearing
the top sheet(s).
o How hard would one have to press? Abraham doesn't know, if such
an amount (or range) of pressure exists, what amount (or range) it is.
o Do I have the strength? Abraham doesn't know, if such an amount
(or range) of pressure exists, if he's strong enough to exert it.
o Do I have the motor acuity? Abraham doesn't know, if such an
amount (or range) of pressure exists, if he has fine enough motor con-
trol to target and maintain it over the course of the writing of the page
of text.
There are likely many more crucial things Abraham doesn't know (whether
his pen nib is adequate in the requisite ways, for example), but I'll stop here
for now. What we see is that these issues are precisely the kinds of problems
that motivated the requirement of knowledge of ability in the argument for
1.5. The first two issues capture Abraham's lack of knowledge of whether,
and how, it is possible to make ten carbon copies at once: does there exist
a means to his end? The second two issues concern whether, assuming
someone could make ten copies, it is possible for Abraham to do so, and do
so now. So we have four types of potential problem. The task might just be
impossible, so that nothing Abraham does would be a way of accomplishing
the task. The task might be possible, but Abraham might select the wrong
way of going about it (by guessing wrong about how much pressure to use),
and so fail. The task might be possible, and Abraham might select the
correct way of going about it, but lack the requisite physical strength, and
so fail. Or it could be that the task is possible, and Abraham selects the
correct way of going about it, and he has the requisite strength, but he is
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unable to exert that amount of strength here, now, for the duration of the
task, and so he fails.
I think it's worth considering in some detail just what kind of problem each of
Abraham's knowledge deficits poses on a view informed by MIND CONTROL
and accountable to NEED TO KNOW.
Let's start with the first one: Abraham's task may be impossible. Many the-
orists, including Davidson, have thought there is something wrong with in-
tending to do something (one knows to be) impossible. Davidson (2001, 100)
says that "There can be no such intention." Often, the problem is described
as one of incoherence. How should we understand this thought?
The view we've been developing provides the resources to see what's wrong
with intending to do something you know to be impossible: if 0-ing is im-
possible, then there is nothing you could have in mind that could (guide
and) secure your 4-ing. The intention to 0 is therefore inconsistent with
knowing it's impossible to q. 21
Of course, Abraham's plight is not one in which he knows it is impossible
to make ten carbon copies at once; he would presumably think that was
a better situation than the one he is in, in that he would have no need
to try. Does MIND CONTROL help us to understand what has gone wrong
when one does not know, but merely fears, that what one hopes to do is
impossible?
Consider a case that does not have all four of the potential problems we
identified for Abraham, but just this one. There are actual cases like this;
Andrew Wiles apparently thought, in the mid-1980s, that if it was possi-
ble to prove (what we now know as) the modularity theorem, and therefore
28. Of course, there are different flavors of impossibility, but that poses no problem for
what I have said. I err if I intend the logically impossible, the metaphysically impos-
sible, or (it seems right to say) the presently/for me/actually impossible-that's what
Abraham is worried about when he wonders if he has the requisite ability, we might
think.
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Fermat's last theorem, he could do it.2 9 And many champions, from Serena
Williams to the competitive eater Takeru Kobayashi, presumably often say
to themselves, "If anyone can, I can." But it is not only those with ex-
traordinary abilities who can entertain, and rightly, such thoughts. At the
moment, I can't recall if there is any tea in the pantry, so I don't know if
it's possible for me to make myself a cup (in the next ten minutes, without
going to the store, etc). But if there is tea, then I know I can make it,
just as many millions of others could, too, were any of them in my kitchen.
Anscombe herself (1963, 32) mentions a case like this: someone who wants
to buy tackle for catching sharks in Oxford. No special skill is required to
pull that off, if it's possible at all; it's just doubtful that the stuff is to be
had.
So let's think about Anscombe's case. She calls it an instance of an error
in judgment to intend to buy shark tackle in Oxford, when one might have
known such a feat is impossible. We've already seen that it would be a
mistake to set out so intending if one in fact does know that shark tackle
cannot be bought in Oxford, but what about the case where one is not
sure?3 0  Call our would-be shark catcher Liz. If Liz intends to buy her
tackle in Oxford, and she knows (at least implicitly) that doing so would be
incoherent if doing so is impossible, then in intending to buy her tackle in
Oxford, Liz presupposes that it is possible to do so. In presupposing that it
is possible to buy shark tackle in Oxford, Liz is taking for granted that it is
possible to buy shark tackle in Oxford. But Liz's actual attitude toward the
possibility of buying shark tackle in Oxford is not one that supports taking
this for granted. And so her combination of attitudes-the intention and
the degree of belief in the possibility of buying shark tackle in Oxford-is
unstable.
29. Or so Simon Singh (1998) reports.
30. I confess, were I in Oxford, I would be tempted to attempt to buy shark tackle, just
to see if an anti-Anscombean shopkeeper had started offering it.
38
But instability of this kind is incompatible with intention's role as a guide:
a guide is supposed to be fixed. (Think of the rigidity of train tracks.) This
instability is a defect. Another metaphor: consider the way one uses a ruler
as a guide in drawing a straight line. If the ruler is not held steady, it can't
serve as a proper guide (and the more unsteady it is, the worse it will be as
a guide). It is thus less likely that the outcome will be as intended-that the
line will be straight-and if the line is straight, this outcome will not have
been secured by the use of the ruler in the way it would have been if the
ruler were steady. We might want to say it will be lucky if the line comes
out straight. To cash out the metaphors: the presupposition and the actual
attitude prescribe different courses of action. The presupposition that shark
tackle is to be had in Oxford supports Liz's heading out into Oxford and
visiting each and every store until she finds some.3 1 Liz's actual attitude,
which we are stipulating for the moment is one of uncertainty as to whether
shark tackle is to be had, supports very different behavior. Indeed, it may
make far more sense for her to try Amazon instead.
The same kind of instability will afflict someone who has Abraham's third
problem: the "I know it's possible, but I don't know if it's possible for me"
case. The intention is supposed to guide my action; if Abraham knows it
would take x lbs of force to press through to the bottom sheet on his pile,
but he knows his maximum force is (x - 1) lbs, then there is nothing he
could have in mind that would secure the outcome of ten copies made. This
is the analog of known (total) impossibility. What about the case where the
possibility-for-me is unknown? Again, there are plenty of real world cases:
take the feats of Andrew Wiles and Serena Williams and Kobayashi: I know
they are possible, because those people have accomplished them. But I am
in serious doubt about my ability to prove Fermat's last theorem, or win
even one game in a Grand Slam, or eat even a few hot dogs. But that doubt
creates the same kind of instability in this case as in the shark tackle case.
31. Recall Williamson (2000, 62ff) on the dedicated burglar.
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Intending to # is presupposing not just that it is possible to #, but that it
is possible for me to #. And the more doubt I have about my ability, the
more unstable, and so defective, my combined attitude is.
What about Abraham's second problem, his lack of knowledge of which way
or ways of proceeding are ways of making ten carbon copies, assuming that
it is possible to do so? We can see that it is incoherent to intend to # by
doing something that is not a way of #-ing. And as with things that are
known to be impossible, most everyone will agree that an intention to # by
doing something that one knows will not lead to having #-ed is not okay. So,
again, what about the case where you just don't know which way is the way
to 0? There are plenty of cases like this: you don't know which numbers to
choose in order to have a winning lottery ticket; you don't know which is
the road to Larissa. In cases like these, you are unable to discriminate on
the basis of choiceworthiness between some range of options-perhaps just a
few, if we are talking about possible roads to Larissa; some 175 million if we
are talking about the Powerball lottery. This inability to discriminate means
that if you choose the right one, your doing so will have been merely lucky,
in exactly the way we have seen to be incompatible with control.
What of Abraham's fourth problem? His uncertainty about whether, even
if he has the brute strength required to make ten copies, he can summon
precisely the required amount-no more, no less-and maintain it over the
course of an entire page of writing, can be put in general terms as the "Even
if it's possible for me to do this (in one sense/in principle), can I do this
(tout court/now)?" Once again, we can think of cases where this is the
primary issue: Serena knows she can serve an ace to win a match, but
even she doesn't always know she can do it now.32 Once again, we can see
how the known inability version of the case would be defective; it looks like
32. It's worth noting here that a case in which a recently paralyzed person intends to clench
her fist but is (properly) not confident she can do so-as in Setiya (2007, 2008)-is some
combination of the "is this possible for me?" and "is this possible for me now" types.
That case is simpler, because the action is basic. But the issue is the same.
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our earlier examples of impossibility of various kinds. But in the version
where the agent merely doubts whether she can < now-which I glossed, in
Abraham's case, as not knowing if he had enough motor control to target
and sustain the requisite pressure-it's easy to see that the problem persists,
because this is the domino flicker case again.
The case of Abraham the carbon copier points to each step in the argument
in 1.5 that skilled action requires knowledge of ability; NEED TO KNOW is
the product of just the problems present here. Thus NEED TO KNOW, al-
though Anscombean in spirit, is not vulnerable to the counterexamples that
doomed Anscombe's original claim. More than that, it helps us understand
just what is going on, and going wrong, in the case.
1.7 CONCLUSION
Time to take stock. I have argued that we need MIND CONTROL to distin-
guish intentional actions from nearby phenomena, and that this means that
intentional actions constitutively aim at control. I've argued further that
that control is just practical knowledge, in Anscombe's sense: the special
knowledge an agent can have of what she is doing, how, and why. So NEED
TO KNOW is true: an intentional action is defective, qua intentional action,
when, and to the extent that, the agent fails to know what she is doing (and
how and why). I've also said that a Bratmanian view of intention does not
appear to be able to account for this fact, so the arguments of the paper
provide new support for cognitivism about intention.
Linking knowledge and non-defective action as my view does leads natu-
rally to questions in epistemology about whether knowledge can come and
go depending on non-epistemic features like what is at stake, leading to
pragmatic encroachment, or making knowledge somehow shifty. In another
paper, I explore what my view adds to that debate. Relatedly, if knowledge
is essential for action in the way my view claims, we might wonder what
that means when there are injustices in our epistemic economy. I take that
question up in further work as well.
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Finally, recall that I started by talking about God and Wile E. Coyote, the
ideal agent and an agent with a lot of terrible ideas. Because my view iden-
tifies a constitutive aim of intentional action that can be met by degrees,
it sets a standard for ideal intentional action: perfect practical knowledge.
We might wonder how this standard relates to other standards, such as
those of practical rationality, or ethics. Are all three of God's perfections-
omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence-bound up together? Does
NEED TO KNOW somehow implicitly tell us all that is required for good ac-
tion? And what are non-ideal agents like Wile E. and this author supposed
to do, frail and fallible as we are? If you've got to know what you're do-
ing, but that's really hard, is there any way to avoid the ACME portable
hole? These are questions for another day, but the seeds of an answer are
here.
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2 KNOWING WHAT YOU'RE DOING
WITH SHIFTY EPISTEMOLOGY
If you're interested in knowledge and action, and what they might have
to do with each other, there are plenty of epistemologists who will have
something to say. There are also a bunch of action theorists who'd be happy
to bend your ear. Oddly, though, the knowledge people and the action people
have not been talking to each other. That's a mistake. (Especially for the
epistemologists, it turns out.)
Action theorists who think action is importantly connected to knowledge
are inclined to agree with Anscombe that there's something special about
knowing what you're doing. Epistemologists who think knowledge is impor-
tantly connected to action generally say the link makes knowledge shifty,
prone to coming and going depending on practical matters like what's at
stake. This paper puts these lines of thought in conversation for the first
time.
The shifty epistemologists start with cases. If you and I are talking about
where we were for a historic event like the release of Beyonce's Lemonade, we
of course have elaborate answers, loaded with detail: we know exactly where
we were. That is, unless a demonic game show host appears and says we'll
get a new toaster if we're right about where we were, but if we're wrong we'll
be forced to engage in online debates with Macedonian fake news bots for
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the rest of our lives-then maybe we don't know after all.1 Cases like this
demonstrate, according to the shifty theorists, that knowledge can come and
go just because of changes in one's practical situation, even if one's evidence
is held fixed.
But this is surprising: after all, just as it would seem like bad epistemic
practice to suppose that the fact that you would very much like for some-
thing to be true bears on whether you know it-treating wishful thinking
as epistemically legitimate--it would seem that the more general question
of how practically significant it is for you that something be true should not
affect whether you know it. Isn't knowledge supposed to be solid, sturdy,
dependable? The shifty theorists say that's just not true; the cases show
that knowledge is shifty-and the cases are ubiquitous.
Anscombe's picture also starts with an intuitive thought and ends up with
a surprising one. Notice that if you ask me why I'm typing this paragraph
to the rhythm of 'Formation,' and I say that I didn't know I was doing that,
then it seems right to say I wasn't intentionally typing to the rhythm of
'Formation.' If you don't know you're doing something, you're not doing it
intentionally, she says.
But if that's right, then doing something intentionally means knowing you're
doing it. And there are counterexamples to this claim-lots of them. Still,
like the shifty epistemologists who say the cases compel us to accept that
knowledge is not as stalwart as we had supposed, Anscombeans soldier on:
intentional action really is marked by its connection to knowledge; it is we
who must be stalwart in the face of the counterexamples.
In what follows, I argue that if we revise Anscombe's thought a bit, we'll
have a way of thinking that illuminates the puzzles of shifty epistemology.
1. If this penalty strikes you as a description of the status quo and so not (merely) a
consequence of a wrong answer, please substitute something horrific but non-actual. If
you can think of anything.
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It turns out that there are some questionable assumptions and trouble-
some ambiguities in the shiftiness literature, and once we have my modified
Anscombean picture in view, we can see better what's at work in the shifti-
ness discussion-and in a way that makes shiftiness itself look unmotivated.
In other words, we can take seriously the thought that knowledge is impor-
tant to action without committing to knowledge's being shifty; we can think
that lack of knowledge tends to hinder action and that whether you know
something is a matter of traditional epistemic factors like your evidence, not
your practical circumstances, despite the appearances in the shifty theorists'
favorite cases.
To those ends, 2.1 lays out two kinds of cases that are the stock in trade
of epistemologists' discussions of stakes-sensitivity, interest-relativity, prag-
matic encroachment-more generally, the phenomenon of shiftiness-and
attempts to get clear on the general structure of shifty views. 2  2.2 revisits
Anscombe's idea and its difficulties, and provides an overview of my pre-
ferred modification of her central claim. In 2.3, I explain how my picture
of what intentional action is like yields principles-know ledge norms that
link non-defective action to knowledge of certain propositions-that appear
to be remarkably similar to those proposed by shifty theorists, but that
in fact have crucial differences both in what they tell us about the cases
and in their explanatory power; 2.4 walks through the comparison via the
paradigm cases. Finally, in 2.5 I take stock, and suggest that while I have
not provided a knock-down argument against shiftiness, I have shown that
the cases that are supposed to motivate such views do not, in fact, push
us that way-because my view about the relationship between knowledge
2. 'Shiftiness' is defined in Fantl & McGrath (2012, 55) as the claim that "factors such as
practical stakes and salience can matter to the truth-value of 'knowledge'-ascriptions."
This is supposed to be a (statement of the) claim that contextualists and interest-
relativists, or subject-sensitive invariantists, both endorse. In this paper, I will almost
always discuss the interest-relativist/subject sensitive invariantist versions of the claim,
leaving the translation to the contextualist idiom as an exercise for the reader for the
sake of concision. But the debunking arguments reach across the divide.
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and intentional action, supported by a ground-up, independent argument,
enables an equally satisfying explanation of the cases in question. Thus my
paper can be understood as debunking shifty theories.
In short, it is illuminating to bring the two conversations about knowledge
and action together; action theory can shed light on epistemology, shifting
the ground under shiftiness itself. Because the point of this paper is that
Anscombe was right that you've got to know what you're doing-and that
means that if what you're doing is being shifty, you've got to wonder: why
would I want to do that?
2.1 TWO KINDS OF CASES
I have said that the debate about shiftiness in epistemology centers on intu-
itions about cases; in fact, two main kinds of cases feature in the literature.
I'll call them criticism cases and encroachment cases.
Criticism: An agent is criticizable when she acts on (the basis of) p, or
takes p as her reason for acting, without knowing p.3 For example:
o Restaurant: Hannah and Sarah are on their way to a restaurant,
where they have a reservation that they will lose if they are late.
Hannah has a hunch that turning left will get them there, and so
she leads them that way. It eventually becomes clear that this
was the wrong way to go, and Sarah (naturally, we are to think)
criticizes Hannah: "You shouldn't have gone down this street,
since you didn't know that the restaurant was here." 4
3. This kind of case is at the center of Hawthorne & Stanley (2008), and since then has
become commonly used, with some variation, in most of this literature. Restaurant is
adapted from the opening paragraphs of that paper, and is followed there by several
other instances of the type.
4. It's worth noting that on the views built atop this case, Hannah would be criticizable
even if it had turned out to be the right way. And one might worry that the fact that
it's the wrong way is what does the work in the case. But since this is a standard case,
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Encroachment: Two agents, with (what is stipulated to be) the same evi-
dence for p, act on (the basis of) p. The agents' practical circumstances
are different-specifically, for one agent the stakes are high, and for the
other agent the stakes are low-and (we are to think) an action that
may be fine for the agent in the low-stakes case would be improper for
the agent in the high-stakes case. 5
" Bank (low stakes): Hannah and her wife Sarah are on their way
home on Friday afternoon, and they plan to stop at the bank on
the way, so they can deposit their paychecks. But as they drive
up to the bank, they see that the lines are very long. There's no
particular urgency to depositing their checks; they have plenty
of money in their account. Hannah says, "I know the bank will
be open tomorrow; I was there two Saturdays ago. So we can
just deposit our checks in the morning when we go out to do the
grocery shopping. Let's skip it tonight." Sarah nods.
o Bank (high stakes): Hannah and her wife Sarah are on their way
home on Friday afternoon, and they plan to stop at the bank
on the way, so they can deposit their paychecks. But as they
drive up to the bank, they see that the lines are very long. There
is some urgency to depositing their checks; they have very little
money in their account at the moment, and their rent will clear on
Monday. Hannah says, "I know the bank will be open tomorrow;
I was there two Saturdays ago. So we can just deposit our checks
in the morning when we go out to do the grocery shopping. Let's
skip it tonight." Sarah frets, "But what if the bank has changed
I'll set the worry aside for now.
5. The pair of Bank cases here is adapted from the presentation in the introduction to
Stanley (2005). Many encroachment cases are borrowed or adapted the contextualism
literature; for example, the pair of train cases with which Fantl & McGrath open their
(2002) is a very slight variation on Cohen's (1999) airport scenario.
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its hours? Monday is the first of the month. Do you really know
it'll be open?" Hannah replies, "Hmm. Maybe not."
2.1.1 THE CRITICISM CASES
Criticism cases like Restaurant are taken to be evidence that there is a
knowledge norm for action: they seem to suggest that, at least, and roughly,
you can properly act on the basis of p only if you know p.6
How are we to understand this claim? How is it supposed to be supported
by Restaurant? Some unpacking is in order.
First: What does acting 'on the basis of p' amount to? The 'basis' talk is
from Fantl & McGrath (2009, 3), who say that when you know p, "you can
put it to work... as a basis for belief [and] as a basis for action;" they also
(see, e.g., their 2002, 77-8) talk about 'acting as if p,' and explain the 'as if'
in terms of rational preference-roughly, to act as if p is to take those actions
it is rational to prefer if p.7 Hawthorne & Stanley (2008) talk instead about
taking p as one's reason for acting. The shift from talking about properly
acting to properly taking something as a reason is not insignificant, and I
will have more to say about it below.
What is the sense of 'proper' action here? As the mention of rational pref-
erence above suggests, this is supposed to be a claim about practical ra-
tionality. Fantl & McGrath (2002, 2009, 2013, etc.) and Weatherson (e.g.,
2012) explicitly have a decision-theoretic orientation; Weatherson is con-
cerned with what can appropriately be written down on a decision table, for
6. I will often in what follows be abstracting from the details of and differences between
various views in the neighborhood; for most of our purposes, we need only the broadly
shared basic picture. But I will note some key divergences when relevant to my discus-
sion.
7. These two versions do not seem equivalent; 'act as if p' looks weaker. Fantl & McGrath's
view has evolved over time; see the cited passages for the details. The difference should
not matter for my purposes.
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example. Stanley (2005), and Stanley & Hawthorne (2008), sometimes seem
to have the same basic sense of propriety in mind, but sometimes seem to
be after something different; again, I will return to this theme below. But
I will set this thought aside for now, and understand the kind of practical
rationality in question broadly enough to encompass both ways of thinking,
if indeed they are distinct. As Hawthorne & Stanley (2008, 574n4) say in
describing Fantl & McGrath's view,
The relevant notion of preferability, standard in decision theory,
is one according to which A is preferable to B only if one wel-
comes the news that A to the news that B ("welcome the news" is
a somewhat technical notion here, because in practice receiving
the news that A typically involves receiving further information
as well that might affect the preference ranking).
Although it seems natural to say that Restaurant and its cousins support
only the claim that knowledge is necessary for proper action-after all, the
criticism is roughly that since you did not know p, your acting as if (or on
the basis of) p was improper-Fantl & McGrath (2002) suggest that the
norm is in fact a biconditional. You can properly act on the basis of p if and
only if you know p. The two directions come as a package, on their view,
because of the way they understand acting as if p to be a matter of taking
those actions it is rational to prefer conditional on p:
If you know that p, then it shouldn't be a problem to act as if p.
If it is a problem to act as if p, you can explain why by saying
that you don't know that p. Suppose you are faced with some
decision-do A or do B-where which of these is better depends
on whether p. You know that if p, A is the thing to do, but that
if not-p, B is. To say in one breath, "I know that p" and in the
next breath, "But I'd better do B anyway, even though I know
that A is the thing to do if p" seems incoherent. If you really
know that p, and you know that if p, A is the thing to do, then
it's hard to see how you could fail to know that A is the thing
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to do in fact. But then you ought to do A. (Fantl & McGrath
2002, 72)
The strangeness, perhaps incoherence, of saying that you know p while also
saying that you ought to do something that is not the thing you ought to
do if p is supposed to support the sufficiency claim. One might want a bit
more argument, but by and large Fantl & McGrath think that the thought
that, as they like to say, "if you know p, it shouldn't be a problem to act as
if p," is intuitive.
Hawthorne & Stanley (2008) likewise advocate for a biconditional norm, but
do not offer much more by way of argument for the sufficiency direction.
They do open the discussion of their preferred principle by noting that the
necessity direction is what cases like Restaurant support. When it comes to
the question of sufficiency, however, they are explicitly concerned only with
suitably restricting the claim, so that their principle does not make knowing
p sufficient to warrant actions for which the truth of p is irrelevant.8 In such
cases, they say, "it would be odd to say that it is appropriate to treat the
proposition that p as a reason for acting, even if one knows that p" (578).
Therefore, they continue,
To get a plausible sufficient condition, we need some restriction
to choices for which the proposition that p is relevant. Let us
say that a choice between options X1 ... X is p dependent iff the
most preferable of x1 .. .- conditional on the proposition that p
is not the same as the most preferable of Xi.. .Xn conditional on
the proposition that not-p. (Hawthorne & Stanley 2008, 578)
In addition to addressing the irrelevance worry, one might think this is
pointing toward the same connection to rational preference that is at work
in Fantl & McGrath. (Otherwise, it looks as though the sufficiency direction
is basically just assumed.) Again, we might have wanted a fair bit more; I'll
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8. We might add: or worse!
return to this question in 2.3 below, but for now notice that Hawthorne &
Stanley's biconditional is not symmetrical. The necessity side, the left-to-
right claim that if you can appropriately take p as your reason for action,
then you know p, is unqualified; but the sufficiency side, the right-to-left
direction, is restricted-because they think you can appropriately take p as
your reason for action if you know it and the truth of p is relevant, perhaps
because it makes your action rational to prefer.
2.1.2 THE ENCROACHMENT CASES
Encroachment cases like Bank can be read two ways. The first follows
the use of such cases in the contextualism literature, and argues from the
(expected) intuition that Hannah knows the bank will be open in the low-
stakes case, and the (expected) intuition that Hannah does not know the
bank will be open in the high-stakes case, even though their evidence is the
same in both cases, to the claim that whether one knows depends in part
on stakes. Call this the direct reading. The second reading proceeds from
the (expected) intuition that it is rational to skip going to the bank in the
low-stakes case, and the (expected) intuition that it is not rational to skip
going to the bank in the high-stakes case, and adds a knowledge norm that
is supposed to be plausible (perhaps because of criticism cases), to generate
the conclusion that Hannah knows the bank will be open on Saturday when
the stakes are low, but not when the stakes are high, and thus that whether
one knows (that the bank will be open, e.g.) depends in part on stakes. Call
this the indirect reading.
In encroachment cases like Bank, on the indirect reading, one is supposed
to think that since (1) the agents have the same evidence in the high-stakes
case and the low-stakes case, and (2) what it is intuitively appropriate for
the agents to do in the high-stakes case is different from what it is intuitively
appropriate for them to do in the low-stakes case (e.g., it is appropriate for
Hannah and Sarah to skip the trip to the bank in the low-stakes version, but
it would not be appropriate for them to skip it in the high-stakes version),
and (3) you can properly act on the basis of p if and only if you know p;
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therefore, in a slogan, because practical matters affect what it is rational to
do, "practical matters affect whether you know." 9 In other words, and more
specifically: Suppose it is right that one can properly act on (the basis of) p
if and only if one knows p. (Perhaps with a qualification requiring that p is
relevant to the action in question, along the lines discussed by Hawthorne &
Stanley.) And suppose that in Bank the relevant p is The bank will be open
on Saturday. The thought is that if stakes alone make a difference to whether
or not one can properly act on p, because by stipulation the stakes are the
only difference between the cases, then-given the biconditional knowledge
norm 1 -they must make a difference to whether you know p. Knowledge
is thus shifty.1 1
There are many questions one might have at this point; I have not here
reproduced the full arguments for the various views in the vicinity. But I
hope to have conveyed enough of how the line of thought goes to give us
something to work with. And I want to flag a few things.
The key points seem to be:
o Criticism cases are seen to suggest a knowledge norm; the epistemolo-
gists who have liked that thought have generally read the action side
of the relevant (bi-)conditionals in terms of practical rationality.
o Combining the knowledge norm with intuitions about the rationality
of action in encroachment cases (as the indirect reading suggests) is
supposed to show that, to put it very colloquially, it's harder to know
9. "Practical matters affect whether you know" is in fact the title of a (2013) paper by
Fantl & McGrath.
10. Notice that the sufficiency direction is required; the necessity side alone is not enough.
11. Again, Fantl & McGrath define shiftiness in their (2012, 55) as the claim that "factors
such as practical stakes and salience can matter to the truth-value of 'knowledge'-
ascriptions," where this is supposed to be a (statement of the) claim that contextualists
and interest-relativists, or subject-sensitive invariantists, both endorse.
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something (p) when more is at stake (for whether p).12 Why? Because
the norm says that if it's practically irrational for you to act on p
(which high stakes may make the case), then you don't know p.
However, if the knowledge norm was not about practical rationality as these
theorists suppose, then this link between having a knowledge norm and
having knowledge be shifty might break. And that's where the picture
of intentional action I've developed in other work comes in; I'll sketch it
now.
2.2 INTENTIONAL ACTION'S AIM: PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
Anscombe said when you act intentionally, you know what you're doing
in a special way, 'without observation' or inference.1 3 Remember how we
began: if you ask me why I'm typing to the rhythm of 'Formation,' and
I say that I didn't know that I was, then I'm not doing it intentionally.14
Add another thought: if instead I say, "Huh-I see that I am!" then I
am still not intentionally typing to the rhythm of 'Formation,' even though
I am probably intentionally typing. If I know what I'm doing, but only
because, prompted, I find myself doing it, that's not the kind of knowledge
12. I noted earlier that many of the encroachment cases have their origins in the contextu-
alist literature. And in fact there has been a substantial debate between contextualists
and what I'll call interest-relativists about which is the right way to explain the apparent
shiftiness present in these cases. Williamson (2005) helpfully crystallizes key differences
between the two views; Stanley (2005) goes to great lengths to rebut the contextualist
alternative. There are certainly differences, and not only because interest-relativists are
concerned with knowledge while contextualists are concerned with 'knowledge.' But
there are important similarities in the projects as well (cf Fantl & McGrath 2012): both
camps are proposing shifty epistemologies. I take it that what I say here should apply
equally, with appropriate translation, to contextualist accounts, but in the interest of
concision I will not walk through how that goes.
13. See Anscombe 1963, e.g. 13-15, 49-50, for discussion of the non-observational, non-
inferential nature of this knowledge.
14. See also Hampshire (1967, 95) on this point.
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that distinguishes intentional action. Similarly, if my reply was "Hmm. I'm
typing to the rhythm of the song Beyonce sang at the Super Bowl. And the
song she sang at the Super Bowl was 'Formation.' So I guess I am typing
to the rhythm of 'Formation,"' then it still seems like I wasn't intentionally
typing to the rhythm of 'Formation,' because I had to infer that that was
what I was up to.
Anscombe took these data points and drew a natural (albeit strong) conclu-
sion: intentional actions are knowledgeable (from the first point); the way
this knowledge is had is, we might say, interestingly direct, as it is not de-
rived from observation or inference (from the second and third points). This
directness also means the agent's special knowledge does not rest on suffi-
cient prior evidence-where by 'prior' I mean 'existing before the formation
of an agent's intention.' This is true even though this special knowledge
routinely relies in part on observation or inference; an agent will and must
generally know many things about her circumstances, her abilities, etc., and
she will know them in a variety of ways: the possession of such ordinary
empirical knowledge is, for Anscombe, a necessary precondition of the spe-
cial knowledge the possession of which is distinctive of intentional action.
But the agent's special, direct knowledge itself does not and cannot rest on
that evidence alone. In other words, a candidate intention-a description
of a possible action-will incorporate various pieces of the agent's ordinary
empirical knowledge. But when the agent converts that candidate intention
from a possible intention into an actual one, the agent's knowledge that this
is what she is doing is not itself empirical.
If I'm intentionally typing to the rhythm of 'Formation,' then when you
ask me why I'm doing that, I'll say something like "Because that's how you
slay, paper-wise." This is another face of the key Anscombean thought:
when I act intentionally, I am able to answer a special kind of question;
Anscombe (1963, 9) says, "A certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given
application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive,
gives a reason for acting." The knowledge that underpins my answer is
Anscombean practical knowledge, an agent's special knowledge of what she
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is doing and why. The 'what' puts the agent in a position to accept the
applicability of the question, and the 'why' is the answer. There is much
more to say to get a full picture of Anscombean practical knowledge, and
I will not take on that task here.1 5 What I want to emphasize is, first, the
requirement of (a special kind of) knowledge-one that is bound up with
the possibility of engaging with reasons-and, second, the way this special
knowledge is, essentially, a non-accidental match between mind and world
that is secured by the agent's intention, her representation of what she is
doing and why-because the intention not only describes something that
happens, but also in an important sense causes that happening. 16 ,17
But there's a problem: it is not true that all instances of intentional ac-
tion involve the agent's knowing what she is doing in this way: there are
counterexamples, as Davidson and others have shown. For example, and
perhaps most worryingly, I can intentionally # without even believing that I
am doing so, and thus without knowing it. Davidson's (2001, 91-2) famous
case involves a person making ten carbon copies at once, while in profound
doubt that he is doing so. If you ask him why he's making ten carbon copies
at once, he'll say "I don't know that I am; I mean, I hope so, but what are
the odds?" Setiya has noted that there are counterexamples of this kind
even for basic actions like simple bodily movements-if I have recently had
an episode of paralysis, I might intentionally clench my fist during an early
stage of my recovery while being far skeptical about my ability to do so to
15. I will not address, for example, what makes this knowledge distinctively practical,
though this practicality is crucial to the justification for the agent's belief about what
she is doing. See Setiya (2008), as well as Velleman (1989), for more on the epistemo-
logical question and its connection to the practicality of practical knowledge.
16. Just what kind of causation intention might involve is a difficult question, and I here
set it aside.
17. For more detail about my preferred understanding of practical knowledge, see my (ms);
my talk here of a 'match between mind and world' and my invoking intentions as mental
states diverge from Anscombe's behaviorist preferences, but are I think clarifying.
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count as believing that I am doing it. 18 So Anscombe's necessary condition
does not hold.
2.2.1 SAVING THE ANSCOMBEAN THOUGHT
Other theorists sympathetic to Anscombe have suggested we should avoid
the counterexamples by weakening one half or the other of the knowing what
you're doing requirement-either weakening the attitude, requiring some-
thing less than knowledge, or weakening the doing-related content known. 19
I suggest we should want more. We should want the full-strength attitude,
and the full-strength action, and their success should vary together. What
we should give up in deference to the counterexamples, I argue, is the ne-
cessity claim. An agent who acts intentionally has Anscombean practical
knowledge of what she is doing when things go well; when (and to the ex-
tent that) she fails to know what she is doing, her action is defective qua
intentional action.
In other words, knowing what you're doing is a normative condition on
intentional action, not a necessary one. Anscombe was mistaken, but on the
right track, in saying that when you act intentionally, you know what you're
doing in a special way; sometimes you fail to have this knowledge, even as
you act intentionally, as the counterexamples show. The right thought is
that such failures occur in cases of intentional actions that are defective as
such.
To state the principle I advocate:
NEED TO KNOW: When you act intentionally, you aim at practical
18. See, e.g., Setiya (2016, 41).
19. For the attitude-weakening approach, see Setiya (e.g. 2016, 9-12; 2012, 18). For the
alternative, see Thompson (2008, 2011). It's worth noting that Anscombe herself seems
not to have endorsed Thompson's strategy; see her 1963 ( 29), where she said, "Another
false avenue of escape is to say that I really do in the intentional sense whatever I think
I am doing." I discuss these alternative views at length in my (ms).
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knowledge, the agent's special knowledge of what she is doing, how,
and why; when (and to the degree that) you fail to have such knowl-
edge, your action is defective, though it can still be intentional.
This is not to say that an action is more or less intentional, depending on
whether (or to what degree) the agent achieves practical knowledge. Rather,
an intentional action, in virtue of being an intentional action, is better or
worse as such depending on whether (or to what degree) the agent achieves
practical knowledge.
The full argument for my view proceeds from a claim about how inten-
tional actions are to be distinguished from nearby phenomena-ranging
from wishes or idle predictions that come true, to merely failed attempts,
to cases of deviant causation-and finds that it is precisely NEED TO KNOW
that marks off the class of intentional actions. It is thus constitutive of
intentional actions that they are defective when, and to the extent that,
the agent fails to have practical knowledge of what she is doing (and how,
and why). What it is to be an intentional action is to be subject to this
condition.
So, again, what NEED TO KNOW captures is a constitutive aim of intentional
action: what it is to be an intentional action is to aim at practical knowledge,
which is to say that to be an intentional action is to be better or worse as
such depending on whether (or to what degree) the agent in question has
practical knowledge of what she is doing, and how, and why.
If the notion of a constitutive aim seems mysterious, it may help to think
in terms of artifacts, because constitutive aims are closely connected to
something like essential functions. So if I have a thermometer, it is better
or worse, qua thermometer, depending on how well it measures the tem-
perature. If a thermometer is very inaccurate, so that it does not in fact
distinguish, say, 350 from 65*, it will be a very poor thermometer indeed,
but it will still be a thermometer. The reason it is evaluable on the basis of
how well it measures temperature is precisely because it is a thermometer;
if it were instead a cup or a cookie, it would not be evaluable on the basis of
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measuring temperature. There may be other ways we evaluate thermome-
ters: by how easy they are to manufacture in quantity, or how beautiful or
durable or inexpensive they are, or how significant the uses are to which
they have been put. But what it is to be a thermometer is to be evaluable
according to how well (or badly) one measures temperature, so measuring
temperature is the constitutive aim of a thermometer.
The thought here is also precisely analogous to other constitutive aim talk in
philosophical theorizing: for example, many people think it is constitutive of
belief that it aims at truth. On this view, beliefs are defective when (and to
the extent that) they fail to be true, and the existence and centrality of this
mode of assessment distinguishes beliefs from other, similar phenomena,
such as imaginings. 20  Being true is in some sense what beliefs are for,
the thinking goes, just as measuring temperature is what thermometers are
for.
On my view, intentional actions are distinguished by the aim of practical
knowledge; intentions are the mental state whose function is to instantiate
such knowledge. This function can be achieved to a greater or lesser degree-
just as in the case of thermometers-so intentional actions likewise have a
constitutive aim. It is the role of an intention to guide and secure an agent's
action; intentions are the mental states that capture what the agent seeks
to do, and how, and why, and then cause the agent to do that thing, in
that way, for that reason. When, and to the extent that, things go well, so
that an intention hooks up with the world as it should, then that intention
constitutes practical knowledge, the agent's special knowledge of what she
is doing, how, and why.
To sum up: While there was something appealing in Anscombe's idea that
agents acting intentionally know what they are doing in a special way, her
claim is subject to counterexamples, and so fails as a necessary condition.
20. The earliest statement I know of of the claim that belief aims at truth is found in
Williams (1973); see also Railton (1994), and especially Velleman (2000).
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But if we revise the claim, converting it to a normative condition as in NEED
TO KNOW, we find we have a constitutive aim, and thus a standard that
allows us both to distinguish intentional actions from nearby phenomena
and to evaluate them as better or worse qua intentional actions.
2.2.2 A CLARIFICATION AND A CAVEAT
It's important to be clear that while I have argued that intentional actions
have a constitutive aim, an aim by which we distinguish them from nearby
phenomena and which provides an internal standard of evaluation, I have not
argued for constitutivism about practical reason, the view-most famously
advanced by Korsgaard (e.g., 2009) and Velleman (e.g., 2000, 2009)-that
(all) the demands of practical reason are derived from the nature of agency.
As with the thermometer that can be evaluated for cost, beauty, or historical
interest in addition to its ability to measure temperature, so for all I have
said we may evaluate intentional actions by any number of distinct, external
standards of practical rationality, asthetics, morality, and more, as well as by
the internal standard of NEED TO KNOW. I have said nothing that requires
that we get all our standards for action from the nature of agency; I have only
suggested that we get an interesting standard for action from the nature of
agency. In other words, for the purposes of this paper I am taking a position
in the middle ground. To one side of me would be those who think there is
no kind of normative standard constitutive of, or derivable from the nature
of, agency; to the other, the constitutivists, who think agency is the source
of all the other standards (whose otherness is thus merely apparent). It may
be that this middle ground is unstable, and that the only live possibilities
are all or nothing. 2 1 It's worth noting that while I have not, as I keep saying,
argued for a constitutivist view, neither have I ruled out the possibility of
developing one from the materials here at hand. There is more to say on
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21. cf Setiya (2013, 2014).
this subject, but that is a project for another day.22
2.3 A DIFFERENT FLAVOR OF KNOWLEDGE NORM
The argument sketched above, leading up to NEED TO KNOW, provides a
ground-up theoretical underpinning for a principle that makes good sense of
both criticism and encroachment cases, but in a very different way. Here's
what I mean.
NEED TO KNOW says intentional actions are defective when, and to the
extent that, the agent fails to have practical knowledge of what she is doing
(and how, and why). And that is already to say that intentional actions are
subject to a knowledge norm: practical knowledge (of what one is doing, and
how, and why) is necessary for non-defective action by the lights of NEED TO
KNOW. One might wonder: is it also sufficient? Yes. The argument for NEED
TO KNOW built up to the requirement of practical knowledge by thinking
about what would be needed in the good case, for an agent to do well in
acting intentionally as such. The thought was that intentional actions differ
from similar phenomena in virtue of aiming at a particular kind of non-lucky
match between what the agent has in mind and what happens in the world,
and it turns out that that aim is achieved when the agent has practical
knowledge, because then her intention is both an accurate description of
what happens, and non-luckily so, because the intention is in an important
(if tricky) sense the cause of what happens. 23
Given that, to say that practical knowledge is insufficient for non-defective
action would be to say that the argument for NEED TO KNOW does not go
through, not to say that practical knowledge is necessary but insufficient
for non-defective action. To put it another way: the aim captured in NEED
22. I take the project up in my (forthcoming).
23. Again, I will not take up the many interesting and thorny questions about causation
and intention.
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TO KNOW is like the aim of getting out of the rain. I can have that aim
and fulfill it only partly by ducking under a sparsely-leafed tree, so that
I'm getting wet at a slower rate but definitely still getting wet; but once I
step inside a building, with a proper roof and walls, so that I'm not getting
wet anymore at all, then I've satisfied my aim of getting out of the rain,
and nothing more is required-it wouldn't improve my performance relative
to the aim of getting out of the rain to go deeper into the building to put
additional distance between the rain and me, or to find a room with no
windows so that I can't even see the rain, or to keep an umbrella over
my head indoors. Practical knowledge is the building: practical knowledge
comes with the factivity and the anti-luck condition that, applied to the
contents of intention, are all we need for non-defectiveness.2 4
So the arguments thus far, if successful, show that practical knowledge (of
what one is doing, how, and why) is necessary and sufficient for non-defective
action by the lights of NEED TO KNOW. But it's worth noting, again, that the
kind of defectiveness in question is defectiveness qua intentional action. As I
emphasized in 2.2.2, it would take significant further argument to assimilate
this kind of defect to the defects of practical rationality that have been
operating in the existing theories about knowledge norms and shiftiness.
For all I have said, an action that is non-defective qua action, which is to
say one that is knowledgeable in the way NEED TO KNOW requires, might
still be defective in some other way, or any number of other ways: it might
be less than satisfactory asthetically, or perhaps morally or prudentially or
as a matter of etiquette, or, indeed, in terms of practical rationality. (Or,
indeed, vice versa.) Again, as I said above, I have not argued that NEED TO
KNOW identifies the only way in which an action can be defective.
All together, the view we've been building up to entails that intentional
actions are subject to a biconditional knowledge norm. In its most general
form, it would be something like: an intentional action is non-defective
24. Again, see my (ms) for the details of the argument for NEED TO KNOW.
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qua intentional action if and only if it instantiates practical knowledge, the
agent's special knowledge of what she is doing, how, and why. But that's
not quite the same kind of thing as the norms that have been bandied about
in the epistemology literature I've mentioned. Those norms were more like
this one, from Hawthorne & Stanley (2008, 578):
HAWTHORNE & STANLEY'S PRINCIPLE: Where one's choice is
r-depen-dent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that r as a
reason for acting if and only if you know that r.
Does NEED TO KNOw entail anything like that? Yes.
The conception of practical knowledge as the special knowledge an agent has
of what she is doing, how, and why makes it natural to think of intentions
as structured with three 'slots' that must be addressed: One intends to #
by means m for reason(s) r.2 5 The three slots reflect the kinds of contents
needed for an agent to have practical knowledge. Combining the very general
formulation of the knowledge norm entailed by NEED TO KNOW and stated
above with this view of the content of intentions allows us to reformulate
the general statement a bit, to say:
KNOW IT ALL: One can non-defectively # by means m because r if and
only if one has practical knowledge that one is q-ing by means m
because r.
The practical knowledge aimed at in every intention is knowledge of the
whole complex. But to have that, one needs to know facts about one's cir-
25. In the full argument for my view in my (ms), I take care to leave open the possibility
of acting intentionally for no particular reason, and of basic intentional actions, which
is to say actions which require no means (beyond, we might say, the intention itself).
But as discussed in more depth there, because of the interdependence of the various
(potential) parts of an intention-the way that the question of what counts as #-ing as
the agent intends, and questions about why she aims to #, and questions about how
she is to #, are all bound up together-it makes sense to understand all intentions as
in a certain sense asking about reasons and means, even if those slots may sometimes
be left unsaturated.
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cumstances, one's aims, one's reasons, one's means; knowledge of all these
kinds is what enables practical knowledge in our sense. As Anscombe said,
having practical knowledge means being able to answer a host of 'why?'
questions, in several different ways. 26 Thus practical knowledge is con-
stituted by, and requires, knowledge of a bunch of propositions-things
like:
o I am #-ing.
o I am #-ing because r.
o r.
o I am 0-ing by means m.
o m is a means to 0-ing as I intend.
o s is a step in means m, which is a means to 0-ing as I intend.
And so on. Therefore, KNOW IT ALL has many corollaries; we derive them by
extracting the components of the intention from the complex as contained
in KNOW IT ALL, to capture all this necessary component knowledge. So
one can non-defectively 0 because r if and only if one can know that one
is #-ing because r, which entails also that one can non-defectively so act if
and only if one knows the proposition r that is the reason. Why is that last
step true? Because 'because' is factive.
But one might object: Why can't r be my reason even if I don't know
it? Indeed, even if I'm wrong about whether r? This seems like an ordinary
occurrence, after all. (I'm not saying that I called my mother for her birthday
yesterday even though it wasn't her birthday, but, ahem, one might.) Since
'because' is factive, these won't be cases of acting because r, but it seems
as though they could be cases of having r as my reason without knowing it.
We can call these cases of acting on the ground that r; the 'on the ground
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26. See Anscombe 1957, 9ff.
that' formulation is not factive, as Dancy (2000, 131ff) notes. So why can't
I know what I'm doing in the way KNOW IT ALL requires just as long as I
know that I'm acting on the ground that r?
The answer is that when you take r as your reason for acting, you have to
take yourself to be acting because r, or aiming to, even though you may in
fact be mistaken about that. Why? Because acting (merely) on the ground
that r leaves open whether r, so to take yourself to be acting (merely) on
the ground that r is in some sense to take the truth of r to be irrelevant.
But taking something as your reason, acting for that reason, can't involve
indifference to the truth of the reason. A reason is something that will guide
and and shape your action as part of your intention, but it can't do that if
you take no stand on its truth, and indeed if you are not in an important
sense invested in its truth.2 7
Consider: If you ask me why I'm cancelling my hike, and I answer that it's
raining, telling me that it's actually not raining after all is a way of telling
me that I'm not doing what I intend, i.e., cancelling because it's raining. I
won't respond that "Well, all that matters is that my reason for cancelling
was that it was raining, never mind that I was wrong about that!" On the
contrary, I am likely to lament having cancelled my hike for no reason. I was
mistaken about what I was doing, to my chagrin. To take something to be
a reason to 0 is to take it to matter whether r, either because the truth of r
bears on the desirability of #-ing, or because the truth of r counts in favor of
#-ing in some particular way rather than another. If r is your reason, then
it matters for guidance. So while I can be mistaken or uncertain whether r,
I cannot be agnostic whether r. That is why I must take myself to be acting
because r, which entails r, and not merely on the ground that r, which does
not entail r.28 And if I take myself to be acting because r, then I will be
27. My thinking about this question draws on Hyman (1999), as well as Gibbons (2001).
28. Of course, if I am uncertain whether r, that very uncertainty is likely to shape my
action; sometimes I will think acting on r under uncertainty is not worth the risk,
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mistaken about what I'm doing, in the way prohibited by KNOW IT ALL, if
I fail to know r.
To come at the question another way: what we are talking about in talking
about my acting on the ground that r (without taking myself to be acting
because r) is intending to q because I (merely) believe that r. But in a
case like that, it is not r that is my reason, but my mental state. And if
I incorporate my belief that r into my behavior in this way, while agnostic
about the truth of r, so that there is not any sense in which what I aim at is
to act because r, what we'll have is not a case of acting for the reason that
r, but of acting for the reason that I merely believe that r-in which case
it will not be r that guides my action, but my belief (and a strangely self-
consciously-mere belief, at that).29 But in any case these will not be cases
in which I take r as my reason for acting, so they are not counterexamples
to the claim that what practical knowledge requires includes knowledge of
the propositions that are your reasons-even though is true that we are in
fact often mistaken about purported facts we take to be reasons, and we
often explain our actions (especially retrospectively, after things have gone
awry) in terms of things we took to be reasons that were not actually the
case. The point is that in acting we cannot take our reasons to be other
than facts, and so we must know those facts if we are to know what we are
doing.
or sometimes I will alter my action so that I am acting on a weaker proposition, like
probably r or possibly r-as when I bring handouts for the conference even though
I'm planning to use slides, because I think it's possible I won't have the right dongle
to connect my laptop to the projector. This makes perfect sense on my view.
29. It's not obvious that this odd state would count as believing r. What would it mean
to believe that r while agnostic about the truth of r? But if I can believe r in this
way, if cases like this exist, I think they will be rather like certain cases in which one
acts from emotion without taking the emotion to be a reason for the action, along lines
discussed in Hursthouse (1991). So I might smile out of frustration, even though I
don't think being frustrated is a reason to smile; perhaps there are roughly analogous
cases for acting from a self-consciously-mere belief.
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All of which is to say that one corollary of KNOW IT ALL is that one can non-
defectively q for the reason that r if and only if one knows that r, because
an agent, in acting, must take herself to be q-ing because r. Any proposition
that fills the r slot in an intention will make that intention (as well as the
action that is the intention's execution) defective if the agent fails to know
the proposition. Therefore:
KNOWN REASONS: One can non-defectively act for the reason that r
if and only if one knows that r.
But KNOWN REASONS looks quite similar to Hawthorne & Stanley's principle
(henceforth HSP). So let's take stock.
Both KNOWN REASONS and HSP put appropriately/non-defectively acting
with r as one's reason on one side of the biconditional, where the other side
is about knowing r. But I have suggested that there is at least some reason
to think the kind of appropriateness in question is different.
Before I get into the different senses of appropriateness, though, it's worth
noting here a couple of other ways my view is different, and perhaps more
appealing, than those in the literature: on my view, the two directions of
the biconditional really are inseparable, symmetrical, and on equal footing.
Contrast Hawthorne & Stanley (and Fantl & McGrath), whose sufficiency
direction seems both less robustly supported when compared with the neces-
sity claim, and not symmetrical with it, since only the sufficiency direction
is qualified. My cleanly symmetrical biconditional is so precisely because
both sides are generated by one and the same argument. But Hawthorne &
Stanley (and Fantl & McGrath) have to provide a separate rationale for the
(restricted) sufficiency side.
Why think that the sufficiency direction is less well-supported than the
necessity side? Recall that the necessity direction rests on the Criticism
cases: it seems clear that acting on the basis of p without knowing p is
makes one subject to reproach. But sufficiency is not supported in this way.
For Hawthorne & Stanley and Fantl & McGrath, I said, it seems that the
sufficiency direction rests on the 'it's weird to combine a claim that you
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know p with a declaration that you ought to do something that is not what
you ought to do conditional on p' move. But that move seems not really to
hinge on the knowledge part of the picture; it's the definition of acting as if
p/p dependence in terms of a (rational) preference ordering based on p that
does the work. While the faultiness of failing to prefer as if p when one is in a
p world does mean that if you know p you ought to act as if p in the relevant
sense, on pain of irrationality, it likewise means that you at least sometimes
ought to act as if p if you merely believe p, or only if you are certain that p,
also on pain of irrationality. All of which is to say that Hawthorne & Stanley
(and Fantl & McGrath) have to do additional work, and via a strategy that
seems not really connected to the project of constructing a knowledge norm,
to get something that falls out automatically on my view.
But those are subtleties; let's talk about the flavor-of-appropriateness ques-
tion. In HSP, I have noted, it is natural to understand the kind of appropri-
ateness in question as having to do with practical rationality. Hawthorne
& Stanley (2008, 572) talk about how it would be wrong to take this ticket
will lose as a premise in practical reasoning about whether to sell a $1 ticket
in a 10,000-ticket lottery with a $5,000 prize for one cent. In the case, the
talk of what is appropriate to take as a premise echoes Weatherson's (2012)
concern with what to write on a decision table; the specifics of the odds and
the dollar values suggest that expected utilities of a standard sort are what
determines if the sale is a bad deal. In KNOWN REASONS, the kind of appro-
priateness (called, in my preferred formulation, non-defectiveness) in ques-
tion is about achieving practical knowledge. One must know one's reasons
because reasons figure in intentions, and practical knowledge is knowledge
in intention. To see whether one errs by the lights of KNOWN REASONS, one
does not ask what the expected utilities are; one asks if p is a constituent of
the intention.
So there are differences between my principle and previous proposals, despite
surface similarity. And perhaps the most important difference, of course, is
that my principle is supported by a ground-up argument, rather than just
intuitions about cases. So if I can explain everything they can, and my
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proposal has advantages both subtle and stark, it looks like my view is a
better option.
So let's consider some cases and compare results.
2.4 COMPARING RESULTS IN CASES
My principle will give us the 'expected' results in many cases; when my view
is at odds with its rivals, I'll suggest, my view gives a better picture. Let's
start with the criticism cases.
2.4.1 HSP VERSUS KNOWN REASONS IN CRITICISM CASES
In fact, HSP and KNOWN REASONS will often give the same intuitively plau-
sible results. For example, in criticism cases like Restaurant, they will agree
that Hannah errs if she takes the restaurant is down the street to the left as
her reason without knowing it to be so. My norm and the proposals from
the interest-relativists will agree that agents who act on the basis of r, or
take r as their reason for acting, go wrong if they do so without knowing
r.
But notice that the two norms will give different results if we vary the
case a little. Suppose we revise Restaurant so that Hannah's reason isn't
the restaurant is down the street to the left, but rather the restaurant is
probably down the street to the left. Hannah could well know that, even if
she doesn't know that the restaurant is down the street to the left. But if
we make this change-call the new case Restaurant*-then the enforcer of
HSP has no complaint to make. Hannah has taken something she knows as
her reason.
What does KNOWN REASONS tell us? It will agree with HSP that Hannah
acts appropriately in Restaurant*. However, there is more to say: KNOWN
REASONS is a mere corollary; it is derived from KNOW IT ALL. And if we fill
in Hannah's intention, so that what she intends is to get to the restaurant on
time, because the reservation is time-sensitive, then if her intended means
does not in fact secure their on time arrival, her intention is defective. And
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if she knows only that -the restaurant is probably down the street to the left,
it is lucky, in the way that rules out Hannah's being in the good case, if they
get to the restaurant on time. Her intended means is gappy; it leaves it open
whether or not that means is sufficient to secure the intended outcome. She
needs a favor from the world.
Of course, it is often the case that we have to act on fall-back propositions
like probably p. It is frequently the best we can do. But what my view
brings out, via the combination of KNOWN REASONS and KNOW IT ALL, is
both what Hannah does right and the ways in which she would wish for
better. Even when we don't or can't, limited and fallible creatures that we
are, know the full-strength p, and we therefore, because of other features
of our situation, decide to act on probably p because it is the best we can
do, we remain sensitive to the way in which the full-strength p would be
better. Thompson (2011, 209-10) makes a point in this spirit about the
carbon copier: he says that if one really were in that case, one would check
along the way to see how it was going, not write the whole page and then
find out. My view explains this; we often take whatever degree of practical
knowledge we can get, while still recognizing that more would be better. And
if we execute an overall defective intention when a non- or less-defective one
is available, we err. HSP does not give us the materials to see all this.
Now, a partisan of HSP might reply in one of three ways. First, she might say
that in fact she can capture the residual defectiveness in a case like Restau-
rant*, via the requirement of p-dependence: maybe the ranking of worlds
preferable if p, when p is the proposition that the restaurant is probably
down the street to the left, will be such that turning left is not preferable.
But I think this is not promising, and in any case, as I said above in talking
about the asymmetry of HSP in 2.3, going this way would mean that all the
interesting work is being done by the requirement of p-dependence, not the
requirement of knowledge, and indeed would seem to apply to a wide range
of attitudes, including mere belief and robust certainty.
Alternatively, she might say that the residual defectiveness is not part of
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the phenomenon in which she is interested; it's a separate question, like
questions about aesthetic value or etiquette. Again, I do not think this is
promising. This residual defectiveness has to do with the way an executed
intention does or does not serve to secure the agent's aimed-at outcome, as is
clear on my view. This is not, intuitively, an extraneous consideration to the
evaluation of action. Indeed, in the full argument for my view in my (ms),
the connection between practical knowledge and skill makes it clear that
this way of thinking is central to our evaluation of action: skillful actions
are ones in which the agent is better able to shape the world to her will.
Sometimes she will desire that the action be elegant, or polite, and if she is
skilled she will be able to make it so. But just noticing the structure of that
thought-the way that skill, the ability to manifest control-is a means to
the agent's ends, which might include things like aesthetic or other kinds of
value, shows that evaluation in terms of practical knowledge is not on a par
with those other forms of evaluation.
Finally, the HSP partisan might simply deny that there is any residual defect
here. But my description of Restaurant* does seem to capture something
significant, and of course my view underpins the case with theory built from
the ground up. So why should we take the HSP partisan's side?
To summarize, while HSP and KNOWN REASONS give the same results in a
range of cases-calling foul anytime an agent takes p as her reason without
knowing p-they can disagree. And when they do, I am suggesting, my view,
combining KNOWN REASONS and KNOW IT ALL, gives a more illuminating
account. In those cases, either the HSP partisan can't capture what's going
on in Restaurant*, or she can only do so by making use of machinery that is
external to the project of explaining why knowledge is important for action-
whereas my view makes the connection organic. My view does better.
2.4.2 HSP VERSUS KNOWN REASONS IN ENCROACHMENT CASES
What about encroachment cases? I have not yet said anything about those.
But the shiftiness claims that pairs like Bank (low stakes) and Bank (high
stakes) are supposed to motivate are the whole point for Fantl & McGrath,
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and Stanley (though perhaps not Hawthorne), and Weatherson.
The first thing to say is that KNOW IT ALL and KNOWN REASONS don't
obviously say anything at all about these cases. Remember, what we test
for with my norms is whether the agent knows what she is doing, and how,
and why. But what drives the verdicts about encroachment in the literature
is a claim about practical rationality; the claim is that, roughly, the expected
utilities won't come out right when the stakes are high. Since my view is not
based on such verdicts, it seems reasonable to say it makes no predictions
about encroachment.
This is already an interesting result: apparently, we can have a strong,
biconditional knowledge norm for action that does not entail shiftiness. Be-
cause stakes seem irrelevant to whether or not one knows what one is doing,
there's just no basis for a claim of encroachment. The indirect route to
encroachment-on which we move from a verdict that the agent should not
qf, plus a norm like HSP, to the claim that the agent does not know some
p-is not supported by my flavor of norm.3 0
This creates a new argumentative burden for those who have wanted to
argue for the entailment: they will need to demonstrate conclusively that
they are not simply mistaking my non-entailing norms for something that
does have such a consequence, especially since my norms capture at least as
many of the intuitive results (and are supported by a ground-up argument).
Of course, it would still be open to those who like encroachment to retreat
to the direct reading of these cases; if the knowledge norm plays no part in
the claim of encroachment, it doesn't matter if there are two possible flavors
of knowledge norm. Nothing I have said obviously militates against that
view.
But such a retreat is costly. First, because the direct reading, in foregoing
30. For reference, the discussion of indirect vs. direct encroachment is found in 2.1.2
above.
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the explanatory component that the indirect reading offers, is less appeal-
ing just in virtue of lacking that explanatory component. Second, since
the direct reading relies essentially exclusively on intuitions about loss of
knowledge in high-stakes cases, it is both dialectically weaker and explicitly
vulnerable to evidence that those intuitions are not as robust or as clear as
the direct reading supposes-and recent empirical work, such as Schaffer &
Knobe (2012) and Rose, Machery, et al. (2017), provides reason to worry
about relying on these intuitions.
Of course, we might wonder: Is there anything in my view that actively re-
buts claims of encroachment, rather than just failing to support them?
Let's start thinking about that by exploring what my view might offer if one
wanted to say that Hannah actually can know the relevant p in both the low-
and high-stakes cases. (After all, as I said, one would naturally think that
stakes are irrelevant to whether Hannah knows what she is doing.) Consider
a slightly fleshed-out version of the pair of bank scenarios.
This time, suppose that Hannah is in the high-stakes case and intends,
plausibly enough, to make the deposit on Saturday because the bank will
be open then and the line will be shorter and the check will still clear before
Monday. Now suppose as a companion case that Hannah is in the low-stakes
case, and, also plausibly, intends to skip the line tonight because either the
bank will be open tomorrow or, if something bizarre happens, the deposit can
go in on Monday. Now, it's true that Hannah might, as a first pass, describe
both these intentions with the same words. If you asked her what she was
going to do about making the deposit, she might, in both cases, answer,
"I'm going to wait till Saturday to avoid the lines." But what I want to
suggest is that we shouldn't take that to be the end of the story.3 1
31. cf Fara (2013), for an extensive discussion of this kind of underspecification in the
case of a similar attitude, desire. My point here can be read largely as a translation of
her basic idea to the intention case. There is a good deal more to say about just what
intentions are like on my view, but I can't give the whole picture here; it is the project
of a further paper.
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The differences between the two intentions are subtle, but what I hope to
suggest is that as a matter of psychological fact we may, generally speaking,
configure our intentions somewhat differently depending on the stakes, and
in ways that matter. So high-stakes Hannah is in fact taking the bank's
being open on Saturday as her reason, whereas low-stakes Hannah is taking
something weaker, like the bank is probably open on Saturday as her reason.
If that's right, then high-stakes Hannah, but not low-stakes Hannah, errs
if she fails to know that the bank will be open on Saturday. Remember:
what my norms test for is whether the intention is such that the agent can
have knowledge in intention, so what is required is knowledge of what one
is doing, how, and why.
To come at the thought another way: It is quite natural for some kind of cost-
benefit analysis to be among our reasons for acting. So even if we haven't
actively or explicitly considered the question, if asked one of Anscombe's
why questions about the costs and benefits of what we're up to, we will
answer. Ask low-stakes Hannah why she is risking finding out that the bank
has changed its hours so that she'll have to wait till next week to make the
deposit, and she'll say that it's worth it to avoid the lines. But one thing
that we might expect of Hannah is that if she's in the high stakes case, she
will in fact, as part of her intention, aim to be ruling out even very unlikely
scenarios such as the bank's changing its hours-calling the case high-stakes
presupposes that the cost is substantial and to be avoided. If her intention
is configured that way, then it will be a different intention than low-stakes
Hannah's intention, which does not aim to rule out this unlikely possibility,
and there will therefore be different ways for it to be defective, because
different propositions will need to be known.
One way to see this is to think about the range of questions we might
ask Hannah. I said that low-stakes Hannah, we can suppose, will not be
configuring her intention so as to rule out a change of hours. But if you ask
high-stakes Hannah "Why are you risking the bank's being closed because
it has changed its hours?" I suggested we can expect her to say "I'm not-I
know they're open on Saturday." But if you ask even high-stakes Hannah
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something a bit different, say, "Why are you risking the bank's being closed
because of an alien invasion?" you will likely find there are wild possibilities
like this that her intention is not built to rule out-"Well, if we have an
alien invasion I'm thinking I'll have bigger problems than whether the rent
clears." In other words, on my view high-stakes Hannah will be relying on a
stronger proposition than low-stakes Hannah, but it's very likely that neither
is relying on a strict, literal reading of 'the bank will be open on Saturday.'
This is what I mean when I say that the way we describe our intentions will
be underspecified. High-stakes Hannah and low-stakes Hannah will probably
have intentions that differ in quite a few respects, including what claims they
make about whether the bank will be open. (And whether the subway will
be running on Saturday, and whether they will get caught up binge-watching
The Handmaid's Tale, and a host of other potential obstacles to getting the
check deposited on Saturday.) This is true even if they might give the same
(underspecified, shorthand) answer to what their plans are.
But this would just be a contingent psychological fact about Hannah. If
she were, instead, a financial thrill seeker, she might intend to take the risk
even when the stakes are high, in which case her action would not (or at
any rate, might not) be defective qua action.3 2 This is thus quite a different
picture than one in which the epistemic standard for knowledge varies with
stakes.
32. I say 'might not' because we haven't yet said quite enough about Hannah's total
cost-benefit picture. Keeping in mind how open the available 'why?' questions are, it
might be that even though Hannah intends to risk the bank's being closed (because
she's a thrill seeker), she might also not intend to, say, risk losing her job-but it might
be that if the bank is closed on Saturday so that her rent check bounces on Monday,
the mark on her credit caused by the bounced check will show up on a random credit
report performed by her employer. Hannah might therefore have an intention that is
not fully consistent-because she is acting on the ground that p and q, where p is that
I'm taking the thrilling risk of having the bank be closed and q is that I'm not risking
losing my job, but p and q cannot, as it happens, both be true-and this inconsistency
means that her intention can never be knowledge, which means it is defective by the
lights of NEED TO KNOW.
76
There's a lot of machinery here, but what I'm trying to get at is really two
points. The first is that agents very likely tend, as a matter of psychological
fact, to construct their intentions differently depending on things like stakes,
even if a casual statement of an intention would not reflect this. 33 The second
is that what will count as defective intentional action by the lights of my
view is a matter of what propositions actually do figure in an intention, and
of certain requirements of consistency among these constituent propositions.
Because the aim is knowledge in intention, the various propositions about
means, reasons, etc. must be known, and they must fit together in such a
way that the whole complex can itself be known.
Combined, I want to suggest, these two thoughts mean that we can make
good sense of many encroachment cases-sometimes getting the same results
as the interest-relativists, and sometimes getting different, but (I have ar-
gued) better, results-but without needing to claim that knowledge is shifty.
In high-stakes cases, agents will tend to construct their intentions so as to
rule out the possible bad outcomes, which will require knowledge of stronger
propositions (p rather than probably p, for example) or more propositions
(because one might intend finer control, and so need more detailed knowl-
edge of means, for example). It will thus indeed normally be harder to
know what one needs to know when the stakes go up; but this will be only
a matter of contingent psychological fact, and the explanation is not that
what it takes to know a given proposition varies with one's practical situa-
tion, it's that what propositions must be known varies with one's practical
situation. 34
33. Again, see Fara 2013.
34. My view is thus compatible with something like the insensitive invariantism proposed
in Williamson (2005). But where Williamson says that it may be that when stakes go
up we simply, as a psychological matter, want to know that we know p, or know that
we know that we know p; I am making a more general claim that what we want to
know, usually, when the stakes go up, is just different stuff, which will often include
the iterations of knowledge he mentions, but also will likely include stronger and/or
more propositions of various kinds, as discussed here.
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All of which is to say that on my view, a plausible empirical regularity
in human intention formation in response to changes in stakes is likely, in
combination with the underspecification of intentions and their contents,
to generate patterns that look very much like those predicted by interest-
relativists and other shifty theorists. Depending on how we fill in the cases,
we will often get the same intuitions about propriety. We can vindicate the
sense that it's often harder to know what you need to know to act properly
when the stakes are high-but in a way that has very different theoretical
upshots.
It's worth considering one more example, to bring out the key thought that
we can expect agents in high-stakes situations to, generally, tailor their
intentions so as to avoid the possible very bad outcomes.3 5 Suppose I am
a neurosurgeon operating on someone's brain, so that if I make a mistake I
am likely to cause severe brain damage. It will be natural for me to choose
my intended means so as to rule out such mistakes; I'll add various double-
checking steps, I'll avoid coffee if it might make my hands shake, etc.
But if we suppose instead that I am a neurosurgeon trying out an idea for a
new surgical technique in a computer simulator, it will then be unsurprising
if I intend to omit some of those steps. This difference in my intention
changes what facts I need to know: when I'm performing the real surgery, I
need (if I am a normal, responsible neurosurgeon) to know propositions such
as I confirmed that the patient's tumor is in the right cerebral hemisphere
and my hands are not shaking; if I'm just trying an idea out in the simulator,
maybe part of what I want to find out is if having coffee beforehand will
make my hands shake too much to pull it off, so that I would not need to
know that my hands are not shaking.
What needs to be known, on my view, is a matter of what is required for
the intention to be a candidate for knowledge: so anything that figures in
35. Even though this is, as I have said, a contingent feature of the agents' psychology,
which we can see by reflecting on our alternative Hannah, the financial thrill seeker.
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the intention-as a reason, or as a means, or as an end-must be known,
and the various components must not be inconsistent or otherwise such as
to be jointly incompatible with knowledge of the whole. So when agents
tend to tailor their intentions in the face of high stakes so as to rule out
the possible very bad outcomes, that will change what propositions must be
known-and, usually, by requiring either knowledge of stronger propositions,
or knowledge of more propositions, or both, thereby increasing the agent's
epistemic burden. I
But even though the picture I'm proposing gives us reason to expect that in
most cases, agents will react to increases in stakes by altering their intentions
in ways that make it more difficult to know what they must in order to have
practical knowledge, the view does not support the claim that this increased
epistemic burden necessarily comes with increases in stakes (because we
can construct cases where it does not, along the lines of the financial-thrill-
seeking Hannah, above), or that knowledge itself is interest-relative (because
the reason it is often harder to know what you need to know when stakes
are high need not have to do with a shifting standard for knowledge, but
can rather be about changes in what contents must be known).
2.4.3 A CAVEAT: NOT JUST CASES
I have said that the arguments for shifty epistemology proceed largely on the
basis of intuitions about these two types of cases, and that this leaves the
shifty theorists at a disadvantage when faced with my view, which is sup-
ported by a ground-up argument. But I should note that Fantl & McGrath
(2009, but especially 2012) do attempt to provide a principled argument for
shiftiness. Unfortunately, it does not help them with the arguments of this
paper.
Their argument (Fantl & McGrath 2012, 64-72) is really more of a schema,
as they take it that there are any number of ways of filling out the premises,
but the key idea, they say, is that if knowledge is compatible with something
less than certainty, and knowledge requires what they call "actionability,"
then there will be pairs of cases like the high- and low-stakes Bank cases,
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where changes in stakes affect actionability, and so whether one knows,
in basically the way I describe in discussing the indirect reading of the
Encroachment cases in 2.1.2: the expected utilities won't work if knowledge
doesn't require probability 1.
At the heart of the argument is the claim that no matter how you understand
actionability-no matter what the specifics are of the principle you use to
link knowing p to being able to (non-defectively) act on p-you will find that
whether p is actionable in a particular case will depend on stakes.
But that is precisely what I deny: my view gives us knowledge norms that
serve perfectly well as statements of actionability, but they do not combine
with fallibilism to entail shiftiness. What does the work for me is not degrees
of certainty and expected utilities, but the fact that knowledge is factive and
rules out relevant kinds of luck. So Fantl & McGrath's principled argument
fails, because there is a way to understand actionability that does not give
them what they need. (It's worth noting that their argument actually still
requires the case judgments, too.)
2.5 CONCLUSION
All told, this paper does several things. First, and crucially, it connects-
for the first time-discussions about the link between knowledge and action
that have taken place in Anscombean action theory and in recent epistemol-
ogy, and shows that action theory can help illuminate the epistemological
debate. To that end, it explicates some knowledge norms that follow from
my Anscombe-inspired view of the nature of intentional action, and shows
how those norms can deliver satisfying results in criticism and encroachment
cases, and often more illuminatingly than previously proposed norms-so my
view can honor the intuition that, for example, an agent who takes r as her
reason for acting, but does not know r, has gone wrong, concurring with the
shifty theorists but also offering an explanation; and my view allows us to
say more about why certain cases where an agent does know her reason will
still be less than ideal.
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Finally, it serves at least to bring into question the motivation for claims
that knowledge is shifty. Because the main basis for earlier discussions has
been intuitions about cases, and my view captures the cases at least as
well, while also being supported by a ground-up independent argument, the
burden is now on those who want to argue either for knowledge norms based
in practical rationality, or for the interest-relativity of knowledge, to explain
why those views should still be tempting in light of what I've said here. I
have not offered a knock-down argument against practical-rationality-based
norms, or against shiftiness. But I have eroded the rationale for those views,
and in ways substantial enough, I take it, to be debunking.
It may have seemed, till now, that recognizing the strong connection between
knowledge and proper action required going in for shiftiness. I hope to
have offered good news to those who find that a high price to pay. You
can intentionally acknowledge the importance of knowledge to acting well
without having to get all shifty about it. You just have to know what you're
doing.
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3 SHACKLING
Here's a thought: When you're a marginalized person, you tend to be judged
less knowledgeable than you are, and the conceptual tools people use to
produce and structure knowledge tend to mask important facts about you
and your experience. That's epistemic injustice, and it's everywhere. (Or
so Fricker (2007) argues.)
Here's another: Acting well requires knowledge; if you don't know what
you're doing, and how you're doing it, and why, something is going wrong.
(Or so I argue elsewhere.)1
I think both those thoughts are true, and furthermore that they interact in
an important way-or so I'll argue in what follows. Together, they entail
that to be denied the status of knower is to be denied the possibility of
acting well: so epistemic injustice does violence to the will.
If one cannot act well, either one must not act, or one must act defectively.
Those denied knowledge are thus in a double bind, forced to choose between
objecthood and wrongdoing. I call this shackling, because the word captures
the two sides of the predicament: shackles both constrain movement and
mark one out as a criminal. That's the phenomenon I'll explore in this
paper. As I'll show, given what action is like, epistemic injustice leads to
agential injustice: harms to agents qua agents.
1. See my (ms a).
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I'll begin with some background: in 1, I'll lay out my preferred way of
thinking about epistemic injustice, and in 2 I'll sketch my view about the
nature of intentional action and its connection to knowledge. The heart of
the paper begins in 3, where I'll connect these two lines of thought, setting
out in abstract terms the kinds of interactions we should expect to see-
the structure and mechanics of shackling. In 4 I'll discuss some cases that
demonstrate the ways shackling works in our world, before offering some
concluding thoughts about what it all adds up to in 5.
3.1 WHAT IS EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE?
The phenomenon of epistemic injustice was famously described by Fricker
(2007). She identifies two kinds, each of which is, she says, a distinctively
epistemic wrong, something 'done to someone specifically in their capacity
as a knower' (Fricker 2007, 1):
Testimonial injustice (according to Fricker): an unjust reduction in
the credibility of a speaker due to prejudice in the hearer
Hermeneutical injustice (according to Fricker): an unjust reduction
in the intelligibility (to herself and/or someone else) of facts relating
to a person who is a member of a marginalized group, due to gaps in
the community's interpretive resources
As stated, these definitions raise a lot of questions, even beyond "Can you
give me an example?" One might well wonder: What kind of injustice is
this supposed to be? Where and when does the injustice occur? Is it really
only a matter of individual exchanges? How can a hearer's failure to believe
be a harm to a speaker, and wrongful? What's especially wrongful about
failure to believe that's caused by prejudice? Is hermeneutical injustice only
a matter of a total absence of interpretive resources? When and why is it
unjust for someone not to have interpretive resources that would be helpful,
rather than merely unlucky? (Are we to suppose that every worker who
lived before Marx's time was unjustly deprived of his insights? How could
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that be?) Are the harms here purely instrumental? If so, how are they
distinctive? And so on.
In what follows, I will be working with a conception of epistemic injustice
that diverges from Fricker's in a few important ways. While I'll follow her
in discussing two broad types of epistemic injustice, I'll understand each of
them rather differently. Going my way will not only give us a better grip
on some important phenomena (or so I'll suggest), it will also help with the
questions above-either answering them, or making them less pressing. So
rather than taking up the questions now, I'll set out the way of thinking
I propose, highlighting the differences with Fricker and giving examples to
make clear what the target phenomena are supposed to be, so that we can
return to the questions with that view in hand.
I should say that I'm not going to offer a detailed argument that my view is
the correct view of epistemic injustice, as opposed to Fricker. First, because
I think it's plausible to understand what I offer as a friendly amendment to
and extension of her view. Second, I really just mean to describe something
whose existence in the world should be obvious (by the time I'm done)
and then stipulate that I'm going to call that thing 'epistemic injustice.'
As we'll see, I think my view can deal with or avoid some of the thorny
questions that arise for Pricker, and I take it that's a reason to think I'm
onto something. But I'm not interested in fighting about what should be
the One True Statement of epistemic injustice; for all I'll say here, there
may be many useful views in this neighborhood that are suited to different
purposes.
3.1.1 THE EPISTEMIC ECONOMY
The first key difference between my conception of epistemic injustice and
Fricker's account is that where Fricker takes epistemic injustice to be a
matter of wrongs done to and by individuals, occurring in particular inter-
personal interactions, I think it is, in the first instance, a structural phe-
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nomenon. 2 Fricker locates testimonial injustice in, for example, an event
in which a police officer fails to believe a young Black driver who says he
is the owner of the car he is driving through a white neighborhood.3 She
says hermeneutical injustice occurs, paradigmatically, when Carmita Wood
is unable to express her legitimate reason for quitting her job to the person
in charge of processing her departure, because the concept of sexual harass-
ment has not yet been invented.4 While I agree with Fricker that we should
expect to see interactions between individuals that flow from and/or instan-
tiate and/or manifest epistemic injustice, I propose that we have a lot to
gain by focusing our attention on the structural, rather than the individual,
level.
What do I mean by that? I mean that epistemic injustice, as I understand it,
has to do with the shape of, and patterns in, the social world.5 In particular,
I understand epistemic injustice to occur both in and through what I call
an epistemic economy.6
2. In this, I take myself to be in harmony with critiques of Fricker's individualistic method-
ology raised by Anderson (2012) and Haslanger (ms).
3. See Fricker 2013 (1319) for this case, a more detailed version of a general kind mentioned
several times in her 2007, beginning on p.1.
4. This case, now treated as paradigmatic throughout the literature on epistemic injustice,
is discussed at length in Fricker 2007 (149-151). But note that she is explicit that even
though the lack of the necessary concept suggests a systematic, structural problem, the
injustice only occurs in particular transactions: "the moment of hermeneutical injustice
comes only when the background condition is realized in a more or less doomed attempt
on the part of the subject to render an experience intelligible, either to herself or to an
interlocutor" (Fricker 2007, 159).
5. When I talk about patterns here, I don't mean to assume that justice is fundamen-
tally distributive, or to rule out a view of justice like Anderson's (1999) democratic
egalitarianism. I mean only that the fundamental locus of the problem is at the so-
cial/structural, rather than the individual/transactional, level.
6. 'Economy' talk is not alien to Fricker; she mentions a 'credibility economy' and an
'economy of hermeneutical resources' (Fricker 2007; 1, 30). But she does not pursue
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An epistemic economy is composed of various epistemic goods, along with
a system of practices involved in the production, reproduction, and distri-
bution of those goods. Epistemic goods, or epistemic resources, can include
anything of positive or negative epistemic value; so the epistemic economy
will traffic not only in knowledge, but also in what we might think of as the
raw materials for knowledge-such as, importantly for my purposes here,
conceptual and/or interpretive resources-as well as things like credibility
that are needed to participate in and benefit from the operation of the epis-
temic economy. It's natural to think of knowledge as the fundamental good
epistemic economies are concerned with, but conceptual tools and credi-
bility are also produced, reproduced, and distributed within such systems,
primarily as a means to the production, reproduction, and distribution of
knowledge. Many kinds of epistemic goods flow through this economy.
The provision of an exhaustive list of epistemic resources is beyond the scope
of this paper. But we can get a sense of the kinds of things that list will
include. Evidence is surely on the list, and I think that certain material
objects and even institutions (or access thereto) will also appear-consider
libraries. But both evidence and libraries suggest that list items will be
such under certain guises: a library is an epistemic resource insofar as it is
a repository of knowledge; it is not an epistemic resource when it's considered
as a place to get out of the rain. Given the many different accounts of what
evidence is-among which I will remain agnostic-we may need to make
similar moves. If evidence is just knowledge, as Williamson (2000, 185)
thinks, it's obviously an epistemic resource; if evidence can be fingerprints
on a bloody knife at a murder scene, we'll need to say that insofar as those
fingerprints help the detective learn the identity of the killer, they are an
epistemic resource; insofar as they contribute to a mess that will need to be
cleaned up, they are not.
the idea, and never suggests that there is an overarching epistemic economy in the
sense I'm interested in.
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What this means is that some things will, in certain circumstances, be prop-
erly called epistemic resources, even though it seems odd to call them such
a thing more generally: say, money, or health care. I think this is no great
mystery, though. Money and health care are resources of extreme general-
ity, useful and/or necessary for a huge range of human undertakings. They
are produced, reproduced, and/or distributed in many human systems. So
calling them epistemic resources will often be misleading, even if correct, in
that it will suggest that the role they play in the epistemic economy is their
primary role. It may well be that to build the exhaustive list of epistemic
resources, we'll need a definition as broad as 'knowledge, plus anything in-
strumental for knowledge'-which we'll then have to supplement with lots
of explanations of the various guises under which particular items do or do
not count.
But as I said, that project would take us off track. In what follows, I'll
talk mostly about two kinds of epistemic resources other than knowledge:
conceptual/interpretive resources, and credibility. What makes those things
epistemic resources? Let's start with credibility.
As mentioned above, credibility is needed for full participation in the epis-
temic economy; as Daukas (2006, 109) emphasizes, "epistemic cooperation
requires trust," and we base decisions about who to trust on assessments
of others' epistemic competencies. 'Credibility,' as I'll use the term here, is
close to Daukas' 'trustworthiness.' 7 As she sees it, this trust is epistemic
because it has to do with assessments of how closely someone approximates
an ideal of behaving "(when contextually appropriate) as though her epis-
temic status is S if and only if her epistemic status is S" (Daukas 2006,
111). However, as Daukas also notes, the trust required for full participa-
tion has a moral component as well; we assess sincerity, benevolence, etc.,
7. Daukas' discussion brings out the way that these assessments can contribute to and
constitute marginalization; I'm indebted to her discussion, which predates Fricker's
book.
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along with epistemic habits in deciding who to trust. So if we're roughly
following Daukas, we can see that credibility, or trustworthiness, has an
epistemic side-assessment of whether someone behaves in accordance with
her actual epistemic position-that is admixed with moralized assessment.
(This hybrid quality will figure in some of my discussion later.) Credibility
is an epistemic resource because it is a prerequisite for participation in the
epistemic economy. We do not engage with others in the giving and receiv-
ing of knowledge when we think they are untrustworthy; we tend not to
include them in the systems of production and reproduction of knowledge,
and we tend to act in ways that disadvantage them with regard to knowledge
distribution.
What about conceptual or interpretive resources? Above, I called these some
of the raw materials for knowledge-that's why they're part of the epistemic
economy. The concepts available to a thinker structure her thought; lack-
ing the concept blue, Homer called the sea 'wine-dark' and said oxen were
likewise 'wine-looking'. 8 The poet had many timeless thoughts; apparently
"oxen and oceans are different colors" was not among them. But what we
can't think, we can't know. And of course this is the point of Fricker's in-
vocation of the Carmita Wood case: Wood can't know she's been sexually
harassed if she has no such concept. 9
In what follows, I'll understand hermeneutical resources somewhat more
broadly than this, though: it's not just about what concepts we have; it's
also about how they fit together. One way to put the point is that concept
possession involves not only competence in naming-calling all and only the
Fs, 'F's-but also competence in responding to F-ness, recognizing what
8. British Prime Minister William Gladstone was the first to highlight Homer's strange
color talk; Deutscher (2011) has much more on the development of color concepts (and
words) from the ancient world to the present.
9. As will be more apparent later, I think the Carmita Wood case, as commonly discussed,
oversimplifies considerably.
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follows-in terms of inferences, interactions with other applicable concepts,
etc. So even if I was perfectly accurate at labeling all the ducks in the
world, I wouldn't be fully competent with the concept duck if I didn't grasp
how duckness relates to concepts like egg and swim, and how duckness is
incompatible with truckness, and so on.
And of course, as soon as we're talking about concepts that have to do with
items that are not just natural kinds, things get complicated fast. To adapt
an example from Haslanger (ms, 2), to be competent with the concept cook-
ing involves grasping human roles-preparer and consumer of food-which
can be filled by the same person or by different people; and also a whole
host of other concepts, from food and heat to cuisine-and those concepts
are inescapably tied to complex systems of farming and distribution, labor
and culture, and so on. In other words, concept possession ends up invoking
a bunch of practices: far more than a question of naming, it's about scripts
and narratives and relations (between people, between things, and between
people and things) and social meanings, a complex web of culture.1 0 All of
which is to say that concept possession involves a host of dispositions, both
to identify F-ness and to respond to it, where the appropriate responses
often require following culturally-given scripts and where the connections
between concepts will be captured in a web of narratives. In short, as the
title of Haslanger's paper suggests, 'cognition [is] a social skill.'
This is a big, complex area, and I can't do it justice here. But what we
need for the purposes of this paper is just to recognize that when I say that
one class of epistemic goods is hermeneutical resources, I'm not just talking
about words. Hermeneutics, interpretation, requires words plus the web of
their connections, which is structured by schemas and narratives. Knowing
10. I follow Haslanger (ms, 3) in taking practices to be "patterns of behavior that enable
us to coordinate due to learned skills and locally transmitted information, in response
to resources, and whose performances are 'mutually accountable' by reference to some
shared schemas/social meanings." What I say here is intended to be entirely compatible
with her view on this.
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you've been sexually harassed isn't just a matter of being disposed to utter
those words as a label for a way you've been treated; it's about recognizing
what it means, and what it calls for, to have been treated in that way. This
was, of course, why sexual harassment was called 'sexual harassment' in the
first place-the coiners of the term were consciously appropriating the legal
concept of harassment, importing the set of narratives and scripts about
harassment's wrongness, systems of redress, and so on.
So: I'm saying that there is a complex system of production, reproduc-
tion, and distribution for a class of epistemic goods, i.e., knowledge and
other epistemic resources, two kinds of which are credibility and concep-
tual/interpretive resources. What can we say about this system? And how
does thinking about it help us understand epistemic injustice?
The epistemic economy is a social structure, and it is embedded in and inter-
acts with other social structures large and small. For example, the epistemic
economy involves the educational system, which is a set of structures and
practices that function (in part) to create and disseminate knowledge and
mark those who possess it; 1 in this capacity the epistemic economy inter-
acts with the 'regular' economy, which takes advantage of the output of
the educational system-both the knowledge and the credentialing-in the
labor market, the intellectual property market, etc. At a more intimate
scale, families also interact with the epistemic economy, both in that there
are practices of knowledge production and distribution that operate within
families and in that the familial practices are both influenced by and inputs
to the larger system. Parents teach children, in the segment of the epistemic
economy that operates within the family, and parents are generally taken to
be authoritative with regard to what's best for children, in the extra-familial
epistemic economy. In short, the epistemic economy is complex, massive,
11. I say 'in part' because in the present-day United States the educational system has
other functions as well, such as providing the site of an enormous and lucrative sports
industry.
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and entangled with pretty much every other major social structure.
Because the epistemic economy is a social institution, it is a potential site
of injustice. There can be injustice in the distribution of epistemic goods,
for example, and the goods that are unjustly distributed can be of instru-
mental or intrinsic value. There can also be injustice that is not a matter of
distribution. In what follows I'll try to make clear which kind(s) of injustice
are operative in particular cases, but the kinds I'll be discussing will usually
be familiar. If you know what distributive justice is in other domains-say,
health care, or the job market-you're equipped to understand it here; it's
a different good being distributed, but the injustice in distribution will be
of an ordinary kind, for example.
Given this reorientation, I'll take a moment to say a bit more about how
I propose we understand testimonial and hermeneutical injustice in turn.
I think that with a few small adjustments we can translate Fricker's in-
dividualistic conceptions to something suited to my more structural ap-
proach.1 2
3.1.2 TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE, REVISITED
If my proposal is that we take epistemic injustice to be the general category
of injustice that occurs in and through an epistemic economy, how am I sug-
gesting we think about testimonial injustice? I propose two main changes,
which will also support a terminological adjustment.
First, unlike Fricker, I'm saying that testimonial injustice is to be under-
stood as the pattern of reductions in credibility suffered by members of
marginalized groups. It thus continues to exist, on my way of thinking, even
at a moment when (or if), somehow, no particular speaker happens to be
being disbelieved on the basis of her membership in a historically marginal-
12. I should say that given the sprawl and complexity of the epistemic economy, it's possi-
ble and even likely that there are other forms of epistemic injustice beyond testimonial
and hermeneutic, but I won't investigate that question here.
94
ized group. I think understanding testimonial injustice as a pattern makes
better sense of the way those who navigate it have to incorporate it into
their thoughts and plans, as a feature always present in the world they in-
habit. I'll say more about this below, but first I want to say a bit about
another way I'm going to diverge from Fricker in thinking about testimonial
injustice.
Specifically, I think the phenomenon should be understood to reach well
beyond testimony. I agree with Fricker that what is at issue is reductions in
credibility on the basis of social identity, but I think that testimony is only
one of many places that the problem manifests. Yes, it is unjust if members
of marginalized groups are treated as less credible in their assertions-and
it is also unjust, and unjust in the same way as in the testimonial cases, if
members of marginalized groups are treated as less credible (i.e., less well-
positioned epistemically, and/or less likely to behave in a way appropriate
to their epistemic position) in other situations.1 3
What I mean is that it is not only unjust that campus police officers very
often disbelieve what young Black men tell them about whether they are
students at the universities they attend. It is also unjust, and in the same
way, that women are very often treated as if they don't know what they
are doing, even if they're not talking at all. One woefully common mani-
festation of this is of course mansplaining, as when very skilled women at
the climbing gym are barraged with unsolicited, unnecessary, and unwanted
'helpful pointers' from men who are much less capable.
So as I'll be using the term, testimonial injustice refers to a structural fea-
ture of the epistemic economy, in which there is a pattern of members of
historically marginalized groups being subject to reduced credibility across
13. Recall that credibility, as I understand it here, is similar to the epistemic trustwor-
thiness discussed in Daukas 2006 (111), which says "A is epistemically trustworthy if
and only if A is disposed to behave (when contextually appropriate) as though her
epistemic status is S if and only if her epistemic status is S."
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a wide range of circumstances, including but not exclusive to testimony.
Because I want to include cases that are not about testimony, I will refer to
this kind of injustice as credal injustice.
Credal injustice is a clear distributive injustice. It's distributive because it
has to do with the allocation of credibility in the epistemic economy; it's
an injustice because the allocation of credibility is not based on people's ac-
tual epistemic positions (or behavior relative to those positions) but rather
on their social identities as members of marginalized groups. Credibility
is clearly of enormous instrumental value: I have defined it as a prerequi-
site for full participation in the epistemic economy. But I don't want this
instrumentality to mask the depth of the harm that credal injustice can
involve: the ability to be and to conceive oneself as a knower depends on
being granted the access and recognition that credibility supports. Which
is to say that there's an intrinsic harm here, along with the instrumental:
epistemic agents subjected to credal injustice are significantly cut off from
their epistemic selves. As Fricker says, they are harmed specifically in their
capacities as knowers.
I'll say more about the many faces of credal injustice below, and I'll work
through more cases. But for the moment, what we need is to register that
credal injustice, as I'm thinking of it, differs from Fricker's conception in
those two ways. I think it's structural, and I think it's about more than just
testimony. Epistemic injustice in the form of credal injustice can exist even
if it is not being instantiated in a particular transaction at a given moment,
because it's a matter of patterns in the social world. And epistemic injus-
tice in the form of credal injustice occurs whenever marginalized people are
treated as less credible just because of their social identities; mansplaining
is an injustice of the same kind as Fricker's cases of failure to believe some
bit of testimony.
3.1.3 HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE, REVISITED
As with testimonial/credal injustice, I want to diverge from Fricker in under-
standing hermeneutical injustice as a structural feature of epistemic economies,
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and then I also want to make a second adjustment.
Since hermeneutical injustice, even on Fricker's view, is about the presence
or absence of communal interpretive resources, it just seems natural to think
of it as a structural feature of the epistemic economy, having to do with
patterns in what is produced by the system. So this is a place where Fricker's
insistently individualistic methodology seems especially odd. But aside from
that, we might again ask if she is arbitrarily limiting the range of cases in
ways we might want to avoid.
Consider the famous case of the missing concept sexual harassment. It's
natural to think that something has gone wrong if a community's conceptual
and interpretive resources are simply silent on large swaths of significant
experiences, just because those experiences belong to marginalized people,
even aside from questions about particular transactions in which failures of
intelligibility occur. As Stanczyk (2012) argues, justice concerns not only
how we choose to distribute the things we produce, but what we choose to
produce in the first place. Taking hermeneutical injustice to be a structural
problem, over and above its operation in particular transactions, takes this
thought seriously while still allowing productive discussion of the kinds of
particular transactions that concern Fricker.
Furthermore, beyond the structural versus transactional question, I want
to ask: Why take hermeneutic injustice to be solely a matter of missing
interpretive resources? Why not think that sometimes the issue will be
about defective interpretive resources, or conceptual tools that are imper-
fectly grasped? Just as I wanted to agree with Fricker that reductions in
credibility were the issue in testimonial/credal injustice while broadening
the range of cases in which we recognize those reductions as occurring, so
here I want to agree with Fricker that reductions in intelligibility are the
issue in hermeneutical injustice, while recognizing a broader range of causes
for those reductions.
Once again, recall Fricker's paradigm case: the missing concept of sexual
harassment. It's not, to me, quite obvious that the lack of that concept
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was the (only) problem; I'm inclined to say that part of the problem was
that the experiences of people being sexually harassed were understood to be
experiences of, say, flirting, where the application of an existing concept that
suggested benign-ness and even desirability, rather than some other existing
concept (perhaps something like lewdness) deepens the wrong. In other
words, the problem isn't that Carmita Wood and others had no words, that
they suffered from a pure absence of conceptual tools to understand what
was going on; it was that the community provided tools that affirmatively
misrepresented what was going on. 14
In short, even this supposed paradigm case looks rather more complex to
me than Fricker's discussion suggests. And I think that in fact there are
a number of ways the state of a community's interpretive resources and
patterns in grasp of those resources can reduce intelligibility in ways that
are harmful and unjust to members of marginalized groups. I'll describe
some more examples in detail below; for now, I hope that my suggestion
that even the Carmita Wood case has more facets than Fricker supposes
will give you something of the flavor of the revision I propose.
So just as with credal injustice, I want to understand hermeneutical injustice
as a structural phenomenon, and I want to broaden the range of cases in
which we recognize its occurrence. Just as I think we should focus on the
14. There's are some distinctions worth making here. Treating what happened to Wood as
an instance of flirting could be willful or not; the concept flirting might be defective or
not. In one scenario, 'flirting' does not capture what Wood experienced, but someone
calling what she experienced 'flirting' just doesn't fully grasp what flirting is. In this
case, the misapplication is not willful, and the concept is not defective; we've just
got operator error in the use of a concept. In another scenario, 'flirting,' as used in
the community, really does include what Wood experienced. But this would (one could
argue) mean that flirting was in some sense a defective concept. In yet another scenario,
we can imagine that calling what Wood experienced 'flirting' is a willful misuse of the
concept, that will be, if systematically undertaken, similar to certain propagandistic
uses discussed in Stanley 2015 (50ff and throughout). As he notes (see 50ff), the
language of liberal democratic ideals is often deliberately (mis-)used, coopted, to cover
up the gaps between those ideals and reality. In what follows, I'll try to be clear about
which of these possibilities is at work in particular cases.
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idea of patterns of reductions in credibility and not limit ourselves to cases
of testimony in particular, so also I want to focus on the idea of reductions
in intelligibility, and not limit ourselves to cases only of absent interpretive
resources. If we go my way, we can see how there are both distributive
and non-distributive injustices here. And we can see that there are both
instrumental and intrinsic harms caused by this form of injustice as well:
hermeneutical injustice causes instrumental harm when it prevents Carmita
Wood's getting the redress she deserves; it causes intrinsic harm when it
puts knowledge about important aspects of marginalized people's identities
out of reach (about which more below).
3.1.4 THE KEY DIFFERENCES IN MY PICTURE COMPARED TO FRICKER'S
Fricker gets a lot right. But I think she misunderstands where epistemic in-
justice is really located, and I think she misses some important kinds.
To summarize: Unlike Fricker, I conceive of epistemic injustice as fundamen-
tally a structural feature of epistemic economies, rather than a property of
particular individual interactions. This affects how I understand both credal
and hermeneutical injustice, shifting the focus to patterns rather than indi-
vidual transactions.
I also make a further amendment in conceiving each of these forms of epis-
temic injustice, broadening their application. In the case of credal injustice,
I think the relevant pattern is found not only with regard to testimony, but
also with regard to assessments of members of marginalized groups' credi-
bility in general. In the case of hermeneutical injustice, I think the relevant
issue is not just about the lack of needed interpretive and/or conceptual
resources, but also certain kinds of defective use of such resources, whether
because the resources are not fully developed, or because they are defective,
or because the agent has only partial grasp of or access to them. Fricker
misses all these additional kinds of epistemic injustice; I think they're im-
portant.
Given all that, here are amended definitions of our central terms:
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Epistemic injustice (according to me): structural injustice in the op-
eration of the epistemic economy, which can include, possibly among
other forms:
Credal injustice (my version of testimonial injustice): a pattern of
unjust reductions in credibility for members of historically marginal-
ized groups 15
Hermeneutical injustice (my version): a pattern of unjust reductions
in the intelligibility (either to herself or others) of facts relating to
people who are members of marginalized groups, due to defects in the
community's interpretive resources or members' grasp and/or deploy-
ment thereof
A note: The inclusion in these definitions of a specific reference to marginal-
ized groups may seem surprising, but I won't argue for it here. I'm following
Fricker, who thinks that while individuals may be wronged when they (for
example) are given less than the appropriate amount of credibility in some
exchange for reasons other than prejudice connected to social identity, that
is not injustice. I find this thought even more plausible when we shift the
location of the fundamental problem to the structural level, and I suspect
that the kinds of patterns I'm leaning on are both evidence and instances
of oppression of the kind that is constitutive of marginalization. But that's
all I'll say about the question here.
As promised, I think some advantages of my amendments to Fricker's pic-
ture should now be clear. 'Going structural' allows several of our initial
questions to get answers of a kind we're familiar with. We can assimilate
questions about what kind of injustice this is to more familiar general types
of distributive and non-distributive injustice. We need not locate the injus-
15. It seems plausible to me that there are also patterns of unjust increases in credibility
for members of historically dominant groups, and these also count as credal injustice
in my sense, but in this paper I'll focus on the reductions.
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tice solely in particular individual transactions; structural features are the
fundamental issue.
As a result, several of our opening questions now seem less pressing: we
need not theorize about how a hearer can wrong a speaker by failing to
believe her, because we can understand the problem as one of distribution,
instead of grappling with the puzzles about doxastic voluntarism and other
thorny issues that naturally accompany the former project. A similar move
allows us to think about whether and how medieval serfs could be personally
wronged by their lack of Marxist theory: there really is a question of justice
about what kinds of interpretive resources (and thus knowledge) a society
produces and does not produce, which is distinct from claiming that Marx's
precise work was unjustly withheld before he turned up to bestow it.
On the question of instrumental versus intrinsic harms, and how the harms
of epistemic injustice are distinctive, my picture gives us reason to expect not
only instrumental harms having to do with the distribution of knowledge,
but also further, distinctive harms flowing from the particular operation
of our two flavors of injustice and the workings of the epistemic economy.
I've said a bit about some of these further harms, and I'll continue to try
to delineate the precise contours of harm as I discuss additional particular
cases below. There will also be more to say on this front when we've got
the other piece of the puzzle-my view of intentional action-on the table,
so that we're considering the interaction between epistemic injustice and
action as I understand it.
So let's talk about action.
3.2 WHAT IS INTENTIONAL ACTION?
If you were watching me type this paper, you might ask, "Why are you
scowling at the screen?" And I might give one of two kinds of answer. On
one hand, I might say, "I didn't know I was doing that!" On the other hand,
I might say, "It's how I psych myself up to tackle an objection. Duh."
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Anscombe (1963, 9ff) says 'why?' questions like these-questions where the
sense of 'why?' is "that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for
acting"-mark off the class of intentional actions. When I not only have
no answer as to why, but deny any knowledge of doing the thing asked
about, my scowling is unintentional, a mere side effect of an overdose of
philosophical effort. But in the other case, when I am aware of the scowling
and offer a reason, my scowling is intentional: it is then not a side effect but
a prescription to counteract dangerously low levels of philosophical ferocity.
When you act intentionally, Anscombe said, you know what you're doing,
and how and why.16
And this seems reasonable, at first blush: it seems right to think that if I
have no idea I'm doing something, I can't be doing it intentionally. The
problem is that it's just not true that we always know what we're doing
when we act intentionally; there are lots of counterexamples. The most
famous comes from Davidson (2001, 91-92), who points out that we often
undertake things while in grave doubt about whether we'll succeed-and
that doubt can be so substantial that we do not even believe we're doing
what we intend, even though, if we pull it off, we clearly will have done so
intentionally.
So, for example, suppose I am scowling at the screen as I type because I need
to increase my argumentative zeal, and I'm hoping that the scowling will
do the trick. I may type for quite some time, diligently scowling, fighting
through an increasingly achy brow, without believing that it's really going
to help. But all that perseverance means that any increase in ferocity that
the scowling actually produces will certainly not be an accident-it will be
intentional, despite all my doubt.
16. She adds that you know it in a special, direct way-'without observation' or
inference-but I won't make use of that specialness in my arguments here. See
Anscombe 1963, 13-15, 49-50 for her discussion of the non-observational, non-
inferential nature of this knowledge; see my (ms a) for how I understand its specialness
and distinctive practicality.
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So Anscombe has offered a tempting thought, but there's a serious prob-
lem. I propose we avoid the counterexamples by making a key revision.17
Practical knowledge is Anscombe's name for the special agential knowledge
of what one is doing (and how, and why) that enables answers to 'why?'
questions. She takes the possession of practical knowledge to be a necessary
condition for intentional action-but the counterexamples make that unten-
able. Where has Anscombe gone wrong? I argue she's right that there's an
important relationship between intentional action and practical knowledge;
her mistake is characterizing it as one of necessity. Instead, I show, practical
knowledge is not a necessary condition but a normative condition: agents
possess it when things go well.
Which is to say that intentional actions aim at instantiating practical knowl-
edge. When, and to the extent that, an agent fails to know what she is doing,
how, and why (in the special way), her action is defective as such. So if I
am #-ing, but in doubt, so that I don't know I'm #-ing, things are not going
well, or not as well as one would hope, from the point of view of intentional
action.
The benefit of my adjustment is that an agent who is in Davidsonian doubt
can still be acting intentionally even in the absence of (full) practical knowledge-
that's the point of moving from a necessary condition to a normative one.
Using the normative condition, we get the intuitively right result: when my
doubtful scowling does its job, that outcome is intentional; it's just that
things weren't going as well for me, qua agent, as they might have. (Af-
ter all, I'd prefer to know either that I'm doing what I intend, if only to
avoid the stress of wondering, or that I'm not, so that I can abandon the
attempt.)
I can't provide the full argument for the view here; that project is the work
of my (ms a). But here are some key points.
17. The full argument for my view is found in my (ms a).
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If we're interested in what intentional action is, we need to distinguish it
from several nearby phenomena. Intentional actions are different from idle
predictions, wishes that come true, failed attempts and lucky successes, cases
of deviant causation, etc. And I argue that what distinguishes intentional
actions is precisely that they, and only they, are defective when and to the
extent that the agent fails to have practical knowledge. A wish is a wish
whether the agent knows it is coming true or not-indeed, we can wish for
things in rightful certainty that they are not coming to pass-and so on. The
connection between intentional action and an aim of practical knowledge,
I argue, is about the distinctive kind of agential control that intentional
action is supposed to involve.
I make my case by reflecting on skillful actions, which involve an elevated
level of practical knowledge compared to less-skilled versions: when Serena
Williams plays tennis, she knows an enormous amount about what she's
doing, how, and why; when I play, pretty much everything that happens is
both a surprise and a mystery. Serena's knowledge is control; my lack of
knowledge is my lack of control. Serena's tennis actions are worlds better,
qua actions, than mine, because she has all that knowledge, i.e., control,
and I don't.
This means that intentions, on my view, must involve belief. An intention
contains a proposition about what one will do: I will # by means m for
reason(s) r. When things go well, as in Serena's tennis playing, this belief is
knowledge, because it is accurate and not as a matter of luck. When I play
tennis, even if I, say, hit a winner, things aren't going well in the Serena
way, in the way that's about practical knowledge, because it is a matter of
luck. When things really go well, according to the standard of intentional
action, what happens is both what the intention describes, and because
the intention describes it-the intention guides the action and secures the
outcome. That's what practical knowledge is: an executed, not just fulfilled,
intention. And that's control.
On this way of thinking, it's clear that just as control comes by degrees, so
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does practical knowledge. And that means that to say intentional actions
are distinguished by an aim of control-i.e., practical knowledge-is to say
they are subject to a graded standard; they are defective when and to the
extent that the agent fails to achieve that aim.
For the purposes of this paper, it's important to recognize that agents can fall
short of full practical knowledge-and so be acting defectively-in several
ways.
I've already mentioned one: the agent might doubt that she is doing what
she intends, because she is unsure about her ability (to, say, scowl her way to
success). But there are other ways. For starters, if intentions are instances
of the schema I will # by means m for reason(s) r, then in order to know
the whole complex (as practical knowledge requires) an agent has to know
a variety of other propositions. She has to know things about her means,
including that her means are such that, if she takes them, she will #. She
has to know the facts that serve as her reasons.
Of course, the agent might have an attitude to some of those propositions
about her means or her reasons that falls short of full belief, and thus holds
her short of full practical knowledge in the same way that the doubt about
her ability does in our initial counterexample. Furthermore, she might know
(or believe to some degree) these facts in more or less detail-and the extra
detail makes for more control. So the gradedness of control can manifest in
different degrees of confidence about propositions involved in the intention
(about her circumstances, her means, her ability, etc.), or in knowledge of
more or fewer of those propositions.
Finally, recall our discussion of hermeneutical resources. An agent can have
better or worse grasp of the concepts involved in her intention-in all the
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ways discussed in 3.1 18-and that variation in level of grasp can affect her
level of practical knowledge. If you're trying to achieve F-ness, but you only
dimly grasp what F-ness involves, it will be a matter of luck, rather than
the control that practical knowledge provides, if you achieve it.
To summarize: on my view, the distinguishing feature of intentional action
is an aim of control, and that control is Anscombean practical knowledge-
the special knowledge agents can have of what they're doing, how, and why.
When an agent acts intentionally, things go well when and to the extent that
she has control, i.e., practical knowledge. In the good case, her intention
describes what happens, and not as a matter of luck: it describes what
happens because it shapes what happens.
I capture my way of thinking in a principle:
NEED TO KNOW: When you act intentionally, you aim at
control, i.e., practical knowledge; when (and to the degree
that) you fail to have such control/knowledge, your action
is defective, though it can still be intentional.
3.3 SHACKLING
Suppose (as I'll ask you to do for the rest of this paper) that I'm right
about intentional action, and intentional actions are defective as such when
and to the extent that the agent fails to know what she is doing (and how
and why) in a special way, as NEED TO KNOW says. Then, when there
is epistemic injustice in the sense I described in 3.1, we should expect
certain interactions between the nature of action and the operative epistemic
injustice. Why? Because epistemic injustice affects what people (can) know,
and how people are assessed as knowers-and knowing things is relevant to
18. Remember that I think concepts are part of a web of culture that also includes nar-
ratives, scripts, and so on. So grasping concepts requires grasping that whole rich
apparatus.
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meeting the standard of NEED TO KNOW, and being recognized as knowing
things is relevant to being recognized as meeting the standard of NEED TO
KNOW.
In other words, if I'm right about action (as I'm asking you to suppose), and
if there's epistemic injustice in the world (as there is), then we should expect
at least two kinds of problems, one for each of our two kinds of epistemic
injustice. First, hermeneutical injustice will occlude facts having to do with
marginalized agents in a way that will make it difficult or impossible for
those agents to know what they're doing, how, and why as NEED TO KNOW
requires. Second, credal injustice will cause observers to assess marginalized
agents as failing to know what they're doing, how, and why as NEED TO
KNOW requires.
But that's not all. For example, we should also expect more complex versions
of the two main types, including combinations. So in the next section, I'll
discuss a series of real-world examples and discuss how they instantiate the
phenomena I'm predicting here. But I do want to take a moment to discuss
what these formal characterizations tell us.
The key thought is that the combination of NEED TO KNOW and epistemic
injustice will tend to put members of historically marginalized groups in
a double bind: they must either act defectively, given their epistemically
unjust circumstances, or not act at all, in deference to those defects. The
combination of epistemic injustice and NEED TO KNOW limits their choice
to wrongdoing or inaction. This is the dilemma I call shackling.
The possibility of shackling is easiest to see in a case where hermeneutical
injustice makes the agent unable to know some fact that is, for example,
serving as her reason for #-ing. Carmita Wood couldn't know that her
reason for quitting her job was because she'd been sexually harassed, because
hermeneutical injustice made that fact unavailable to her. But because she
couldn't know that fact, she couldn't act on it with practical knowledge-
because practical knowledge requires knowing what you're doing, how, and
why. So her only options were to act defectively, or not to act at all, in the
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face of her circumstances.
Credal injustice makes things more complicated: it's about how agents are
assessed with regard to their epistemic positions, not those epistemic posi-
tions themselves. So as a first pass, we should expect a slightly different kind
of shackling in credal injustice cases: the choice will be between taking an
action that will be assessed as defective (because the agent will be assessed
as failing to know what she's doing, how, and why) and not acting.1 9 This
is the plight of the women at the climbing gym mentioned above: they know
that they must either go climbing and face mansplaining, or skip the gym.
Act in a way that will be wrongly assessed, or forego acting.
There are a few points I want to flag before we get to our cases.
One is about what kind of harm shackling causes to marginalized agents.
As we'll see, shackling can make it harder for an agent to achieve the things
she wants and deserves-for example, it often interferes with her ability to
know her means, and that's an important instrumental harm. But it's more
than that.
When I say that epistemic injustice is an obstacle to action that is non-
defective by the standard of NEED TO KNOW, it's important that NEED TO
KNOW is the constitutive standard of intentional action. Making it impossi-
ble for an agent to satisfy NEED TO KNOW is a harm to her in her capacity
as an agent. To see this, notice that hermeneutical injustice affects not just
an agent's means, but also the kinds of reasons that are available for (non-
defective) action. And the kinds of reasons that hermeneutical injustice
makes it harder or impossible to access are very often things that are cen-
tral to the identities and experiences of marginalized people. (Again, think
of Carmita Wood.) But if you can't act from the deepest parts of your
identity, or your most important experiences, there is a way in which your
19. Though as we'll see below, these assessments can be self-fulfilling, so that the agent
will be forced to choose between actually defective action and inaction after all.
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actions can't be truly yours. This barrier to acting from central features
of one's identity-and so making the actions you take properly your own-
is thus a deep, intrinsic harm, separate from any instrumental problems,
and it's distinctive of the picture I'm articulating here. Shackling alienates
marginalized agents from their actions.
Another question one might have involves the way that characterization of
shackling offered here suggests a moralized reading of the defectiveness of
shackled actions. If the defects are epistemic, what's this talk of wrongdoing
about? As I hope the cases below will make clearer, I think there are
good reasons to accept that there will in fact tend to be a moral tinge
to assessments of these defects.
First, since these defects are (actual or erroneously assessed) failures to act
well as such, there's a sense in which they are precisely (actual or erroneously
assessed) failures to act as one ought. Which is to say, they are, in a broad
sense, (actual or erroneously assessed) moral failures.
Second, as we'll see in a type of complex case discussed below, sometimes the
kinds of narratives involved in grasping concepts about the social world will
invoke the moral side of the dual nature of the trust required for epistemic
cooperation noted by Daukas (as discussed on p. 91 above)-imputing lack
of sincerity, or benevolence, etc. to members of certain groups-as a way of
justifying the reductions in credibility that characterize credal injustice: so
both aspects of Daukasian trustworthiness will be in question.
Finally, because in a social world our actions just do affect others, failure to
act well by the standard of NEED TO KNOW will often be seen to be a failure
to take due care with regard to other people. None of that is to say that the
defects at issue in shackling are always, in a narrow sense, moral. But it's
why I'm not concerned if you hear a somewhat finger-wagging note in the
definition of shackling. It's apt, given shackling's status as a practical, wide-
sense moral, problem, and the intermingling of epistemic and (narrow-sense)
moral features in many pieces of this puzzle.
One final point before we look at some cases. Stanley (2015, especially
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chapter 6) considers the relationship between epistemic injustice (Fricker's
version) and a claim linking knowledge and proper action, namely the claim
that knowledge is interest-relative; I want to distinguish my view from the
one he presents. Stanley endorses the claim that knowledge is interest-
relative, which is to say he thinks that two agents, identically epistemically
positioned with regard to some proposition, may differ in whether they know
that proposition just because of differences in what is practically at stake for
each of them with regard to its truth.20 (So-to borrow a case often used
in this literature-if you and I are each considering whether to stand in a
long line at the bank on a Friday afternoon in order to deposit a check, or
to wait until Saturday instead, and we have exactly the same evidence that
the bank will be open on Saturday, there can be a difference in whether each
of us knows the bank will be open if only one of us is in danger of bouncing
the rent check if we don't get the deposit in on time.) Stanley goes on to
argue that this means that marginalized people will be unable to know facts
about their oppression, precisely because the stakes are too high for actions
that implicate those facts.
But in her (2018) reply, Dotson brings out some deep problems with Stan-
ley's argument. Stanley cites thinkers (including Dotson herself, as well
as, e.g., Wright and DuBois) who are members of precisely the groups that
Stanley says will be unable to know facts about oppression; as Dotson notes,
Stanley's citations of these thinkers as authorities is incompatible with the
claim he is arguing for. Furthermore, as Srinivasan discusses at length in
her (2016) critique of Stanley, the claim that marginalized people will be
less able to know facts about their own oppression than more privileged
people is in conflict with a long tradition of compelling Black, feminist, and
Marxist thought that says that marginalized people are the best positioned,
20. In my (ms b) I argue that the evidence used to support claims of interest-relativity-a
collection of intuitions about cases-does not in fact support that claim, and suggest
that my view better captures the phenomena while being supported by a ground up
argument (i.e., my ms a). But I won't rehash that discussion here.
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the most likely to know facts about oppression-that marginalized people
often possess double consciousness, because they see the world both as their
oppressors see it (as they must, since the oppressors are in control and what
the oppressor sees will affect what happens) and as it is (since only by un-
derstanding the actual, oppressive systems can they navigate them).21
But my view does not have the problems identified for Stanley by Dotson and
Srinivasan. For one thing, as I discuss at length in my (ms b), my view about
the link between knowledge and non-defective action does not entail interest-
relativity; indeed, it can be used to debunk it. Moreover, while I am indeed
suggesting that there will be cases in which hermeneutical injustice creates
obstacles to marginalized people's knowledge of important facts, including
facts about their oppression, nothing in my account suggests that this is
always, or inescapably, the case. We can see this by noticing that Stanley's
view looks incompatible with the possibility of consciousness-raising, since
attempts at consciousness-raising do not change the stakes of action against
oppression; by contrast, my view strongly suggests consciousness-raising as
a necessary remedy, because it is a way of creating a new community that
can incubate new and better hermeneutical resources. (It's not a coincidence
that the conceptual work on sexual harassment occurred through just such
a process.) I do not have space to go into great depth on this subject, but I
hope these brief thoughts will suffice to distinguish my claim from Stanley's,
and to stave off Dotson- and/or Srinivasan-esque worries.
So, to summarize before we (at last) take up some cases: We should expect
at least two key types of interaction between epistemic injustice and the
nature of intentional action as captured by NEED TO KNOW.
When hermeneutical injustice meets NEED TO KNOW: By mak-
ing it difficult or impossible to know certain facts, hermeneutical injus-
tice will make it difficult or impossible to take certain actions (namely
21. Stanley replies to his critics in his (2018).
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actions involving those facts) non-defectively.
When credal injustice meets NEED TO KNOW: By making it dif-
ficult or impossible to be assessed as knowing various facts, credal
injustice will make it difficult or impossible to be assessed as taking
certain actions (namely, actions involving those facts) non-defectively.
Recognizing these interactions allows us to identify shackling, a dilemma
that can be both an instance of and a means to oppression.
Shackling: Agents who are members of marginalized groups will often be
forced to choose between acting defectively (or acting in a way that will
be assessed as defective) and not acting, because epistemic injustice
makes it too difficult to know (or be assessed as knowing) facts relevant
to what those agents are doing, as non-defective action requires.
I've said that we can expect to see not only clean cases of a single flavor of
shacking, but instances where both the "direct" and the assessment-based
kinds of shackling are at work in a single case, instances where unjust as-
sessments are self-fulfilling, instances of interactions between the two kinds.
But we'll get to all that.
That's as far as I think we can go in the abstract. Let's look at some
cases.
3.4 CASES
In the last section, I gave an abstract characterization of the basic kinds
of interactions we should expect to see between circumstances of epistemic
injustice and the nature of intentional action. A key phenomenon arising
from that interaction is the one I call shackling: To be shackled in my sense
is to be forced, by the interaction of epistemic injustice and NEED TO KNOW,
either to act defectively (or be assessed as acting defectively) or not to act. It
is an agential dilemma. But we might wonder: what do real-world instances
of the schemas I presented look like? How common are they? How serious?
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To start answering those questions, we'll need to look at some cases. So
that's the project of this section.
3.4.1 SHACKLING VIA HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE
Hermeneutical injustice, as I've been saying, is a pattern of unjust reductions
in intelligibility of facts relating to (members of) marginalized groups, due
to certain kinds of defects in the community's interpretive resources or the
community members' grasp and/or deployment thereof. In other words,
this is the circumstance of missing, defective, or ill-used conceptual tools,
where the patterns of absence, flaws, and/or misuse align with patterns of
marginalization. And as I described in the previous section, the paradigm
case of shackling via hermeneutical injustice occurs when facts relating to
marginalized people are obscured in these ways, thereby making it difficult
or impossible for agents from marginalized groups to act non-defectively by
the lights of NEED TO KNOW.
In order to act non-defectively, NEED TO KNOW says, agents must have prac-
tical knowledge; having practical knowledge requires knowing facts about
one's circumstances, and one's means, and one's reasons-any fact that fig-
ures in one's intention. Since hermeneutical injustice makes many facts
relating to marginalized people less available, actions that depend on those
facts will often be defective. Or anyway, that's the idea. So what are some
examples?
Several things I've said so far have hinted that we can read the Carmita
Wood case as one such example. As Fricker describes her, she lacks the
concept of sexual harassment, as does her interlocutor, so her experience is
unintelligible to both of them. On this reading, the failure of intelligibility,
both to Wood and to her interlocutor, is the hermeneutical injustice, and
it's a matter of a missing concept, a gap in the community's interpretive
resources. But I read the case somewhat differently.
Remember that I made two adjustments to the Frickerian conception of
hermeneutical injustice. First, I said that we should understand it as a
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structural phenomenon, not a matter of individual interpersonal transac-
tions. So where Fricker thinks the injustice only exists when a particular
failure of intelligibility occurs, I think it persists as long as the commu-
nity's interpretive resources don't do justice to the lives and experiences of
marginalized people. A failure of intellibility with regard to some fact en-
tails that there is a fact that could be intelligible; I think it is an injustice
that some facts-facts having to do with marginalized groups-are less in-
telligible in virtue of the way our interpretive resources happen to function
whether or not any actual failures of intelligibility are occurring. After all,
for an attempt at intelligibility to occur, someone has to realize that there is
something that might be intelligible. But if the available resources are inad-
equate enough, that realization may be impossible. To my eye, such a case
is not an absence of hermeneutical injustice, but an extreme case.2 2
Which brings me to the second way I differ with Fricker about hermeneu-
tical injustice. Remember, I said that lacking important concepts is not
the only way a community's hermeneutics can be unjust. Hermeneutical
injustice also occurs, on my view, when important concepts are imperfectly
grasped-either because they are obscured by other features of the epis-
temic environment or because they are defective such that they could never
be fully grasped (as the would be if, say, they were internally contradictory).
When we have imperfect grasp of a concept, we tend to err in a few ways:
we may take things to be Fs that are not Fs; we may fail to recognize Fs as
Fs; and we may respond inappropriately to F-ness (failing to make appro-
priate inferences, take appropriate actions, and so on).2 I think that this
22. Consider an analogous case of absent conceptual resources where that absence is not
a question of justice. Before the advent and eventual widespread acceptance of the
germ theory of disease, humanity was unable to prevent or remedy some of its greatest
afflictions. Things were clearly not going well just because no one was trying and failing
to understand what microorganisms were.
23. I am neutral on questions the ontology of concepts, but I am committed to the idea
that conceptual grasp is a matter of having certain dispositions: dispositions both to
correctly identify and to correctly respond to F-ness.
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expansion helps us get a better grip on the Carmita Wood case, and also
see just how common cases of this form are.
Let's look at the Wood case through this lens. As I said above, it seems
likely that Wood herself, and potentially others with whom she discussed her
experience, might well have thought of what happened to her as flirting. We
can understand that possibility in one of two ways: perhaps calling what
happened to Wood flirting was apt, in which case there was something
defective about the public concept-I'll say more about defective concepts
below-or perhaps calling what happened to Wood flirting wasn't apt, in
which case community members were just not fully competent with the
concept of flirting. (Because if they had been fully competent, they would
have realized that touching and talk of the kind she endured are not flirting
if they are repeated and unwelcome advances made in a workplace under
conditions of significant power asymmetry, for example.)
So it's not just that the right label wasn't available. It's that a wrong
label was. And the application of the wrong label suggested all kinds of
responses that were not the appropriate ones to what actually happened:
if it was flirting, perhaps she should have been flattered. Perhaps she had
no reason to quit. And even if Wood wasn't, herself, tempted to think
that what happened was flirting-even if she was inclined to think it was
more like abuse, or sex discrimination-the fact that the patterns of concept
application in her community would emphasize flirting and not abuse or sex
discrimination will mean she will find it hard or impossible to make herself
understood. (And of course, the resistance she'll face along the way may
make her doubt her own insight.)
So that's how the Wood case looks different on when read as an instance
of my version of hermeneutic injustice. I think this reading does better at
capturing the complexities of the case, while still clearly being of a piece
with the 'missing concept' thought that motivates Fricker. But there's one
more step we need: how is the Wood case an instance of shackling? How
does this epistemic injustice become agential injustice?
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The answer, of course, is that it will be shackling if the issues with partial
concept grasp make it impossible for Wood to have practical knowledge in
acting. Which is exactly what we see.
Notice that Wood is not just experiencing confusion about what happened
to her; she is trying to make herself understood, and she is trying to re-
spond to what happened. She is trying to do things, to act on the basis of
her experience. But she can't do that, because without the concept of sex-
ual harassment, she can't know she's been sexually harassed-so she can't,
say, have practical knowledge that she's quitting her job because she's been
sexually harassed, since she can't know her reason.
And that's not all. Suppose she intends to quit her job because she's been
abused, and/or because she's experiencing sex discrimination. I take it
that it's true she was abused, and true that what she experienced was sex
discrimination; to say that she experienced sexual harassment is to sharpen
those claims, not to deny them.
So suppose Wood intends to act for the reason that she's been abused, or
that she's been subjected to sex discrimination. I'm stipulating that she can
know she's been abused, and/or subjected to sex discrimination. But it's
natural to think that the right response to abuse is to call the police, and
that the right response to sex discrimination is to sue. Given the patterns of
concept application in relevantly similar cases, the police would do nothing
and if a lawyer took her case she would lose-remember, the general thought
in the community is that what happened to her was flirting. So she's likely
to fail in her attempt to seek redress, because of failures of uptake on the
part of her audience.
But even that is not yet the crux of the problem, from the point of view of
NEED TO KNOw. The real heart of the matter is that even if, miraculously,
Wood did find a lawyer who took on her case (maybe just for publicity,
maybe out of real solidarity), and, even more miraculously, managed to
win a judgment (again, for reasons good or bad)-well, that would be so
miraculous, such a stroke of luck, that it would not have been a case of
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practical knowledge. It would have been far too out of Wood's control. If
she intended to get compensation for what was done to her, she couldn't
know she was doing that-the system was not structured to make legal
redress an outcome after sexual harassment. The concepts and narratives
and scripts weren't set up that way.
Finally, remember that I emphasize that hermeneutical injustice is struc-
tural, not transactional. If Wood had somehow gotten lucky, she still
wouldn't have succeeded in acting with practical knowledge, but the very
fact that it was a matter of luck shows that the structural problem exists
for agential injustice just as much as for epistemic injustice. Women like
Wood-who were subjected to sexual harassment-are, as a class, subject
to shackling. The pattern need not hold with perfect universality to exist
and to matter for justice.
So Carmita Wood faced a dilemma. She could take action in response to
the fact that she was sexually harassed, but that action would necessarily be
defective. Or she could forego acting in response to that experience. Both
options are bad ones: for there to be no way for her to fully and properly
exercise her agency in light of a profound experience is a deep harm, one that
goes beyond the financial and social costs she incurred. That's the double
bind of shackling. Wood couldn't know she'd been sexually harassed, but
she knew for sure that what had happened to her was something she had
to respond to. But because of her community's interpretive resources, there
was no way for her avoid being shackled.
I've talked through the Wood case at such length for two reasons. First,
because it's familiar from the literature on epistemic injustice, and, second,
because it offers a way to bring out features we can find in additional cases.
So let's look at some of those features in isolation to see what other cases
they bring to light.
The first feature to consider is the way that imperfect grasp of relevant
concepts can be an obstacle to non-defective action. Let's think about how
that works in a little more detail, and then a little more generally.
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I think we might want to say that Wood had an extremely early stage
of grasp of the concept of sexual harassment. She had an inchoate sense
that her experience was of a kind that had certain features and merited
certain responses-it seemed bad, and it seemed like it merited quitting her
job, and not with a penalty. She could in some sense point to this thing
that happened, and think 'That is a reason to quit, and I'll tell human
resources that so they can help me.' She had some of the dispositions that
go with grasping the concept of sexual harassment: dispositions to associate
certain kinds of treatment in the workplace with to-be-avoided-ness and to-
be-rectified-ness, etc.; perhaps also the sense that that treatment related to
phenomena like abuse and sex discrimination. (Those ill-defined dispositions
are of course the raw materials with which the people who went on to develop
the concept of sexual harassment began their work.) But the inchoateness
of Wood's grasp of what happened to her meant not only that she lacked the
word for it, but also that she couldn't know what responses were called for.
The abuse-like qualities suggest police; the sex-discrimination-like qualities
suggest civil action; the lack of any established conceptual structure along
with the bare fact that this happened in the workplace suggested trying HR.
Her minimal grasp of the concept meant that she had no access to what
follows from its aptness, and so no ability to act in response to it.
And that's how conceptual grasp affects agents' ability to have practical
knowledge, in general. Here's the picture. Conceptual grasp is graded, run-
ning from total lack of grasp to perfection. Increases in grasp are increases
in what can be known and what can be done. Let's track Sarah as she comes
to grasp the concept salsify.
1. Sarah is on the subway and overhears part of a conversation. One
passenger says, "So what did he say?" The other says, "Salsify." (She
is now disposed to acknowledge that 'salsify' refers to something in
English, though this will be a very weak disposition since it could be a
foreign word and in any case she has no idea if it's a noun or a name
or an adjective or a verb...)
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2. That night, Sarah is at a restaurant. On the board where the specials
are posted, she reads "Crushed celeriac and roasted salsify $12." She
is now disposed to take salsify to be a food item.
3. Sarah asks the server what salsify is. He replies that it's a root veg-
etable, sort of like a parsnip. She is now disposed to associate it with
fall and winter, things appropriate for vegetarians, etc.
4. Sarah orders and eats the celeriac and salsify special. She is now
disposed to recognize roasted salsify by sight, and to associate the flavor
of salsify with the taste of artichoke hearts, though this is again a weak
disposition since she's not sure how to distinguish what part of the
dish's flavor comes from the celeriac and what part from the salsify.
5. Some time later, Sarah is at the farmer's market and sees a bin of
brown things that look like sticks with a sign that says 'salsify.' She
is now disposed to recognize it by sight when raw.
6. Sarah gets a new job, working for a chef who loves salsify and grows
it on the property, cooking it in and participating in the development
of many dishes. Sarah is now disposed to recognize the taste of salsify
alone and in combination, cooked and raw, to expect it to taste good
with certain things and bad with others, to take it out of the oven after
x minutes, and so on.
7. Sarah takes over the cultivation of the salsify in the restaurant garden.
She is now disposed to harvest it at a certain point, to water it under
certain conditions, and so on.
8. Sarah studies with a botanist and learns about salsify's relation to
other plants. She is now disposed to recognize it as a relative of the
dandelion.
9. Sarah studies with a biologist and learns about salsify's role in wild
ecosystems. She is now disposed to identify it as a food item for certain
animals and not others, and so on.
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10. Sarah studies with a historian and learns about salsify's popularity in
the Victorian era, and that it was one of Thomas Jefferson's favorite
foods. She is now disposed to look for it if she tours the grounds of
Monticello, to bring it to a friend's period potluck, and to recognize it
under its alternate name, 'Johnny-go-to-bed-at-noon.'
At step 1, it looks like Sarah has the most minimal possible grasp, or perhaps
a precursor for the most minimal grasp, of the concept salsify. At step 2,
I would say she has the concept, though her grasp is definitely very basic.
Her grasp increases as we progress through the steps. By step 4 or so it
seems right to say she is competent in an ordinary sense with the concept;
by step 6 or 7 she seems to have expert grasp of the concept; if we keep
going in the vein of steps 8-10, maybe adding some time with a shaman
to learn about traditional medicinal uses and some time with a chemist
to learn about basic structure, we'll be approaching perfect grasp of the
concept, where that would mean being disposed to associate salsify with all
its features, and to draw all the correct inferences and take all the correct
actions with regard to salsify-grasping all the nuances of salsify's place in
the conceptual web.
Once we lay out the progress of Sarah's grasp of salsify stepwise like this,
it's easy to see how increasing grasp of the concept increases the reach of
Sarah's agency vis a vis salsify. If she's at step 4, and intends to get some
salsify by foraging, it will be a matter of luck if she manages to do so-she
can't have practical knowledge that she's getting some salsify by foraging if
her grasp of what salsify is doesn't extend to recognizing it in the wild. Her
action will be defective, because she won't have control. Where as the Sarah
of steps 6, 7, or 8 can non-defectively get some salsify by foraging.
In short, what the Sarah case shows is how increasing grasp of a concept can
increase what an agent can know in ways that are relevant to her action: the
better she grasps a concept, the more she can do-the more actions she can
take while having control, i.e., practical knowledge. Increasing conceptual
grasp increases what can be known, and so what can be done non-defectively.
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As Sarah learns more about salsify, she is able to take the fact that this is
salsify as a reason to to more things-at step 4, she's able to take the fact
that this is salsify as a reason to expect an entree at another restaurant
to be delicious; at step 6 she's able to take the fact that this is salsify as
a reason to substitute it for asparagus when the kitchen runs out of the
latter.
So as Sarah's grasp of the concept increases, she calls more and more of the
bits of salsify in the world 'salsify,' and she calls fewer and fewer of the non-
salsify things in the world 'salsify,' and she draws the salsify-appropriate
inferences and takes the salsify-appropriate actions in a wider and wider
range of circumstances. She knows more propositions involving salsify, and
I'm inclined to say that there are some propositions involving salsify she
knows better, precisely in virtue of the way that her knowledge of something
like salsify is a root vegetable kind of like a parsnip could mean that she
can distinguish it from numbers and dollars and doughnuts as well as root
vegetables not like parsnips-say, round ones like turnips-at step 3, but
her knowledge of that same proposition at step 7 and beyond could mean
that she can make all the step 3 distinctions and more, say because she also
grasps the ways salsify is not like a parsnip, and what salsify's being like a
parsnip means for how it tastes and roasts and grows, and so on.
I hope this digression has made clear how conceptual grasp relates to knowl-
edge and action. 24 I hope it's also apparent how this same kind of progres-
24. It's worth noting that there are two potential claims I might be making about the
way merely partial grasp of a concept can be a barrier to knowledge (and so to non-
defective action). One claim would be that if I have only partial grasp of F-ness, then I
can't know any proposition involving that concept. This would be an alarmingly strong
claim. But I don't need anything that strong. What I need is something much weaker.
For my purposes, we can say that Sarah knows that's salsify when she sees some at the
farmer's market after step 5, even though she has certainly not achieved the perfect
grasp of salsifyness that she might achieve at or beyond step 10. The reason we can
say she knows it's salsify when she sees it is that her grasp of salsifyness includes what
it looks like raw. On the other hand, step 5 Sarah's grasp of salsifyness doesn't extend
to recognizing it under a microscope or by smell, or to associating it with dandelions
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sion is possible with terms that are not about natural kinds. We'll want one
more thing before we use all this, plus the Carmita Wood case, to generate
more cases.
The last thing we need is to understand how the epistemic economy can
cause problems with conceptual grasp that constitute hermeneutical injus-
tice of the kind that leads to shackling. The short answer is that concepts
relevant to the kinds of facts for which hermeneutical injustice comes into
play are sometimes prone to being imperfectly grasped through neglect, and
sometimes through concealment. I'm not going to say much about conceal-
ment here. Concealment cases will often involve Stanley-style propaganda,
as mentioned above; another kind of concealment will occur when, for ex-
ample, sex ed courses are designed to be silent on everything other than
hetersexual cisgendered monogamous relationships. But let's talk about
neglect.
When neglect is at work, conceptual resources will tend to be underdevel-
oped-as if the community investigated salsify to, say, step 3 and no further.
For socially significant concepts, neglect frequently results from taking the
dominant group to be the default. So, for example, women and members of
racial and ethnic minorities have often been unable to know what is happen-
ing and respond appropriately when they have certain health issues, because
all the research and education has focused on how the issues in question man-
ifest in white men. Take the hermeneutics of heart attack, for example. The
grasp of this concept both among the general public and within the medical
profession have involved descriptions of symptoms that are paradigmatic in
men but not at all in women-so women have been less likely to realize them-
and Thomas Jefferson. So what I'm saying is that not just the level of grasp but the
particular contours of that grasp will matter for what Sarah can know. The aspects
of salsifyness at work in the proposition and/or the action must match the aspects of
salsifyness Sarah grasps. (These thoughts are similar in flavor to the view advocated in
Stanley (1999), on which the truth of an ascription of understanding is context-relative.
But I don't have space in this paper to explore the relationship between that view and
mine.)
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selves that they were having heart attacks, and so to seek treatment, and
to be recognized by treatment providers as having heart attacks even when
they do seek treatment. The community's partial grasp of heart attack is a
hermeneutical injustice, and it leads to shackling: women are unlikely to be
able to act non-defectively for the reason that they're having heart attacks
because that fact is obscured by the available interpretive resources. As in
the Wood case, it will be a matter of luck if they hit upon the appropriate
diagnosis and respose.
Treating the dominant group as the default isn't the only way that these
problems can arise, of course. Each year, several thousand children from
China and Korea are adopted by families in the United States. Many of
the adoptive families are white. Children adopted into these white families
often at some point wish to explore and express the identities and cultures
of their birth. But in the U.S., the distinctions between Chinese identity
and culture and Korean identity and culture and, indeed, Japanese and
Mongolian and Indonesian identity and culture are not well captured by the
available interpretive resources; American culture tends to lump all these
and more together into an undifferentiated Asianness.25 So a child born in
China but raised in America is unlikely to grasp what Chineseness is well
enough to express it in her actions non-defectively. If she managed to do
something authentically of Chinese culture, it would likely be a matter of
luck: it's not clear that her environment offers her the resources to grasp
that learning aikido, for example, would not be a way of connecting with
her roots, whereas making niangao might be. 26
25. It is not only Americans who have this problem. In July 2018 the British Foreign
Secretary, visiting China, accidentally referred to his Chinese-born wife as Japanese in
a meeting with his Chinese counterpart. His gaffe was widely diagnosed as arising from
his habitually thinking of her as Asian rather than Chinese.
26. Aikido is a Japanese martial art; niangao is a traditional Chinese New Year cake,
most popular in Eastern China.
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So we now have a recipe for one way hermeneutical injustice can lead to
shackling: the hermeneutical environment may make it difficult or impossi-
ble for agents from marginalized groups to have adequate grasp of concepts
relating to to their experiences (as in a Carmita Wood or woman's heart
attack case) and/or identities (as in the case of the adopted child). These
agents won't be able to know facts about their reasons and their means that
they must know in order to act non-defectively: facts like I was sexually
harassed or I'm having a heart attack or this is a way of expressing my
birth identity. This puts limits on the ways these agents can exercise their
agency-limits that bar non-defective action in domains that are critically
important both instrumentally and non-instrumentally.
I want to flag here that only my view can make this clear. Why? Be-
cause my view's requirement of knowledge for non-defective action makes
the difference. If you had an alternate view, on which action doesn't require
knowledge, but rather just belief, or a 'distinctively practical attitude' as
adherents of Bratman's (1987) way of thinking suppose, then these cases
will look just fine, even though in the original Carmita Wood case, where
we understand it to be a matter of a completely absent concept, we'll see
a problem. That's because in the original Wood case, the complete ab-
sence of a concept means that Wood can't even have a thought about sexual
harassment-can't believe, can't have a distinctively practical attitude, none
of that. So clearly she can't act on any of those attitudes. But in the par-
tial grasp cases the agents can and do have thoughts-that's why they're
trying to act from those thoughts. Partial grasp of a concept doesn't pre-
vent thought, or belief. It's the knowledge requirement that brings out the
way things are going wrong for the agents in the partial grasp cases-the
knowledge requirement that is distinctive of NEED TO KNOW.
So hermeneutical injustice-an unjust deficit in available interpretive resources-
makes it the case that partial-grasp Carmita Wood, and our women heart
attack victims, and our adopted Chinese and Korean kids are unable to fully
know propositions that are necessary for their intentions (and actions) to
be non-defective. They are shackled: they can act defectively on the basis
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of their incompletely-grasped experiences of sexual harassment, or medi-
cal conditions, or birth identities, or they can refrain from acting on those
things-but as I've been stressing, inaction on facts like these is hardly a
viable alternative. That's the daily, damaging dilemma.
And notice that on this view, something has gone wrong even if our agents
avoid disaster. Even if our heart attack victim survives, and our Chinese
born child ends up learning to make niangao just like her birth family's, it
won't be because of what they intended; it won't be because what happened
was under their control in the way Serena Williams' tennis playing is under
her control. That's the deep harm of shackling, and it's only visible on my
view: the way epistemic injustice limits the reach of marginalized people's
agency, removing the possibility of control.
Of course, something like this is what Stanley (2015) was trying to get at
in his discussion of interest-relativity. But the problem with Stanley's view
was that he thought the issue was about what's at stake for marginalized
people, which didn't leave room for double consciousness and the ways that
the marginalized both can and do often have extra knowledge, knowledge
that can enable resistance. On Stanley's view, acting to resist will destroy
knowledge, because of the way that action will raise the already high stakes
for the marginalized. But as I said above, on my view, we can see how the
community of the marginalized can be a source of new and better concepts,
concepts that can be the means to resistance, and the stakes don't have any
bearing on knowledge.2 7 So we can see both how shackling via hermeneutical
injustice is an unjust and substantial burden while recognizing the possibility
and necessity of change. Consciousness-raising and other improvements to
27. I should say that I think stakes can indirectly affect knowledge, because it seems right
to say that belief is interest-relative: high stakes can make people doubt in ways that
are belief-undermining, and so, by extension, knowledge undermining. But that kind
of interest-relativity doesn't have the upshot Stanley claims: it's not necessarily the
case that knowledge is destroyed by high stakes-the very community solidarity that
can enable consciousness-raising can be a source of confidence that counteracts the
tendency of stakes to produce doubt.
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the available conceptual resources can and must happen.
3.4.2 SHACKLING VIA HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE, PART 2
The partial grasp cases above show how distributive injustice in hermeneu-
tical resources leads to shackling. But recall that on my view hermeneutical
resources are rich and complex, having to do not just with single concepts
like sexual harassment or heart attack or Chineseness, but also narratives,
and scripts, and schemas. And defects in those narratives and scripts and
schemas due to hermeneutical injustice can likewise lead to shackling.
So imagine a young Black man, call him Michael, involved in a traffic stop.
He knows how dangerous that situation is for people like him, so he intends
to be respectful, compliant, and in no way suspicious. He calls the officer
"sir." He meets his eye, to avoid seeming shifty, but doesn't hold it, to
avoid seeming defiant. He reaches for his license and registration when
asked, but moves very slowly, to avoid seeming as if he's going for a weapon.
Even if Michael takes all this care, because being respectful and not being
suspicious depend in part on uptake, he can't know he's doing what he
intends because the hermeneutical patterns of police officers are capricious.
With some officers, on some days, Michael's actions will be read in the way
he intends; with other officers, or on other days, his amount of eye contact
will be read as falling too far on the shifty side (or the defiant side), or the
speed with which he reaches for his license will be read as too slow, and
so reluctant, or sassy, or too fast, and so dangerous. He can't know if the
officer will read his behavior through a 'thug' lens or not. So even if he
gets lucky, and the officer interprets him as respectful, compliant, and not
suspicious, Michael can't know that he's doing what he intends, because the
hermeneutical environment infects the officer's responses with caprice.
This is a case where it's natural to think that Michael has double consciousness-
he has a lot of knowledge about the defectiveness of the prevailing hermeneu-
tical resources, and is making every effort to navigate them in light of that
knowledge. But he can only do so much: it's not just Michael's reading that
matters; he's at the mercy of the officer's interpretation. The dominant cul-
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tural narratives prescribe respectfulness and forbid acting suspicious. But
narratives around blackness make it unclear if or how that's possible, as the
tensions in the description of Michael's choices bring out. The means to
Michael's end are obscured by hermeneutical injustice, because of his de-
pendence on the officer's response. For him, the shackling is double-layered:
hermeneutical injustice (on the officer's end) makes it the case that Michael
can't non-defectively take action to safely navigate the traffic stop; he can't
know what he's doing in the way NEED TO KNOw requires, because of the
caprice in the officer's response. But in Michael's case, the other horn of
the shackling dilemma isn't quite available, either: if Michael tries not to
take the defective action, the caprice in the officer's response means he will
probably be interpreted as taking some (bad) action anyway. This kind of
conversion of the inaction horn into a second-order defective-action horn will
be a hallmark of these audience-interpretation cases.
This case is similar to our earlier partial-grasp cases in that the issues arise
from problems with the availability and deployment of hermeneutical re-
sources. One key difference is the more pronounced role of the audience's
interpretation as compared to the agent in the Michael case. Another is
that while there are some concepts that play roles in Michael's case like the
role played by heart attack or Chineseness in those cases-respectfulness,
for example-the Michael case leans more on the additional components of
a hermeneutical environment. In the Michael case, it's complexities like the
interactions between (e.g.) the script for being respectful and the narratives
around blackness that generate the caprice that puts the outcome beyond
Michael's control.
Before moving on, I should reiterate that this is, once again, a case where a
mundane yet important situation cannot be navigated via the marginalized
person's agency. So even if Michael comes through unscathed, things have
not gone well for him. The lack of control he experiences is an oppressive
harm whether or not he suffers physical or other harm. It is also a case
where only my view allows us to see this: it's the knowledge requirement
that captures the control problem, just as in the partial grasp cases above.
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And of course, what Michael's case really is is a manifestation of a structural
injustice: young black men, as a group, face this problem; even if sometimes
things don't end in disaster, the pattern is one of undue limitations on
agency.
3.4.3 SHACKLING VIA CREDAL INJUSTICE
What about shackling that happens through credal injustice? Recall that
credal injustice, as I'm using the term, is about patterns of unjustly reduced
credibility. Combined with NEED TO KNOW, credal injustice means that
agents from marginalized groups will be assessed as failing to know (or know
fully) the facts about what they're doing, even when they know perfectly
well. And since NEED TO KNOW is not just an internal standard-it also
operates explicitly in our evaluations of actions-actions involving the facts
for which the agents are unjustly assessed as not (fully) knowledgeable are
therefore unjustly assessed as defective. 28 So in these cases, the shackling
dilemma is not a choice between acting defectively and not acting; it's a
choice between acting such that one will be assessed as doing so defectively
and not acting. All that was predicted in 3.3. So where do we see it
happening?
To get a feel for what these cases are like, we can again imagine a slightly
altered version of the Carmita Wood story, using some thoughts introduced
above. Imagine Wood being interviewed, during the process of determining
her eligibility for benefits, about her departure from the job where she was
sexually harassed. Now vary the case just a little and suppose that when
she is asked why she left the job, instead of saying she doesn't know, she
28. That we routinely criticize agents for failing to know facts relevant to their actions
is the basis of a huge swath of literature on contextualism and interest-relativity in
epistemology; see Hawthorne & Stanley (2008) for a representative example. The
restaurant case with which they begin has become standard: In that case, two people
have a time-sensitive restaurant reservation. When one of them takes them down a side
street on the way there, she is criticized for doing so without knowing the restaurant
is there.
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says, "my boss abused me." Her interviewer asks her to describe the abusive
behavior; when she does, the interviewer says "Come on-you don't know
that he was being abusive; it sounds like he was just flirting with you!" As in
the real case, she is seen as having left her job for no good reason, and while
it's easy to see that there's a dispute about applicable concepts here, it's also
true that the problem in the dispute is about an unjust lack of credibility:
Carmita is treated as not knowledgeable about her own experience. To put
it in the terms we saw in the schema above, our alternate Carmita is wrongly
assessed as not knowing what she's doing (leaving her job because she was
abused), because she's wrongly assessed as not knowing the reason for which
she acts (the fact that she was abused). 29
This is common for marginalized people; there are many current, actual
cases with the same structure. For example, in a number of jurisdictions,
women seeking abortions are prevented from getting one unless they undergo
an ultrasound (sometimes an invasive transvaginal ultrasound) and watch
the output of the procedure as a doctor describes their fetus. To the extent
that promoters of these laws are acting in good faith, this is a case of these
women being assessed as not knowing what abortion is, or what a fetus is,
or some similar fact necessary for them to know what they're doing, despite
abortion's being one of the most-discussed medical procedures in our society
and despite the very basic bodily function implicated. As a result they are
barred from acting until they are "informed."
The instinct to discount women's knowledge in this way is so ingrained that
many people accept the idea that these forced ultrasounds serve to inform
women, rather than manipulating them. But note that we do not have
similar requirements in any other similar cases. A father can consent to high-
risk surgery for his child without being told he must observe the gruesome
procedure beforehand or speak to a parent whose child did not survive the
procedure. A man can have a vasectomy without having to watch Three
29. Just as in the restaurant case mentioned in the previous note.
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Men and a Baby. Potential organ donors do not have their driver's licenses
withheld until they visit a trauma center to see for themselves the horrible
cost of the shortage of donors. Only abortion is treated this way, because the
real issue is that women are not treated as knowledgeable and authoritative
about their own reproductive lives. They are shackled: these laws assess
women seeking abortions as lacking necessary knowledge and thus as acting
defectively, and require that they therefore either forego the abortion or be
"informed" by the ultrasound.
In another case, women in media circulated among themselves a Google
spreadsheet containing the names of men in media who have engaged in
objectionable sexual behavior, intending to warn others. An outcry ensued
because "you don't know what happened." Once again, the claim is that
the women don't know the proposition that is serving as the reason for their
action, and so that the action is defective. (There is an implied additional
claim that women who, upon encountering the list, take actions like avoiding
the men named are also acting defectively, because they too, we are to think,
fail to know their reasons.)
Because of the role outside assessment plays in this form of shackling, in
many of these cases we see people forced to choose the inaction horn of
the shackling dilemma: they are prevented from acting due to wrongful
assessments of their epistemic position vis a vis propositions that figure in
their intentions. This happens even when in fact their intended actions are
non-defective; I take it women do know what an abortion is, what a fetus
is, etc, when they seek abortions.
Notice, too, that this kind of wrongful assessment can sometimes be self-
fulfilling: sometimes the manipulation of the forced ultrasound will convince
women that they were confused about what they were doing, even though
they were not; sometimes the insistence that women don't understand their
own sexual experiences makes them doubt their knowledge in that domain.
When that happens, we see the similarities between this type of shackling
and the Michael case, in which the interpretive flaws in his audience pre-
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vented his knowing what he was doing.
So while there are differences more and less subtle between the kinds of
cases we've considered thus far, the similarities suggest we should look for
interactions. Call those combined cases.
3.4.4 A COMPLICATION: COMBINED CASES
Combined cases are cases in which both hermeneutical and credal injustice
are interacting with NEED TO KNOW. One key domain where we see this is
(again) women's sexuality. The combined epistemic injustice that operates
here even has a name: rape culture. Rape culture is the set of narratives
that ratifies and enforces the reduced credibility ascribed to women in sex-
ual contexts. Patterns of reduced credibility for women (and others who
don't identify, or are not identified as, men)-credal injustice-are explic-
itly endorsed and justified by the hermeneutical framework, which is used to
support patterns of action assessment and response. So the credal injustice
is part of a larger unjust hermeneutical environment.
This interaction manifests in cases. For example, given the narratives that
say that women are ignorant and/or dishonest about their sexual experi-
ences, women seeking to report rape, or warn the community about sexual
harassers, can't know that they're doing so-because the speech acts of re-
porting and warning require uptake, and that uptake is withheld because
of the narratives. So even if these women have evidence, and they speak
up, and they take all the steps in all the ways that, in other circumstances,
are adequate to the task of reporting or warning, they can't satisfy the re-
quirements of NEED TO KNOW. (As is often noted, reporting a mugging
requires much less of the victim than reporting a rape.) So rape culture
serves to shackle women: they must either refrain from reporting, or do so
defectively.
So there are actions (here, speech acts) that marginalized people can't know
they're performing, because of the interaction of credal and hermeneutical
injustice. Unjust narratives in the hermeneutical framework generate and
support reductions in credibility. Those reductions in credibility create toxic
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doubt in the agent, causing her to lose her grip on relevant concepts (e.g.,
rape) and so lose knowledge of the very thing she set out to act on. The
negative assessment of her is self-fulfilling, hermeneutical injustice creates
credal injustice creates hermeneutical injustice, and the victim is shackled
twice over.
3.4.5 A FINAL COMPLICATION: DEFECTIVE CONCEPTS
Earlier I mentioned that problems with the application of hermeneutical
resources can have any of several causes. Sometimes agents are learning
a concept, and don't yet have complete competence with it. Sometimes
people aren't really still learning, but just have less than full grasp-the
way, say, someone who slept through most of high school physics and never
thought about it again might still have a grasp of gravity that's not all that
much better than Wile E. Coyote's. Sometimes concepts will be willfully
misapplied, perhaps in an effort to reshape a hermeneutical environment, as
in the propaganda cases that are of central concern in Stanley (2015).
I want here to flag a special kind of case: necessary misapplication. Neces-
sary misapplication will happen when concepts are inherently defective-so
that the problem isn't with the agent's grasp of a perfectly good concept;
rather, the problem is that the agent could never fully grasp the concept,
because taken in total it is contradictory. There is a long tradition of critical
thought that suggests that the ideologies of capitalism, and patriarchy, and
white supremacy all possess deep but hidden contradictions.3 0 I haven't
relied on this idea in what I've said so far-so if you don't like it, you don't
have to revise your opinion of the previous material-but I want to mention
what it means for the picture I'm painting if we do accept it.
Suppose that all, or nearly all, our concepts around gender, race, capital, etc.
are inherently defective. I find this very plausible: for one thing, it would
30. Classic loci for this thought include Marx (2004) and Beauvoir (1953); it's affirmed
on both sides of the debate about Stanley (2015): he and Srinivasan (2016) agree.
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explain the prevalence of double binds, because we'd see that our conceptual
frameworks contain contradictory narratives, incompatible scripts and man-
dates about what to do, and so on. (It's easy to see how the Michael case
could be read in this light, and it's not hard to think of additional cases,
either.) If we have whole swaths of concepts that are profoundly broken,
then whole swaths of everyone's actions will be defective according to NEED
TO KNOW. Is that a problem for my account?
I don't think so. In fact, I'm inclined to think both that it's right, and that
it's just more grist for my mill. Because we can see that even if everyone
is in the same boat with regard to these concepts, everyone does not pay
the same price for the problems they create. Shackling cases involving these
concepts may be all but universal, but assessments of agents' actions are not
on a par. Members of dominant groups are assessed as acting non-defectively
even as members of marginalized people are criticized and worse. And we've
seen above that injustices in assessments of action are themselves important
forms of shackling.
One final point about defective concepts. We might wonder if this is a
case where a Bratmanian gets the same result I do, or if I am still offering
something unique. The question is whether there can be a thought, enough
material for a belief, or a distinctively practical attitude, when an inherently
defective concept is involved. If not, then Bratman can say as much as I
about necessary misapplication cases. So for my account to be the only way
to capture this problem, it must be that we can still have thoughts, beliefs,
and 'practical attitudes' involving inherently defective concepts; the thing
that's out of reach has to be knowledge. And I think that's right.
To see why, start by recalling how Sarah's grasp of salsify progressed above.
In the beginning, she could make a few distinctions, know a few very local
facts. As her grasp grew, so did her epistemic and agential reach.
Now consider a slur. I'm going to make one up, to avoid using a real one.
Suppose 'flark' is a derogatory term for people born in Connecticut, and
suppose there's a history of oppression of these Connecticut-born people
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(as ill-grounded as actual oppressions are), so that this is a case like real
slurs. Someone learning the slur might first come to understand it via the
non-derogatory 'born in Connecticut' content. And it seems to me that at
that stage, this slur-learner can have thoughts when she is applying flark,
even though there is no proposition 'x is a flark' that is true, since that
proposition would require that there be something wrong with being born
in Connecticut. The slur-learner's use of flark does pick out something in the
world, just not what she supposes. (It picks out people born in Connecticut.)
The slur-learner will never fully grasp or fully competently use flark, because
that's not possible. She could never know 'x is a flark,' because 'x is a flark'
is always false. But she can have a false belief that 'x is a flark,' and she
can intend to meet a flark in a Bratmanian way, and so on.
I think the slur-learner and her mismarked flarks show us how one can have
thoughts and beliefs and practical attitudes involving inherently defective
concepts, even as it is impossible to have knowledge and act non-defectively
while using them. When a white female police officer tells Black schoolchil-
dren to be respectful if they are stopped by police, she's having a thought
there: she's invoking a respectability script that would work, in a limited
range of cases-ones where the person trying to be respectful is, say, a white
woman like her. It's just that that script only works locally; in a context
where it's interacting with blackness, the behaviors mandated by the re-
spectability script don't work anymore, as we saw in the Michael case.
All of which is to say that while there's much more to explore on this sub-
ject, I think we can see that inherently defective concepts fit well with the
view I'm advocating, even though I did not lean on them in my initial pre-
sentation.
3.5 CONCLUSION
This is a very big paper, so let's take stock.
I agree with Fricker that epistemic injustice is about unjust harms to know-
ers qua knowers-it's about barriers to the possession of knowledge, and
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barriers to recognition as a bearer of knowledge. But I began by introduc-
ing a conception of epistemic injustice that's different from Fricker's classic
presentation in some key details. First, I take epistemic injustice to be,
fundamentally, a structural phenomenon, rather than something that exists
only in particular individual transactions. Second, I think that both of the
two kinds of epistemic injustice Fricker identifies-what she calls testimonial
and hermeneutical injustice-are broader that she supposes. Testimonial in-
justice isn't just about testimony, on my view (so I propose a terminological
change to credal injustice); it's about reductions in marginalized people's
credibility more generally. Hermeneutical injustice, on my view, isn't just
about gaps in collective conceptual resources; it's about a range of injustices
in the community's production, reproduction, and use of its interpretive
tools.
With that understanding of epistemic injustice in hand, I sketched my view
of the nature of intentional action. I summarized my view in the principle
NEED TO KNOW, which says that actions are defective, qua actions, when
and to the extent that the agent fails to know have practical knowledge. On
my view, actions are only fully successful when an agent knows, in a special,
direct way, what she is doing, how, and why-because this knowledge is the
special kind of control that is the whole point of intentional action: this
control is intentional action's constitutive aim.
But if epistemic injustice creates barriers to possessing and/or being recog-
nized as possessing knowledge, and non-defective action requires knowledge,
then we should expect some bad interactions when marginalized agents are
acting, or trying to act, in circumstances of epistemic injustice. I laid out the
interactions we should expect in abstract terms, and then I walked through
some cases to flesh things out. What we saw was the phenomenon I call
shackling: the combination of NEED TO KNOW and epistemic injustice will
tend to put members of historically marginalized groups in a double bind-
they must either act defectively, given their epistemically unjust circum-
stances, or not act at all, in deference to those defects. The combination of
epistemic injustice and NEED TO KNOW limits their choice to wrongdoing or
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inaction. It eliminated the possibility of agential control.
We saw that this creates problems of both distributive and non-distributive
justice, and that the harms are both instrumental (since shackling makes it
harder for marginalized agents to get what they want and deserve) and in-
trinsic (since shackling harms marginalized agents qua agents when it limits
the reach of their agency and the ability to act in ways necessary for their
actions to be fully their own). Shackling thus manifests and constitutes op-
pression. And given that shackling commonly operates in domains relevant
to resisting oppression, shackling also reinforces and protects the prevailing
order.
My view of action is the only avenue to understanding all this, as we saw.
Popular alternative views about the nature of action, because they don't link
proper action to knowledge, can't explain some of the crucial phenomena,
such as the way that something has gone wrong, oppression is still present,
even when outcomes are not at their worst. Our Michael case has something
of the flavor of Philando Castile's story, but I have shown how Michael
need not suffer Castile's fate to be harmed. Oppression is not only present
in physical violence; the picture I've laid out here shows its subtler, more
insidious aspects.
One way to see the importance of this point about shackling-that it shows
how something is going wrong even when things in some sense go better
than we might expect-is to consider a related point often made by political
philosophers who worry about domination (like Pettit 1997) and feminists
as far back as Astell and Wollstonecraft. The thought is that living under
a dictator is a harm even if that dictator is benevolent; just being subject
to arbitrary rule is a bad state of affairs. My view brings out the way that
culture can be such a dictator. Even when it smiles upon Michael, so that
he is able to leave the traffic stop unscathed rather than dead, he is harmed
just in virtue of being subject to its caprice.
So one larger upshot of this paper is to support an old claim of feminist
thinkers: justice cannot be secured either just by changing individual at-
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titudes or just by changing the laws and institutions of the state. 3 1 Cul-
ture-understood as the web of practices and their associated hermeneuti-
cal resources-is a both a site and a source of injustice, and that has to be
reckoned with.
There is more work to do, even aside from that project. I suggested that
there may well be additional forms of epistemic injustice that we will find
via an effort to create a more exhaustive list of epistemic goods; these new
forms of epistemic injustice are likely to yield new forms of shackling. And
of course, there's more to say about the kinds identified here.
As I confessed above, I'm sympathetic to the idea that shackling affects every
one of us, due to the deep contradictions hidden in some of our central
conceptual structures-but either way it is clear that it affects the most
vulnerable among us most powerfully of all. I've tried, here, to shed light
on these chains. I hope that can be one step toward breaking them.
31. See Haslanger 2017 for a forceful articulation of this idea.
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4 KNOWING AND DOING,
WELL AND GOOD
Hannibal Lecter is good at stuff. He's good at manipulating people; he's
good at giving the cops the slip; he's good at carrying on a conversation with
his victims even as he slices open their skulls and nibbles on the still-busy
brains inside.
The guy really knows what he's doing. He's got everything under control.
Hannibal Lecter looks like a really, really successful agent.
I mean, obviously he's also super evil. But so what? Wouldn't anyone
be better off if they could just be as good at doing stuff as Hannibal
Lecter?
This paper takes that question seriously. It offers a view of the nature
of intentional action on which control is the peak of agential achievement.
Even more than that, it's a view on which the only authoritative standard
for action is this aim of control. And then it asks: if that's really what it
takes to act well, what's wrong with being a cannibalistic criminal master-
mind?
Here's the (non-diabolical, I swear) plan. In 4.1, I'll sketch my view of
the nature of intentional action. In 4.2, I'll show how that view of action
entails a new form of constitutivism about practical reason; then, in 4.3,
I'll suggest that if what I've said is right, we may be living in a world
where Hannibal Lecter is pretty much an ideal agent-because it's not clear
what could be defective about his evil ways. In 4.4-4.6, I'll sketch some
possible avenues of escape from Lecter's clutches; then I'll briefly address
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some lingering questions in 4.7 before concluding.
This paper is a bit unusual. You'll see that it's all based on my view of the
nature of intentional action, which I describe but don't argue for. 1 Instead,
I just ask you to suppose that I'm right about action, so that we can explore
what it would mean. Then I raise a big worry about what follows from
my view-the specter of Lecter-and I offer only a partial and tentative
response, via a possibility proof: I show that there are ways that we could
avoid the worry. In other words, in many ways this paper has extremely
modest aims: it's conditional, and it doesn't purport to firmly establish
many of the claims it raises. But I think you'll find it's worth your while
nonetheless. Because beneath that modesty lurks a rather wild ambition: to
do a bit of arcane magic, conjuring a moral ought from an action-theoretic
is. It's a big project-too big for a single essay. But as with all conjurings,
the first step is to catch a glimpse of the hidden realm. So that's what I'm
offering: an invitation to a new way of seeing. Hopefully, by the end you'll
be inclined to look at things through my eyes.
Just not, you know, in a Hannibal Lecter way.
4.1 I HOPE YOU KNOW WHAT YOU'RE DOING
Ask me why I'm putting my sneakers on, and I'll say I'm going to a march
against the disaster du jour. Ask me why I'm going to the march with pico de
gallo in my hair, and I'll say I had no idea I was doing that. Anscombe (1963,
9ff) says the ability to answer 'why?' questions like these-where the sense of
'why?' being deployed is "that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason
for acting"-is the mark of intentional action: so I am intentionally going
to the march, but I am not intentionally doing so with pico in my ponytail.
When you act intentionally, she said, you know what you're doing, and how,
and why. That's how you're able to answer the question. (She also says you
1. That's a big project and I take it up in my (ins a).
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know it in a special, direct way-'without observation' or inference-but
that specialness won't play a role in my arguments here.) 2
There's something appealing in Anscombe's idea, but there are obvious
counterexamples. For example, as Davidson (2001, 91-92) emphasized, I
can be doing something intentionally without believing I am doing it, be-
cause I have serious doubts about my ability to pull it off. If by participating
in this march I am actually somehow making a difference (despite my deep
suspicion that I am howling into the void), I will not be making a difference
by accident-it's clearly intentional. Yet my failure to believe I'm making
a difference means I certainly don't know I'm making a difference, so my
making a difference can't be intentional on Anscombe's view. Something's
gotta give.
I propose a novel way to avoid the counterexamples. I argue for it inde-
pendently, not on Anscombe's terms, but the end result is Anscombean in
spirit. Anscombe makes an agent's possession of practical knowledge-the
special agential knowledge of what one is doing, how, and why-a necessary
condition for intentional action. And that, I argue, is her fatal mistake. On
my view practical knowledge is instead a normative condition: an agent has
practical knowledge when things go well. In other words, intentional actions
aim at instantiating practical knowledge; intentional actions are defective
when (and to the extent that) the agent fails to know what she is doing,
how, and why in this special way. So if I am #-ing, but in doubt, so that
I don't know I'm #-ing, things are not going well from the point of view of
intentional action.
Moving from a necessary to a normative condition means I can still be #-
ing intentionally in a Davidsonian doubt case. When the condition is a
normative one, the question of whether the agent has practical knowledge
2. See Anscombe 1963, 13-15, 49-50 on the non-observational, non-inferential nature of
this knowledge; see my (ms a) for how I understand its specialness and distinctive
practicality.
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is a question of how we are to evaluate her action, instead of how we are to
sort it in a binary intentional/not-intentional scheme.3
I can't provide the argument for my view here; that's the project of my (ms
a). I'm not going to try to convince you; in this paper, I'm going to ask you
to assume I'm right. But I can give you a sense of how the argument works,
what kind of machinery I'm wheeling out, at least enough to convey the
flavor of the view. First, I note that we can distinguish intentional actions
from nearby phenomena-idle predictions, wishes that come true, failed
attempts and lucky successes, cases of deviant causation, the things that
befall us, etc.-by recognizing that intentional actions, unlike the others,
are supposed to involve control on the part of the agent. When you set out
to do something intentionally, the idea is that that thing will happen, and it
will happen because you intended it to. Its happening will be a product of
your intervention; you will have shaped the world to your will. By contrast,
when we predict or wish for some outcome, we expect or hope it will happen
without making any claim about our role; and when things happen to us,
instead of through us, the whole point is that it was not our will that made
it so.
Second, if we think about skillful actions, we see that this control is just
Anscombean practical knowledge: the agent's special knowledge of what
she is doing, how, and why. When Serena Williams plays tennis, she has
exceptionally deep practical knowledge about what she is up to: she knows
just how to hit the ball, she knows the precise moment to do so, and she
knows exactly why that's the way and that's the moment to hit it. And that
is to say that what happens on the court is under her control, in the sense
I'm saying is relevant to intentional action, to an enormous degree.
This knowledge need not be, and often will not be, articulable or conscious.
It is not necessary that Serena be able to narrate her skillful performance.
3. I'll say more about the relationship between aims like this and evaluation in 4.2 below.
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She can be in a state of flow. What matters is that her devastating aces and
her breathtaking winners and all the rest are not a matter of luck: it wasn't
the wind that placed the ball there, it's the result of a precisely calibrated
movement of her body which itself is the product of years of training-
training that means Serena sees the conditions with an expert eye, and
she responds expertly, and she knows why the response is the right one for
the conditions. All together, that seeing/responding/knowing constitutes
Serena's practical knowledge-which is to say, the control wielded by an
agent who is doing very, very well.
Serena intends to take this state of affairs and make it that state of affairs,
by doing thus and so. Her intention therefore involves belief: a belief that
she is taking this state of affairs and making it that state of affairs by doing
thus and so. When things go well, as they so often do for Serena, the
intention/belief is knowledge, because it is accurate and not as a matter
of luck. When things go well, what happens is what Serena's intention
describes, because Serena's intention describes it: the intention guides the
action and secures the outcome. That's what practical knowledge is-an
executed intention. And that's what I mean when I talk about control.
By contrast, when I play tennis-always badly-I am in a state of David-
sonian doubt. I have only the smallest degree of belief that my doing thus
and so will turn this dimly perceived state of affairs into the one I aim for.
(I recognize that it is more likely I will serve an ace by flailing my arm to-
ward the tossed ball than it would be if I had stayed in the locker room and
refused to enter the court, but not by much.) So my action is defective, qua
intentional action, even if I occasionally, miraculously, serve an ace-because
I don't know my thus and so will lead from this to that.4 It's lucky, a fluke,
when things go my way; it's not under my control in the way it is for Serena.
4. In the full argument for my view in my (ms a), I leave open the possibility of basic
actions: actions for which no means are necessary. But I won't discuss those compli-
cations here.
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What my view provides is a way to understand both what unifies my serve
and Serena's-the aim of control, or practical knowledge-and the ways her
serve is both different and better, qua intentional action, than mine.
As this discussion suggests, control comes by degrees, so practical knowledge
does, too. For intentional actions to be distinguished by an aim of control-
practical knowledge--is for them to be subject to a graded standard; they
are defective when and to the extent that the agent fails to achieve the
aim. I've already mentioned one way an agent can fail to have practical
knowledge: she might doubt that she is doing what she intends, because
she is unsure about her ability. But there are other ways. If we think of
intentions as having the form I will # by means m for reason(s) r, then in
order to know the whole complex an agent has to know a bunch of other
propositions: she has to know the facts that serve as her reasons; she has
to know that her means are such that, if she takes them, she will #; and so
on.
But the agent might have an attitude toward those subsidiary propositions
that falls short of full belief, and thus holds her short of full practical knowl-
edge in just the way Davidsonian doubt does. She might also know these
propositions in more or less detail-and the extra detail makes for more
control. (I know a clay court responds differently than grass. Serena knows
all about how differently it responds. And that knowledge allows her to
leverage those differences to control her shotmaking.) So the gradedness
of control can manifest in different degrees of confidence in propositions
involved in an intention (about one's circumstances, one's means, one's rea-
sons, one's ability, etc.), and/or in differences in the level of detail of the
agent's knowledge, and so on.
In short: intentional action is distinguished by an aim of control, and it turns
out that that control is just practical knowledge in Anscombe's sense--the
special knowledge agents can have of what they're doing, how, and why.
When I'm acting intentionally, things go well when and to the extent that
I have control, which is to say, practical knowledge. In the good case, my
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intention describes what happens, and not as a matter of luck: it describes
what happens because it shapes what happens. In a principle:
NEED TO KNOW: When you act intentionally, you aim at control, i.e.,
practical knowledge of what you're doing, how, and why; when and to
the extent that you fail to have such control/knowledge, your action
is defective, though it can still be intentional.
That's all I'm going to say about how I get to my view about the nature
of intentional action. And again, I don't take myself to have said enough
to convince you it's correct; my goal has been just to give you a sense of
how it works. Now, for the rest of this paper, I'm asking you to just assume
that I'm right. Because if I am, some interesting-and worrying-things
follow.
4.2 PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE CONSTITUTIVISM
NEED TO KNOW is the metaphysical hat from which I'll pluck a metaethical
rabbit.
By which I mean: the principle gives us the materials for a new kind of
constitutivism about practical reason; it enables us to derive an ethical
ought from an action-theoretic is. Set aside for now just what the ethical
content will be-it will be ethical in a wide sense in that it concerns what
one is to do, but it might or might not involve, say, a concern for the welfare
of others. We can't tell in advance what the ought of practical knowledge
constitutivism will require; for now I want to focus on how we generate an
ought at all, to show that this kind of derivation isn't prima facie fishy.
(Look: nothing up my sleeves!)
All constitutivists are in the hat-rabbit business, arguing that some defining
feature of agency generates the standards of practical reason. Following
Setiya (2013, 2-4), we can schematize the constitutivist's argument. The
first premise goes back to Aristotle: when a kind has a defining function,
to be a good instance of the kind is to perform that function well. A good
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thermometer measures temperature well. A good kidney filters blood well.
This is a modest claim, and it's hard to deny while maintaining a coherent
conception of a defining function.
Constitutivists say that agency, like thermometers and kidneys, has a defin-
ing function-so a good agent performs that function well. Different con-
stitutivists disagree about what that defining function is, but they agree
that there is one. Typically, constitutivists construe the function of agency
teleologically: agency aims at some end. Velleman (2000) says the aim is
self-understanding; Korsgaard (2009) says it is self-constitution. End talk
allows us to cash out what it is to carry out agency's function well: it is to
achieve the end in full.
Importantly, to play the needed role in a constitutivist argument, achieve-
ment of the end must be graded. If it is all or nothing, the aim will sort
things by whether or not they are instances of agency, whereas a graded
aim allows us to sort instances of agency along a spectrum of better and
worse.
So the first two premises of a constitutivist's argument are the claim that
agency has some defining function that's achievable by degrees, and the
claim that when something has a defining function, a good instance of the
kind is one that performs that function well, i.e., in full. One more premise is
required: the claim that to be a good instance of agency-one that achieves
its defining function in full-is to satisfy the requirements of practical rea-
son.
Is it true that if an instance of agency is good as such, then it satisfies the re-
quirements of practical reason? As Setiya (2013, 4; 2014, 71) notes, it's hard
to see how it could be false. The requirements of practical reason have to do
with the standard of excellence for actions, or agents, or instances of agency.
Certainly, one might wish to deny that the basis of the requirements of prac-
tical reason is to be found in the nature of agency and functional kinds. But
if the requirements of practical reason are not about the standard of excel-
lence for actions/agents/instances of agency, what on earth is their subject
148
matter? The thing is, once you concede that practical reason has this subject
matter, it's hard to see how you can deny the equivalence. A good instance
of agency-which is what the first two premises purport to describe-must
be one that satisfies the requirements of practical reason.
Let's lay out the schema:
P1. A good instance of a functional kind performs the kind's function well,
i.e., (if the function is graded) in full.
P2. Agency has a (graded) defining function, which is x.
-÷ C1. So to achieve x in full is to be a good instance of agency.5
P3. To meet the standards for being a good instance of agency is to satisfy
the requirements of practical reason.
- C2. So to achieve x in full is to satisfy the requirements of practical reason.
A key thrust of Setiya's (2013) is that this form of argument unites constitu-
tivists; it's logically valid; and at least premises 1 and 3 are hard to deny. If
you want to avoid the ultimate conclusion, you have to overturn the second
premise. So I won't argue further on the schema's behalf; I'll just point out
that if I'm right about intentional action, as I've asked you to suppose, I've
earned a seat in this apparently seaworthy boat.
How so? Well, what's needed to generate a constitutivist view is material
for premise 2: the claim that there is some x that is the defining function
of agency, plus a specification of that x that supplies an end achievable by
degrees. My view of the nature of intentional action gives us just what
we need-I don't talk about agency, but rather about intentional action,
as the thing with a defining function, but this adjustment doesn't change
5. If this is Velleman's version of the argument, x=self-understanding. If this is Kors-
gaard's version, x=self-constitution. So Vellemanians think good instances of agency
are ones in which the agent has full self-understanding; Korsgaardians think good in-
stances of agency are ones in which the agent fully constitutes herself.
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the shape or validity of the argument. I specify this defining function as the
provision of control, which is to say, the achievement of practical knowledge.
And I've already said that control, i.e., practical knowledge, is achievable
by degrees.
I've asked you to suppose that I'm right about intentional action; now you
see why. If I am, then my view generates a form of constitutivism about
practical reason: it supplies a version of premise 2, and as Setiya shows,
that's what's needed to compel the constitutivist conclusion. So my view
about the nature of intentional action entails a form of constitutivism. If
I'm right about intentional action, as we're supposing, then what practical
reason requires is that actions fully instantiate practical knowledge.
Should we welcome this conclusion? Well, like all constitutivist views, mine
gives us a way to get from an is to an ought, which is no small thing.
Furthermore, my view has some appealing differences compared to the best-
known alternatives.
Consider Velleman's (2000, 2009) view. He likes to invoke Anscombe, and
often talks about agency's aim in term of knowledge. So one might think his
view and mine are similar. But in fact, the defining function of agency on
Velleman's view is the achievement of self-understanding. He thinks things
go well for me, qua agent, if my action is (fully) intelligible to me in light
of my beliefs, my desires, and, crucially, my character. Does my action
comport, in a robust way, with my sense of who I am? If so, Velleman says,
it is a good intentional action, one that satisfies the requirements of practical
reason.
But as Bratman (1991) notes, if Velleman is right, then a nervous actor, who
expects her stage fright to make her flub her lines, does well if she flubs her
lines-because her doing so is highly intelligible to her. Likewise, Velleman's
view suggests that a habitual procrastinator can achieve complete agential
success by failing to finish writing her book, since her procrastination is in
keeping with her character. And it seems a racist, corrupt sexual predator
will satisfy the demands of practical reason if he just keeps on keeping on.
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On Velleman's view, practical reason never demands that I be anything but
what I think I already am, or do anything but what someone like me would
do. But that seems very strange.
I think that Velleman, though he's right that the function of agency has to
do with a kind of inquiry, is confused about the object of that inquiry. He
thinks that the inquiry is inward-looking: Velleman's central thought is that
whenever I act, no matter what else I'm after (a fresh mango, a tenure-track
job, health), what I'm really seeking is self-understanding. No matter what
my particular project is in a given instance of acting, the deeper, constant,
true project is about me. For Velleman, the aim that defines agency is
narcissistic.
My view is different. Even if you read Velleman's view in the way that
sounds the most like mine (taking Vellemanian self-understanding talk to
just be about self-knowledge), and read mine with practical knowledge's
status as a kind of self-knowledge in mind, our views point to different
objects of inquiry.6 For Velleman, the object of inquiry is the psychological
explanation of one's action. For me, it's the facts in light of which one is
acting.
Here's an analogy. Consider two people who decide to learn about their
ancestry. One, call him D, wants to find out what his genetic makeup is
like: is he predisposed to certain diseases? Does he have Neanderthal DNA?
The other, call her A, wants to learn about her ancestors: were they from
Canada or Cambodia? Were they bakers or biographers? There's a sense
in which we can say D and A have the same project: to learn about their
ancestry. But there's a difference.
The object of D's inquiry is himself; he's interested in the features of his
6. And as I said above, Velleman in fact thinks that something stronger than knowledge
is required-he's talking about a rich kind of self-understanding. This is very different
from practical knowledge in Anscombe's, and my, sense.
151
genome. Of course, in learning about himself, he will learn some things
about other people-such as that someone in his ancestral line had the
mutation on their X chromosome that causes red-green color blindness, or
that someone in his ancestral line was a Neanderthal. But the things he
learns about other people are not the things he's aiming to learn; they're
incidental.
What about A? Well, the object of her inquiry is other people; she wants
to know where her great-grandparents were born, and what kinds of lives
they led. Of course, in learning about them she will learn some things about
herself-such as that she's part Canadian, or that she's partaking in a family
tradition by becoming a baker. But the things she learns about herself are
not what she's aiming to learn; they're incidental.
The difference between D and A can seem subtle; it's a difference of focus.
But it matters: D's project means he's not interested in certain informa-
tion (say, about which of his ancestors was a Neanderthal, and when the
colorblindness gene entered the family tree). A's project means she's not
interested in the biological facts about her genome. These differences will
call for D and A to take different steps in their inquiries; they'll rationalize
different approaches. D and A have different reasons.
My view about intentional action differs from Velleman's picture of agency
in much the way that A's project differs from D's. D, like a Vellemanian
agent, is inquiring about himself, his biology. D's project is narcissistic. But
A, like my agent, is not inquiring into herself. It's true that the knowledge
she gains will involve her, but her questions are not inward-looking. The
aim of practical knowledge I articulate is, remember, an aim of control-it's
about reaching out into the world and intervening.
For my part, I also find it strange to suppose that the fundamental project of
agency is about the agent; it just seems more plausible to me that agency's
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objective has to do with what the world is like.7
There is of course a vast literature on the varieties of constitutivism (and its
discontents). I can't respond to all of it here. What I hope is clear is that my
view offers a novel answer to the question of what the defining function of
agency is versus the most famous alternatives-I say the aim is control, i.e.
practical knowledge, rather than Vellemanian self-understanding or Kors-
gaardian self-constitution. And I think the aim I propose is more plausible.
Agents may learn about themselves, or even constitute themselves, by their
actions. But I don't think that's the point. The point of acting is to shape
the world.
So I'm offering a new kind of constitutivism. Like any constitutivist view,
it has the advantage that it shows us how normativity can arise from non-
normative stuff. Furthermore, my view is more intuitively plausible than its
most famous cousins. So should we welcome the news that if I'm right about
intentional action, then what practical reason requires is just that actions
fully instantiate practical knowledge? Unfortunately, there's a reason to
think the answer is no.
4.3 WHO'S AFRAID OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE CONSTITUTIVISM?
Why might the truth of my brand of constitutivism be unwelcome? The
answer comes in two parts. The first is easy to see, though it will be hard
to see off. The second is harder to see, and I think can't be seen off at
all.
So, the first part: it's not at all obvious whether or how a requirement of
practical knowledge entails all the other requirements we think good actions
7. While I don't have space to discuss the point in detail here, it's worth noting that
this point applies equally to Korsgaard's view, on which actions are supposed to create
agents. One might have thought it was the other way around. I suspect a Korsgaardian
variant of narcissism may underlie the famous shmagency objection from Enoch (2006),
but I don't have space to explore the point here.
153
must satisfy. We're supposed to be deriving all the standards of practical
reason from the nature of intentional action-but how would the derivations
go for particular principles? How do we get, say, a requirement of means-end
coherence out of the requirement of practical knowledge?
I think this one is doable; just think about how the difference between
Serena's and my knowledge about our means in playing tennis figured in
the discussion above and you'll have a sense of how it might go. (Agents
only have full practical knowledge when their means secure their ends. If
the means you intend will not in fact lead to your end, then if your end
comes to pass it won't be because you intended it-it will be lucky, instead
of a product of your control. Serena's deep knowledge of her means-what
they are, how they work, how they relate to her circumstances-is why she
is such an exceptional agent, with such extreme control.)
But what I want to focus on is something that looks much harder to get out
of the materials provided by NEED TO KNOW. How could we get classically
moral requirements like concern for the needs and interests of others from
the requirement of practical knowledge?
Now, you might think that we just won't. What practical knowledge con-
stitutivism tells us is what it takes for actions to be good as such, but we
shouldn't expect to get all our normativity that way. An action that's good
as such may or may not be morally good, we might think. But this is where
the second part of my answer comes in.
Constitutivist views are powerful: they summon ought from is. But like all
powerful magic, they exact a price. Constitutivist views don't just offer to
provide normativity; they insist on it, and they won't tolerate your shopping
elsewhere. This is the force of the identification in premise 3 above. (Once
you've said that what it is to be a good thermometer is to measure temper-
ature well, you can say that thermometers ought to measure temperature
well. But you can't say thermometers ought be, say, amusing. Amusingness
or lack thereof just doesn't bear on what thermometers should be like, if
measuring temperature is the defining function of thermometers.) As Setiya
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(2014) puts it in arguing for this point at length, constitutivist views are
imperialist.8
Let's walk through this a little more slowly. Premise 3 identifies being good
qua exercise of agency with meeting the standards of practical reason, be-
cause the standards of practical reason just are the standards of agency.
Given the rest of the argument, if there is a graded constitutive aim of
agency, then that's where we can and must look for the basis of the require-
ments of practical reason. But this means that any form of constitutivism
threatens to limit the existence and/or generality of reasons.
This is because one way to fall short according to the standards of practical
reason is to fail to respond to a reason of which one is aware. But if some
form of constitutivism is true, and one can fail to respond to some fact of
which one is aware without failing to satisfy the constitutive aim of agency,
then that fact is not a reason.
This adds new weight to the worry raised above about whether and how we
might get a requirement of concern for the needs and interests of others out
of a requirement of practical knowledge. Suppose I see someone suffering
terribly, and I see that I can alleviate that suffering at no cost to myself. If I
can intentionally refuse to alleviate that suffering, being utterly unmoved by
it, and do so with full practical knowledge, then the fact that that suffering
exists and I can remedy it at no cost to myself is not a reason to remedy
it.
This is a consequence of the way my view of action, if it's right as we're
supposing, compels a constitutivist view, combined with the role premise 3
plays in the constitutivist argument schema. Again:
Premise 3 identifies being good qua action with satisfying the requirements
of practical reason. If you are satisfying the requirements of practical rea-
8. I follow his argument in what I say here.
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son, you are not failing to respond to a reason of which you are aware.
Therefore the reasons you have are all and only those such that, if you are
aware of them, you cannot fail to respond to them while fully achieving the
constitutive aim of action.
It can be hard to get a handle on exactly what the problem is here, so I
want to distinguish the worry I'm raising from one that might seem similar.
I'm saying that if practical knowledge constitutivism is true, then the only
reasons we have are those that come from the aim of practical knowledge.
But here's what this doesn't mean: it doesn't mean that if I have a choice
between accepting five dollars and shooting at a bullseye with a 75% chance
of hitting it, where hitting the bullseye comes with a prize of five hundred
billion dollars and an end to all human suffering, I have to take the five
bucks. The truth of practical knowledge constitutivism doesn't mean that
what you have most reason to do is what you'll have the most practical
knowledge in doing; it's not an assimilation of all possible reasons to the
single reason I'll know I'm doing this.9 That way of thinking is a category
mistake: the achievement of practical knowledge isn't itself a reason, it's a
source of and formal constraint on reasons.10
So if I'm right about action, we'd better hope that, somehow, you can't
really have control, you can't have full practical knowledge, without being
moved by the needs and interests of others. (Yes, I'm looking at you, Mr.
Lecter.)
The question, then, is obvious. How could a requirement of practical knowl-
edge generate a requirement of responsiveness to moral considerations? To
put a finer point on it: doesn't Hannibal Lecter know quite well what he's
doing? Doesn't he have quite a lot of control? It seems natural to think that
when he manipulates everyone around him to enable his escape and resume
9. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
10. For discussion of another kind of comparative question, see 4.7.3.
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his brain-eating ways, he knows exactly what he's doing. So the question is,
what resources does practical knowledge constitutivism have if we want to
criticize Hannibal Lecter, to say he's not actually the ideal agent? How can
we tell him he's going wrong in not responding to moral reasons?
Call the worry that practical knowledge constitutivism doesn't have robust
enough resources to allow us to criticize a monstrous cannibal serial killer
the thin gruel problem. In the rest of this paper, I'm going to suggest a
couple of ingredients we might add to our constitutivist stew to make it into
a more satisfying dish.
4.4 ONE WAY OUT: OOMPHY CONCEPTS
Our first possibility borrows an idea from Murdoch. She says if you are
fully competent with the concepts you use in describing your circumstances,
you'll be responsive to the needs and interests of others in the ways that are
morally appropriate. To know a fact is to be moved by it, in just the way
and to just the degree morality calls for."1 As she puts it (1970, 64), "true
vision occasions right conduct." So if you really know the facts, you'll do
the right thing-because really knowing requires full competence with the
relevant concepts, and full competence with the relevant concepts means be-
ing responsive to features like the needs and interests of others. Since really
knowing the facts is just what practical knowledge constitutivism requires,
then if Murdoch is right, we have a solution to thin gruel. Full competence
with the concept of need or the concept of interest, or the concepts that go
into describing needs and interests, will entail responsiveness to those fea-
tures of your circumstance. And so actions that achieve the aim of practical
knowledge will be actions that are morally right, in the sense that they man-
ifest appropriate concern for, or responsiveness to, the needs and interests
11. I owe this simplified statement of Murdoch's view to Setiya's (2013, 7) reconstruction;
what I say about her view will almost entirely agree with, and is deeply indebted to,
his reading.
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of others.
The trouble is that it's easy to think of people who, say, know that millions
of people are starving in Yemen but still think it's okay to spend half a billion
dollars on a possibly fake and certainly damaged painting by Leonardo da
Vinci. So why would we think Murdoch is right?
Murdoch anticipates this objection. She replies that such a person doesn't
really, fully, know. You may think they know, but that's because you're
confused about how concept possession works. Sure, this person is compe-
tent enough with the relevant concepts to pass ordinary public tests-the
unmoved art collector, we'll assume, could give a definition of 'starving' and
'painting' and carry on a conversation about the purchase and the famine
that isn't obviously incoherent. But Murdoch says that this isn't all there
is to concept possession; this kind of ordinary public competence is a lowest
common denominator, not an outer limit of possibility. That we can do
better than mere public competence is the point of her famous discussion of
the case of M & D.
As the story begins (Murdoch 1970, 16-17), M thinks of her daughter-in-
law, D, as "pert and familiar, insufficiently ceremonious, brusque, sometimes
positively rude, always tiresomely juvenile." But M engages in some reflec-
tion, attending more carefully to D, and comes to see her differently. "D is
discovered to be not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified by spon-
taneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful,
and so on."
The point is that, in reflecting, M improves her grasp of the concepts she
applies. She begins with ordinary public competence, but her attentive
effort enables progress beyond that. She comes to see that the concepts
in her initial characterization of D were the wrong ones, and to determine
which concepts are actually appropriate, by gaining a new grasp of what
both sets of concepts involve.
To be clear: Murdoch is stipulating, not arguing, that M is getting things
right after reflection that she wasn't before. The point of the example is
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that this story is possible; people can start out with ordinary competence
and then improve beyond that.
If Murdoch is right about M & D, then apparent counterexamples to the
claim that really knowing a fact means being moved by it as morality requires
need not be counterexamples at all. It can be true that a person who is
unmoved by a circumstance in which she can save a life at no cost to herself
is not seeing the situation clearly. Such a person, we can say, is not fully
competent with the relevant concepts, and so does not fully know what her
circumstances are.
So far, this is just a possibility proof.
How can it help with practical knowledge constitutivism? Recall that the
reason NEED TO KNOW can serve as the basis for a constitutivist argument
is that it provides a standard that can be met by degrees: an agent, in
acting intentionally, can have more or less control, which is to say more or
less practical knowledge.
As I said in the initial articulation of my view, we can have more or less
practical knowledge in virtue of differences in confidence, or in virtue of
knowing more or fewer of the propositions relevant to what we're doing,
how, and why. But as the discussion of Murdoch brings out, there's another
way our practical knowledge is graded: we can have more or less grasp of
the concepts that figure in those propositions. Because concept possession
comes by degrees, so can our knowledge of particular propositions. Young
children learn that gravity makes baseballs fall back to earth no matter how
hard you fling them into the heavens. They know this fact, in the sense that
they are competent in at least a minimal version of the public sense. But AP
Physics students in high school know the same fact better, and professional
physicists know it better still.'
12. See my (ms b) for more about how differences in conceptual grasp affect what one can
know and thus what one can do.
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The case of M & D shows that full possession of a concept is not merely
a matter of passing the tests of public performance, and the phenomenon
is eminently recognizable. New parents often say they only now really get
what love is. A soldier discovers what war is when she experiences combat
for the first time. It's not that the parents and the soldier had not achieved
public competence with the relevant concepts before the arrival of the child
or the trip to the front lines. It's that there's more to grasping love and war
than what mastery of public use requires.
So the fact that we might be inclined to think someone can know a propo-
sition without being moved by it is just a reflection of the shallowness of
the requirements of public competence. Once you see that we need not
equate an understanding that deploys ordinary public competence with one
that manifests the deeper kind of knowledge M achieves, it is not, after
all, outrageous or impossible to think true vision occasions right conduct.
(The parent and the soldier will attest that their new knowledge is loaded
with action-guiding oomph.) But it's of course a big step from 'it's not
impossible' to 'it's true.' How are we supposed to make that step?
Murdoch's view is that the progress M makes is an instance of a generally
possible deepening and enriching process, which could be perfected. What
would a move toward perfection be like?
Competence with a concept is twofold, so perfect competence is, too. For
full competence, one must not only be disposed to recognize or categorize the
Fs as Fs-applying a concept is not merely a matter of naming. Concept
application also, essentially, involves a disposition to respond to F-ness in
certain ways. I'm not competent with hunger unless I both recognize it as
hunger and have a disposition to get something to eat when I'm experiencing
it. The kinds of responses that follow from the identification of hunger
include both inferences (I'll conclude that I need some food) and motivations
(I'll be moved to get some food). In short, what's needed is compliance with
both what we might call input rules, which determine which things count
as Fs, and output rules, which determine the appropriate responses to F-
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ness.
On this way of thinking, perfect mastery of a concept, full possession, will
be like perfect skill in other domains: being disposed to do just what you
should do, just when you should do it, across all circumstances-calling all
and only the Fs 'Fs,' and doing everything called for when in the presence
of F-ness. If that's right, then we've made significant progress in dispatch-
ing thin gruel: potentially robust motivational, practical content can come
with the requirement of practical knowledge, because achieving full practi-
cal knowledge will require perfect concept possession, and perfect concept
possession requires certain responses.
So we've made one more step: we've shown that true vision occasions...
conduct. But to fully dispatch thin gruel, we need yet another step, to
make sure that the responses required will include concern for the needs
and interests of others.
Murdoch handles this by saying that we will respond to the needs and inter-
ests of others in the ways that are morally appropriate because those are the
reasons, and nothing could be a reason if it didn't mandate moral conduct.
But this is where I part ways with Murdoch.
I need to, for one thing: if I went Murdoch's way, my view would be circu-
lar. (I explain reasons in terms of the aim of agency, so I can't appeal to
the notion of reasons here; doing so would be explaining the aim of agency
in terms of reasons.) So I want to agree with Murdoch that concepts like
need or killing come with output rules, without taking on board her expla-
nation for why those rules prescribe concern for the needs and interests of
others.
That means I still need an explanation for why full competence with killing
will involve avoiding it, full competence with need will involve ameliorating
it, etc. Could one have a concept of pain that is non-aversive, or non-aversive
when it belongs to others and aversive only when it is one's own?
I can't say everything I'd like to about this here. (Which is one reason I
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promised only a possibility proof in this paper.) But we can make enough
progress to see that the possibility proof goes through.
Start here: A non-aversive concept of pain, or a concept of killing that is non-
aversive when the target is someone else, may or may not be possible. But
the concepts of pain and killing that are actually in use are ones where pain
is aversive, and killing is bad. So even if there were no further anchor (such
as the one Murdoch finds in her Platonic metaphysics), as long as we're
accountable to the actual public concepts, we'll be making an error if we
are aware our circumstances involve killing or pain and we are not moved
to avoid them. Our public concepts of pain and killing have these roles,
and we are accountable to the public concepts. Why? I take it that that
this publicity of one's concepts is the price of entry for communication and
coordination-so there is an important constraint placed on our concepts
by the social world.
So if we imagine some person who is not using the public concepts, well,
that person may fail to know things relevant to her action-say, that it is a
killing, if killing is not among her concepts. But then we will just evaluate
the action according to our thinking about agents acting in ignorance-there
is no special problem here.
If we press on, wondering, couldn't there be a genuine concept, killing*,
which has the same input rules as killing, but output rules such that killing*
is non-aversive? Then even if killing is also a genuine concept, it looks like
there would be no verdict provided by the knowledge that one's action was
a killing/killing*.
I think this is unlikely, partly for reasons I'll mention in 4.6. But also,
nothing I've said here entails that the normative weight of applicable con-
cepts can't be in tension; we might think that a case like this would be a
somewhat unusual version of that possibility.
To summarize: as long as one is fully competent with the actual concepts
of pain, killing, etc., one will be moved, as Murdoch says. If one was using
different concepts, one might fail to know important facts, but we can deal
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with a case like that in the usual way. And if we wonder whether there could
be genuine concepts that had the same input rules but wildly different output
rules, well, it's not obvious that that's possible, or exactly how bad it would
be if true. In any case, we've arrived at a point where the only way thin
gruel could retain any bite at all is if there are coherent, genuine concepts
like, say, a non-aversive pain*, such that an agent who is using such concepts
is not in conflict with her social environment, the physical/scientific facts,
etc.
Given all that, I take it we have one promising potential way out of our
worry about moral nihilism.
4.5 ANOTHER WAY OUT: KNOWING ALL THE WAY
Maybe your eyes glaze over at concept talk. Maybe you're really worried
about killing*. If so, I'm happy to report that there is another possible
avenue of escape from thin gruel.
Remember, practical knowledge constitutivism says an action is good to the
extent that the agent has practical knowledge, and defective to the extent
she does not. So if you could know more fully what you're doing (and how,
and why), then your action is defective. And of course, one way you can fail
to know fully what you're doing is to fail to know, fully, some fact about your
circumstances, your means, your reasons, or the outcome, as those things
figure in your intention.
What would it mean to know such a fact, but less than fully? I'll make one
way of understanding the thought more concrete in 4.6 below, but for now
I want to give you a sense of what I have in mind in another way. Recall
Jackson's (1982) discussion of Mary the scientist. She knows all the facts
about color, but has never had the experience of seeing red. Jackson's claim
is that she learns something when she sees red for the first time: finding out
what it's like to see red enhances her knowledge.
We can understand her learning as either the acquisition of some new fact,
or as a deepening of her knowledge of a fact she already knew; I'll say
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more about what follows depending on which we choose. What interests me
now is that, either way, we see that knowing what it's like is very often an
important way of knowing more fully.
Now set Mary's case aside for a minute, and just think about the difficulty
you have in deliberating when you contemplate taking action that will in-
volve your having a really new experience. You can think here of the kind of
profound life changes discussed in the transformative experience literature,
but I'm going to use a more mundane case.
You're considering taking up hot yoga. The classes are expensive, but you've
got some physical issues that make other kinds of exercise unsuitable, and
you've been told hot yoga is your best option. There's a discount on the
classes if you pay for ten up front; at that price, you could swing it. But
you normally dislike heat, and you usually prefer fast-paced activities like
basketball. So you're not sure what it will be like for you to take the classes,
and if it's bad in ways that make you decide to quit, it will be a big waste
of money that you can't afford.
What you're wondering is if the experience of hot yoga will be bad in the
ways you fear, and, if so, if it will be bad enough to make buying the ten
classes a waste of money. You'd know more about what you were doing in
buying the classes, and in a way that is significant for whether your action
is defective by the lights of NEED TO KNOW, if you knew what it would be
like to take the classes.
The point is that often one of the challenges we face in deliberation is that
we don't know ahead of time something that's important for our intentions:
what it will be like to take the action in question. We can't reason as well,
in forming an intention, if we don't know not only that (for example) it will
be over a hundred degrees in the yoga studio, but also what it will be like to
do yoga in a studio where it's that hot.
Intentions formed in deliberative circumstances like these will be defective,
ineligible for full practical knowledge, because they'll either take a stand on
questions the agent doesn't have evidence for, or they'll remain agnostic,
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and thus fail to provide guidance, about significant points.
But notice: we can say the same thing about our knowledge of what-it's-
likeness regarding features of our action when the person who'll have the
experience is someone else. Very often, another person's phenomenology
will figure in our intentions. If I have to break some bad news to my friend,
I'll wonder if it will be less painful for her if I tell her quickly or build up,
if I do it over drinks in a bar or at home over tea, etc. (And if she were my
frenemy, so that what I wanted was the option that would hurt the most,
I'd still be better able to deliberate if I knew what each option would be like
for her.)
So if your intention involves facts about what your action will be like for
someone, you can't have full practical knowledge unless you know, fully,
what it will like for that person-whether it's you or someone else. 13
Now remember Mary. Even if we include facts about what it's like to see red
in the list of things Mary supposedly knew before she saw red, we'll want to
say that she learned something when she had the experience herself. Having
an experience is the obvious, and paradigmatic, way of having knowledge of
what that experience is like. Similarly, if I've had an experience before, I'll
be more confident of my ability to reason about what it's like.
But notice two things about that. First, having the experience in the past
normally helps me to properly deliberate and plan about it now. Second, the
reason it's so useful to have had the experience is that when you're having the
experience, in the moment, its normative contours are inescapable. When
you're in pain, the aversiveness of pain is obvious. And having experienced
a particular kind of pain enables responsiveness to these built-in normative
properties in all their specificity, including the particular ways the make-it-
13. This should actually be a claim not just about people, but about any entity for which
there can be something it is like. (I certainly spend an inordinate amount of time
configuring my plans based on what things are like for my cat.) But I'll talk about
people here for simplicity.
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stopness is mitigated by distractions, or balanced by the phenomenology of
benefits the experience also promises, and so on.
This is not to say that we must have had an experience, or be having it
at this very moment, in order to know, fully, what it's like. Memory is
not necessarily inadequate, and we may be able to imagine our way into
knowledge of what some new experience will be like, especially if we've had
similar experiences before. But what is required is that the proposition
that some experience will be like this has the same motivational contours
whether you're having the experience, remembering it, or imagining it. If
the motivational upshots that are inescapable from inside the experience
drop out, you've lost your grip on an essential feature of the phenomenology,
so you don't fully know what it's like.
Let's take stock. Very often facts about what our actions will be like-either
for ourselves or for others-figure in our intentions. And I've argued that
fully knowing what something is like requires having a motivational profile
that matches the one that is automatic when one is in the throes of the
experience. So if pain is part of the what it's like content, your motivational
profile must reflect that, including the built-in aversive qualities, and in the
kind of detail that captures the specifics of the pain in question. And this
will be true whether the person who will be having the experience is you or
someone else: if facts about what it will be like for someone else figure in your
intention, then your intention will be defective, because it won't be eligible
for full practical knowledge when executed, if your action isn't shaped by
the motivational oomph that is manifest from inside that experience. So
if I intend to do something that will cause you pain, and either that pain
or what it will be like for you in general figures in my intention, then my
intention, and action, will be defective if they are not shaped by what it's
like for you just as they would be if I plugged myself into an experience
machine and felt the pain as you will.
In a nutshell: if what my action will be like for someone-anyone-figures
in my intention, then my action will be defective if it is not shaped in ac-
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cordance with the motivational oomph that is inescapable from inside that
phenomenology. You don't fully know what you're doing in such a case if you
aren't appropriately motivated. And if that phenomenology involves (e.g.)
pain, it doesn't matter if it's your pain or my pain, the motivational pro-
file is-must be-aversive, because what fixes the appropriate motivational
profile is what it's like from the inside.
How does this help with thin gruel? It shows that at least in the cases where
what my action will be like for someone figures in my intention, my action
can only be non-defective if it conforms to the motivational profile mandated
by the phenomenology. But that means that it can only be non-defective
if it comports with the kinds of concerns that utilitarians (at least) take to
be of interest for morality. Pleasures call us to seek them (ceteris paribus),
and pains call us to avoid them (ceteris paribus), no matter whose they are.
My actions are defective, because I don't fully know what I'm doing, if they
don't reflect that, at least as long as facts about what it's like for people
figure in my intention.
Of course, we might want more.
Most urgently, the limitation on which intentions are subject to the phe-
nomenological constraint looks like a problem for the generality of this ap-
proach as a solution to thin gruel. If all I have to do to avoid the requirement
of concern for the needs and interests of others is to avoid having facts about
what my actions will be like for them figure in my intention, then it looks
like, say, a malignant narcissist, who just never thinks about other people
in that way, isn't subject to the moral demands we were hoping to secure.
And couldn't anyone just gerrymander her intention to avoid including the
facts that come with motivational requirements of concern for others?
One thing to say is that it's actually very hard to take interesting, substan-
tial actions without somehow invoking other people and something about
how you'll affect them. You operate within social structures; you have ex-
pectations about what will provoke a response and what will not, where
sometimes you need the response and sometimes you need there to be none;
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you engage in communication, which crucially depends on the participation
of your interlocutors. So even if you don't explicitly think, e.g., 'Lisa will
help me and Yafeng won't interfere, because what I do will be like this for
Lisa and like that for Yafeng' your calculation of risks and expected values
and your expectations about what means are available and how they work
and a host of other considerations will bring in other people. And what I
want to say is that that is plausibly enough to open the door.
Next, the cases where it seems most plausible that I could leave out facts
about what my action will be like for others are ones where the action in
question is something like blinking 3 seconds from now. But that kind of
case also seems like precisely the kind in which we might be inclined to say
that there aren't morally relevant effects on other people.
Finally, remember that when I first mentioned Mary's case, I said we can
understand it in either of two ways: either she comes to know a new fact
(or facts) when she learns what it's like (from the inside) to see red, or she
comes to know the same fact(s) better. If we choose the second option, we
might have a way of extending the reach of the phenomenological argument
about action. Here's the idea. If we think that Mary, when she sees red for
the first time, doesn't just come to know better what red is like, but also
comes to know better what red is, we might be able to make a similar move
here. Maybe knowing what it's like is important for full knowledge of lots of
things-we might use this move to recover the requirement of concern if an
intention includes facts about killing, for example. We might even extend
the thought to say that knowing what it's like is required for full knowledge
of any state of affairs. 14 While I can't prove this here, it doesn't strike me
as outlandish.
Secondarily, as I said, this picture most obviously captures the kinds of
needs and interests that utilitarians emphasize: pleasures and pains and
14. If this sounds like a way of expressing the Murdochian ideas of 4.4 in a material
rather than a formal mode, I'm okay with that: see 4.6 below for more.
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their cousins. What about other things that we might think are relevant if
we want to capture all that counts as concern for the needs and interests
of others? What about, say, rights? Of course, some people will think we
don't need to capture those. Furthermore, as I said at the beginning, I am
not here attempting to show that we can capture everything we might have
in mind when we talk about moral requirements. It may take significant
further argument to get a requirement of concern for rights from the phe-
nomenological approach, if it can be done at all. But for now, we'll have
made very substantial progress in solving the thin gruel problem if the phe-
nomenological argument has secured a utilitarian moral framework. If that
turns out to be all we can get, we'll have to decide if that fact counts in
favor of a basically hedonistic view, or if it's a point against the truth of
practical knowledge constitutivism, or if it means that practical knowledge
constitutivism is a good news/bad news scenario. No matter what, though,
thin gruel is substantially defanged if we secure a requirement of concern
for pleasures and pains, wherever they're found.
What's more, I think that we need not suppose that the phenomenological
approach only yields concern for pleasures and pains. Phenomenology has
more diverse motivational upshots that that. Edges in our visual field compel
our attention. The literature on affordances reminds us that a door handle
says grab me. A full exploration of the normative content of phenomenology
is the project of another paper, but it's clear there is much more to talk
about than just pleasure and pain, and that this may well be a source of
richer demands.15
The phenomenological approach says that fully knowing what you're doing
requires having a motivational profile that matches the one you'd have if you
were experiencing the effects of your action, all of them, from the inside, and
that that profile will be one that is sensitive to the needs and interests of
others in at least the sense that utilitarians care about. You might think
15. I thank Mark Schroeder for this point.
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of this as a kind of extreme Humean sympathy. As with the Murdochian
approach above, questions remain about exactly what the limits of this
solution are. But given all I've said, I take it we now have a second potential
escape from the thin gruel problem.
4.6 BETTER TOGETHER
I've offered two possible ways to avoid the conclusion that a world in which
practical knowledge constitutivism is true is a world in which moral nihilism
is, too: the Murdochian approach and the phenomenological approach. Ei-
ther one, I've argued, could give us what we need.
I've also noted that with each, we might wonder about certain limits. With
the Murdochian approach, it wasn't clear if one could have a genuine con-
cept, killing*, such that instances of killing* were non-aversive. With the
phenomenological approach, it wasn't obvious how many intentions would
be subject to the requirement, because we might wonder if only intentions
that explicitly include facts about what one's action will be like for others
fall under its scope, and it also wasn't clear if that approach would ever be
able to capture something like rights.
What I want to note here is, first, that the Murdochian approach and the
phenomenological approach can both be right; and, second, that if they are,
each can help address the possible limits of the other.
If both are right, phenomenology could provide the kind of anchor we want to
constrain what concepts can be genuine on the Murdochian picture. There
couldn't be, for instance, a genuine non-aversive concept of pain, because
aversive phenomenology is essential to pain; if you omit the aversive phe-
nomenology, you might say, you're talking about something other than pain,
changing the subject. The general thought would be that there are some
central, morally relevant concepts that are locked in by the phenomenology.
This would provide a constraint to replace the one lost when I abandoned
Murdoch's explanation for the moral content of output rules.
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If both are right, the Murdochian picture could give structure to the phe-
nomenological view, and fill in some of the areas that are hard to secure via
phenomenology alone. This seems likely to help us extend beyond pleasures
and pains, and perhaps beyond facts that are explicitly about what things
are like. It might even enable us to capture things like rights.
Finally, I think that the combined picture puts meat on the bones of one
of the most compelling things Murdoch says (1959/1997, 215): "Love is the
extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real."
Combining phenomenology with the claim about concept possession suggests
that what it means to consistently apply a concept like pain is for the pains
of others to be as real to you as your own. In full generality, this requirement
is nothing less than a requirement that the lives of others, their weal and
woe, matter to you as if they were your own. And that, we might think, is
love.
Because I find both the Murdochian approach and the phenomenological
approach plausible, and because the combination is appealing in these ad-
ditional ways, my own instinct is to say that the best solution to thin gruel
will be one that involves the combined view. Those who found one more
appealing than the other need not take on the combination, but for my part
it looks to be both the most promising and the most intuitive option.
4.7 LOTS OF LINGERING QUESTIONS
I've been arguing that even if practical knowledge consitutitivism is true, so
that all there is to say about acting well derives from the aim of practical
knowledge, it is at least possible that we can salvage a requirement of concern
for the needs and interests of others. I've sketched a few ways we might do
so. But even though I've claimed only to be demonstrating this possibility,
not showing that it holds, you probably still have a lot of questions. I'm
going to try to gesture at some answers in the space I have left.
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4.7.1 DOWN WITH IMPERIALISM
Maybe you got off the boat back in 4.2. Maybe you thought, okay, NEED
TO KNOW tells us what it is for actions to be good for their kind, but I don't
buy this claim that that's the only standard. Why can't I just say that even
though Hannibal Lecter is doing really well qua agent, he's doing badly by
a separate, moral standard?
There are two things you might have in mind with that question. On one,
you're conceding that whether Lecter is practically rational or irrational is
fixed by whether he meets the standard of NEED TO KNOW-you accept the
identification in premise 3 of the constitutivist argument-you're just saying
that even if he can rationally (by the standard of NEED TO KNOW) fail to
be concerned with the needs and interests of others, nonetheless there are
reasons for him not to be that way.
But this version of the objection is incoherent. Accepting premise 3-the
identification of being a good instance of agency with satisfying the demands
of practical reason-is accepting that reasons come from the standard of
action. That was the point of the discussion of imperialism and amusing
thermometers in 4.3.
On the other hand, maybe what you mean is that whether or not Lecter
is rational is beside the point; the question is whether he's vicious.16 This
version of the question isn't addressed by the discussion of the imperialism
of constitutivist views above. But I think there are things to say.
First, notice how clearly authoritative the kind-goodness standard, identified
with practical rationality, is. We understand why a kind ought to fulfill
its constitutive aim, why that ought has bite. And if we're conceding the
existence of a standard like that, and positing a separate moral standard,
there's a real puzzle about how morality could be authoritative too. Because,
16. This version of the objection is in the spirit of Williams (1979).
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of course, we can come up with lots of other standards: etiquette, the rules of
games, arbitrary conventions, asthetics. If morality is just one among many
of those, what makes it special? We want morality not only to condemn, but
authoritatively, perhaps even overridingly. But how could that be?
One way to see the problem is to realize that if we're conceding that Lecter
is practically rational, we can't really say he has reasons not to be a brutal
killer. But even if we want to try to wriggle out of that problem, I think
there's another one. Even if there's some (free-floating) sense in which Lecter
shouldn't go around eating people's brains, that's not all we want. If moral-
ity is going to matter in the ways it's supposed to, we also don't want to
say that there's some important sense in which he should.
In short, even the coherent version of this worry doesn't point to a way that
something that really has the features we expect to find in morality could
be free-floating.
4.7.2 EXTRA! EXTRA!
Maybe you're noticing that there is an awful lot of machinery here. Couldn't
we streamline things a bit? I mean, why do we need practical knowledge
constitutivism if we have the Murdochian and/or phenomenological stuff?
Why not go with a simpler view, maybe a neo-Humean kind of thing on
which what I have reason to do is what I would be motivated to do if I were
fully informed?
There are a couple of things to say here. The first is to recall that my
argument is that if I'm right about what intentional action is like, we're stuck
with practical knowledge constitutivism. So then the question is where that
leaves us-which is where the Murdochian and phenomenological material
comes in.
And sure, it's true that the moves I make toward converting the aim of
practical knowledge into a requirement of concern for the needs and interests
of others end up leaning on what it takes to really know things, and so run
into territory that's also friendly to the neo-Humean option. But remember:
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one key benefit of the constitutivist approach is that gives us an answer to
the question of why it matters what we'd be motivated to do if we were fully
informed; as I've been saying, it solves the problem of the authority of the
moral requirements. By contrast, the bare neo-Humean view is vulnerable
to a shmagency-style objection: if being fully informed means I have to
be good, ignorance is bliss! (At least enough ignorance to let me off the
hook.) So it's not clear to me that the sparser neo-Humean view is more
appealing.
4.7.3 NAIVE SAINTS
Here's another puzzle. My view says the more control an agent has, the more
fully she knows what she's doing, how, and why, the better her action is. If
that's so, we might wonder if savvy evildoers will do better by the standard of
my view than naive saints. We've worried about whether we could criticize
Hannibal Lecter for eating people's brains; the worry I'm raising now is
about the comparative question: is Hannibal Lecter doing better by the
lights of practical knowledge constitutivism than people we want to say are
morally better even if less mastermindy? Even if one concedes that Lecter
doesn't have full practical knowledge, and so is criticizable, will his degree
of deficiency qua agent line up with his degree of moral deficiency?1 7
There are many versions of this worry. We can compare a sadistic torturer to
a clueless nice guy, where the torturer is (to use our Murdochian framework)
really good at the input rules, and completely wrong about the output rules,
and the nice guy is really bad at recognizing the input conditions, but very
good at getting the output right on those occasions when he manages the
input.
Or we can pit the torturer against an inarticulate saint, who has inchoate
grasp of input but somehow manages to do well at output. What about an
inept Samaritan, who recognizes need and aims to meet it, but is incompe-
17. I'm grateful to Tristram McPherson for pressing me on this point.
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tent? Is she doing better than a bandit who sees the same situation and
recognizes not the need but the opportunity to steal a wallet and get away
with it, and does so?
Rather than taking the cases piecemeal, how could we answer this challenge
all at once? In each case, what we want is for getting the output right to
take priority in our evaluation of someone's degree of knowledge.
I think that's right. One relevant thought is that it seems like the point
of input conditions is to direct us to output conditions-the point of cat-
egorization is to shape our responses. Consider a case of non-moralized,
theoretical knowledge.
Tom and Tara are at the Large Hadron Collider. Tom is a layman who
thought he was visiting a demolition derby; Tara is a graduate student in
particle physics. They both come to believe the proposition that was a Higgs
boson. Tom believes it because the Director General, Dr. Fabiola Giannotti,
tells him "that was a Higgs boson." Tara, out of earshot, believes it because
of the readouts she sees on the instruments. Given the testimony on which
Tom's belief is based, he knows that was a Higgs boson. But has no idea
what follows from that. Tara, on the other hand, doubts her belief; it would
be a big deal to have witnessed a Higgs boson. But she knows exactly what
it would mean for it to have been a Higgs boson.
I think Tara is doing better than Tom in this scenario. Her knowledge
about what the world is like has increased, even if her doubt means there
is still room for improvement; the way her new attitude is integrated with
the rest of her knowledge matters. Tom, on the other hand, might as well
have been told "That was a blorp." The only facts he gains access to are
trivial-things like Dr. Giannotti said 'that is a Higgs boson.' He can't
tell if she was alerting him to the presence of a rare rodent or an expensive
piece of equipment or a person of a particular rank in the organization.
It's not clear to me that 'knowledge' of a fact involving a concept about
whose output conditions one is totally ignorant can really be knowledge at
all.
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This case is a recipe. Even though a full demonstration that output compe-
tence is prior to input competence is work for another day, I take it there's
reason to think that output should be prior to input when it comes to as-
sessing knowledge, including the knowledge relevant to action.
4.8 CONCLUSION
I've shown that my view of the nature of intentional action entails a new kind
of constitutivism about practical reason. I've also noted that we might not
welcome this news, because if actions are better or worse just depending on
how much practical knowledge the agent has, then either there are no moral
requirements, or the moral requirements are derived from the requirement
of practical knowledge-something that is not obviously possible. So the
goal of this paper has been to show that the derivation is possible: there is
a way to get from a requirement of practical knowledge to a requirement of
concern for the needs and interests of others. In fact, I've argued, there are at
least two potential paths to that result, and they can be taken separately or
together. And there may well be other possibilities; one benefit of offering
a possibility proof is that I'm not ruling out other good answers to the
question of how the derivation might go.
Agential perfection, I have argued, binds success in knowing and success in
doing both to each other and to a demand that we be alive to the needs of
others-Hannibal Lecter be damned. But what does that ideal of perfection
have to do with mere mortals like us? Murdoch calls our attention to the
nature of our concepts because their possible perfection is connected to our
imperfect state by a chain of potential progress. If, like M, we make the
effort to attend to our world and our worldmates, we can change our way
of seeing. And because what we see shapes what we do, to change our way
of seeing is to change our world. It is not easy: it is an achievement to act
well, and true vision may be rare. But valuable things often are. Our task
is to seek them.
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